presuppose as a "framework" a set of legal and moral values which, in modern times, especially, are little more stable than "pure economic" forces, and which, in any case, are of same nature as economic forces,—fluid, psychic forces—"Pure economic" forces, working in vacuo, would lead to anarchy; any concrete economic tendency depends on legal and moral forces quite as much as on "pure economic" forces—Illustrations 132
CHAPTER XIV
ECONOMIC SOCIAL VALUE (continued)
Abstract elements of the Austrian and English schools, individual "utilities" and "costs," have their place in the concrete whole of social intermental life—Social causes largely determine them—But this not enough for a theory of social value—Intensity of a man's feelings or desires has no relation whatever to value in market till we know social rankings of men—Conflicts of values concerned with these social rankings—Prices express results of court decisions as well as results of changing individual desires for economic goods—We break the circle by turning to the concrete whole of social-mental life—Economics has failed to profit by example of other social sciences here—No social science can explain its phenomena by reference to one or two abstract factors 148
CHAPTER XV
SOME MECHANICAL ANALOGIES
Mechanical analogies of limited use in revealing full complexity of social control, but of use for certain purposes—Our argument can be put, in part, in terms of mechanical analogies—Transformations of social forces—Illustrations—Marginal equilibria among social forces—Illustrations—Social forces of control take different forms under different conditions—Mechanical analogies useful enough for economic price-analysis—Our thesis involves no radical revision of economic methodology—It is rather concerned with interpretation and validation of economic methodology 156
CHAPTER XVI
PROFESSOR SELIGMAN'S PSYCHOLOGICAL DOCTRINE OF THE RELATIVITY OF VALUES
Professor Seligman's contributions to value theory—Points of difference between his views and those here maintained—His psychological doctrine of relativity—Different from doctrine of English School, which is a matter of logical definition—Values relative because there is fixed sum of values, and increase in one value can come only through decrease in other values—Criticism: psychological difficulties; diminution of all values in times of panics and epidemics; decrease of economic values through increase of religious and other values—Element of truth in Professor Seligman's doctrine—Relation between Professor Seligman's view and that of Professor Clark 162
CHAPTER XVII
THE THEORY OF VALUE AND THE THEORY OF PRICES
Price and Preis—Price broadened to include all relations between values, whether money be involved or not—History of price-concept in English economics—Distinction between prices and values—Generalization of notion of price—Measurement of beliefs, etc., in terms of money—"Qualitative analysis" and "quantitative analysis"—Great bulk of economic theory, and virtually all that is valid and valuable in economic theory, has so far been in theory of prices, and not in theory of value—Methods of price analysis—Abstract units of value—Price theory and practical problems 175
CHAPTER XVIII
THE THEORY OF VALUE AND THE THEORY OF PRICES (concluded)
Great work of Austrians really done in field of price theory—They have, without logical right, but with excellent results, assumed and used a quantitative, objective value concept—Distribution in relation to theory of value and theory of prices—Mill's treatment primarily from standpoint of fundamental value theory; later theories, as a rule, chiefly concerned with more superficial, but also more exact, price analysis of distributive problems—Theory of value not a substitute for detailed price analysis, but, rather, a presupposition of it—Prices have meanings, which only theory of value can explain 188
CHAPTER XIX
THE THEORY OF VALUE AND THE SOCIAL OUTLOOK—SUMMARY
Belief that social optimism and social pessimism are connected with theory of value—Views of Fetter, Schumpeter, Wieser, and Davenport—No such implications, either optimistic or pessimistic, in theory here maintained—Theory of value does not contain justification of existing social order—Summary of main argument of book 194
INDEX OF NAMES 201
PART I
INTRODUCTION
SOCIAL VALUE
CHAPTER I
PROBLEM AND PLAN OF PROCEDURE
Recent economic literature has had much to say about "social value." The conception, while not entirely new,[1] has become important only of late years, chiefly through the influence of Professor J. B. Clark, who first set it forth in his article in The New Englander in 1881 (since reproduced as the chapter on the theory of value in his Philosophy of Wealth). The conception has been found attractive by many other American writers, however, and has become familiar in many text-books, and in periodical literature. Among those who have used the conception may be named: Professors Seligman, Bullock, Kinley, Merriam, Ross, and C. A. Tuttle.[2] Gabriel Tarde, the brilliant French sociologist, has independently developed a social value doctrine, different in many respects from that of the Americans named, which we shall later have occasion to consider.[3]
In its most definite form, the theory asserts that the value of an economic good is determined by, and precisely accords with, the marginal utility of the good to society, considered as a unitary organism. Professor Clark, as is well known, makes use of the analysis of diminishing utility in an individual's consumption of goods in much the same fashion that Jevons does, but while Jevons makes this simply a step in the analysis of market ratios of exchanges, Professor Clark treats it as analogical, representing in parvo what society does, as an organic whole, on a bigger scale.[4]