law that they differ. In Scotland the common law is radically different. There will, therefore, be some difficulty in finding a common denominator for the Imperial Parliament—and in avoiding, even under “Home Rule All Round” a certain divergence in the legislative capacities of the members from Scotland and Ireland, with the attendant risk of an “in-and-out” procedure.
[pg 050]
II.—Irish Administration Under Home Rule. By Lord MacDonnell of Swinford
[The following article was, at my request, written by Lord MacDonnell before he became acquainted with the provisions of the Home Rule Bill. We agree in thinking it desirable that the article should appear without alteration as an expression of the views which Lord MacDonnell had formed on the subject.—The Editor.]
I am asked to state my opinion as to the changes of Administrative Direction and Control which should be introduced into the system of Irish Government in the event of a Home Rule Bill becoming law.
As I write (in March) I am not acquainted with the provisions of the promised Bill and my conjectures in regard to them may, in some respects at all events, fall wide of the mark. But there are cardinal principles which, presumably, must govern the Bill, and lend to conjecture some approximate degree of accuracy. Among such principles are the establishment of a representative assembly (Mr. Birrell has told us there will be two Houses), with powers of legislation and of control over the finances allocated to Ireland; the maintenance of the supremacy of the Imperial Parliament; and the preservation of the executive authority of the King in Ireland.
Assuming then that the Bill will, in essence, be a [pg 051] measure of devolution under which the supremacy of the Imperial Parliament will be preserved, the Executive Power in Ireland will continue vested in the King (as under the Bills of 1886 and 1893) and a representative body controlling the Finances (and consequently the Executive) will be established, an intelligent anticipation may be made of the organic changes in the existing system of Irish Government which are likely to be required when the Bill becomes law.
I do not propose to push this anticipation into regions beyond those of constitutional or organic change. It may happen that re-arrangements of the Civil Service in Ireland, Inter-Departmental Transfers of the Executive Staffs, and reductions of redundant establishments, may ensue on the creation of the Irish Legislature.63 But these changes, if they take place, will not be organic or constitutional changes; nor could anticipations in respect of them be now worked out with due regard to vested rights or economical administration. If not so worked out, such anticipations would be either valueless or harmful.
I shall therefore not attempt on this occasion to allocate establishments, or to suggest scales of pay, for the departments of the future Irish Government which I shall suggest in the following paragraphs. But I shall, as opportunity offers, point to such retrenchments of higher administrative posts as appear to follow from the organic changes I shall indicate as necessary.
The dominating constitutional change will, of course, be the establishment of a Parliament which, operating [pg 052] through a Ministry responsible to it, will control and direct the various departments engaged in the transaction of public business. It is unnecessary to consider here how that Parliament will be recruited, though I may express my conviction that justice to minorities, the mitigation of political mistrust, and the promotion of efficiency in the Public Services, urgently require the recruitment to be on the system of proportional representation. But I assume that when recruited, the Parliament's general procedure will be fashioned on the model of the Imperial Parliament at Westminster. To that end the first thing the new Parliament will have to do is to create its own establishment of officers and clerks, to frame its Standing Orders relating to the conduct of public business, and to settle any subsidiary rules that the Westminster precedents may suggest.
Having thus provided itself with the requisite machinery for the exercise of its powers, the Irish Parliament would naturally next proceed to bring under its supervision the various existing agencies for the direction and control of the public business of the country.
At present the business of Civil Government in Ireland is carried on through the following forty-seven Departments, Boards, and Offices, which I group with reference to the degree of control exercised over them by the Irish Government at the present time.
Departments, etc., under the Control of the Irish Government.
| (1) Royal Irish Constabulary. | |
| (2) Dublin Metropolitan Police. | |
| (3) Prisons Board. | |
| (4) Reformatory and Industrial School Office. | |
| (5) Inspectors of Lunatics. | |
| (6) General Registry of Vital Statistics. | |
| (7) Registry of Petty Sessions Clerks. | |
| (8) Resident Magistrates.64 | |
| (9) Crown Solicitors. | |
| (10) Clerks of Crown and Peace. | |
| (11) Office of Arms (Ulster King of Arms). |
Departments, etc., under the Partial Control of the Irish Government.
| (1) Land Commission. | |
| (2) Commissioners of charitable donations and bequests. | |
| (3) Public Record Office. |
Departments, etc., not under Control of the Irish Government, but having the Chief Secretary as Ex Officio President.
| (1) Local Government Board. | |
| (2) Department of Agriculture and Technical Instruction. |
Departments, etc., not under the Control of the Irish Government except as regards Appointments and, in some instances, the Framing of Rules of Business.
| (1) Board of National Education. | |
| (2) Board of Intermediate Education. | |
| (3) Commissioners of Education. (Endowed Schools). | |
| (4) National Gallery. | |
| (5) Royal Hibernian Academy. | |
| (6) Congested Districts Board. |
[pg 054]
Boards Exercising Statutory Powers in Ireland but not under Control of the Irish Government.
| (1) Public Loan Fund. | |
| (2) Commissioners of Irish Lights. | |
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|