it in a civil state, his rights are proportioned by the principles of that state.
I know that many authors, and particularly Grotius,* give long enumerations of the alienations of sovereignties. But the examples often prove only the abuse of power, not the right. And besides, the people consented to the alienation, either willingly or by force. What could the inhabitants of Pergamus, Bithynia, and Cyrene do, when their kings gave them, by their last wills, to the Roman people? Nothing remained for them, but to submit with a good grace to so powerful a legatee. To furnish an example capable of serving as an authority, they should have produced an instance of a people resisting a similar bequest of their sovereign, and whose resistance had been generally condemned as unjust and rebellious. Had Peter I. who nominated his wife to succeed him, attempted to subject his empire to the grand signor, or to some other neighbouring power, can we imagine that the Russians would have suffered it, or that their resistance would have passed for a revolt? We do not find in Europe any great state that is reputed alienable. If some petty principalities have been considered as such, it is because they were not true sovereignties. They were fiefs of the em-<32>pire, enjoying a greater or lesser degree of liberty: their masters made a traffic of the rights they possessed over those territories: but they could not withdraw them from a dependence on the empire.
Let us conclude then, that, as the nation alone has a right to subject itself to a foreign power, the right of really alienating the state can never belong to the sovereign, unless it be expressly given him by the entire body of the people.† Neither are we to presume that he possesses a right to nominate his successor or surrender the sceptre to other hands,—a right which must be founded on an express consent, on a law of the state, or on long custom, justified by the tacit consent of the people.
§70. Duty of a prince who is empowered to nominate his successor.
If the power of nominating his successor is intrusted to the sovereign, he ought to have no other view in his choice, but the advantage and safety of the state. He himself was established only for this end (§39); the liberty of transferring his power to another could then be granted to him only with the same view. It would be absurd to consider it as a prerogative useful to the prince, and which he may turn to his own private advantage. Peter the Great proposed only the welfare of the empire when he left the crown to his wife. He knew that heroine to be the most capable person to follow his views, and perfect the great things he had begun, and therefore preferred her to his son, who was still too young. If we often found on the throne such elevated minds as Peter’s, a nation could not adopt a wiser plan in order to ensure to itself a good government, than to intrust the prince, by a fundamental law, with the power of appointing his successor. This would be a much more certain method than the order of birth. The Roman emperors who had no male children appointed a successor by adoption. To this custom Rome was indebted for a series of sovereigns unequalled in history,—Nerva, Trajan, Adrian, Antoninus, Marcus Aurelius,—what princes! Does the right of birth often place such on the throne?
§71. He must have at least a tacit ratification.
We may go still farther, and boldly assert, that, as the safety of the whole nation is deeply interested in so important a transaction, the consent and ratification of the people or state is necessary to give it full and entire effect,—at least their tacit consent and ratification. If an emperor of Russia thought proper to nominate for his successor a person notoriously unworthy of the crown, it is not at all probable that vast empire would blindly submit to so pernicious an appointment. And who shall presume <33> to blame a nation for refusing to run headlong to ruin out of respect to the last orders of its prince? As soon as the people submit to the sovereign appointed to rule over them, they tacitly ratify the choice made by the last prince; and the new monarch enters into all the rights of his predecessor.
Principal Objects of a good Government; and first to provide for the Necessities of the Nation.
§72. The object of society points out the duties of the sovereign.
After these observations on the constitution of the state, let us now proceed to the principal objects of a good government. We have seen above (§§41 and 42) that the prince, on his being invested with the sovereign authority, is charged with the duties of the nation in relation to government. In treating of the principal objects of a wise administration, we at once shew the duties of a nation towards itself, and those of the sovereign towards his people.
He ought to procure plenty.
A wise conductor of the state will find in the objects of civil society the general rule and indication of his duties. The society is established with the view of procuring, to those who are its members, the necessaries, conveniences, and even pleasures of life, and, in general, every thing necessary to their happiness,—of enabling each individual peaceably to enjoy his own property, and to obtain justice with safety and certainty,—and, finally, of defending themselves in a body against all external violence (§15). The nation, or its conductor, should first apply to the business of providing for all the wants of the people, and producing a happy plenty of all the necessaries of life, with its conveniences, and innocent and laudable enjoyments. As an easy life without luxury contributes to the happiness of men, it likewise enables them to labour with greater safety and success after their own perfection, which is their grand and principal duty, and one of the ends they ought to have in view when they unite in society.
§73. To take care that there be a sufficient number of workmen.
To succeed in procuring this abundance of every thing, it is necessary to take care that there be a sufficient number of able workmen in every useful or necessary profession. An attentive application on the part of government, wise regulations, and assistance properly granted, will produce this effect, without using constraint, which is always fatal to industry.
§74. To prevent the emigration of those that are useful.
Those workmen that are useful ought to be retained in the state; to succeed in retaining them, the public authority has certainly a right to use constraint, if necessary. Every citizen owes his personal services to his country; and a mechanic, in particular, who has been reared, educated, and instructed in its bosom, cannot lawfully leave it, and carry to a foreign land that industry which he acquired at home, unless his country has no occasion for him, or he cannot there obtain the just fruit of his <34> labour and abilities. Employment must then be procured for him; and if, while able to obtain a decent livelihood in his own country, he would without reason abandon it, the state has a right to detain him. But a very moderate use ought to be made of this right, and only in important or necessary cases. Liberty is the soul of abilities and industry: frequently a mechanic or an artist, after having long travelled abroad, is attracted home to his native soil by a natural affection, and returns more expert and better qualified to render his country useful services. If certain extraordinary cases be excepted, it is best in this affair to practise the mild methods of protection, encouragement, &c. and to leave the rest to that natural love felt by all men for the places of their birth.
§75. Emissaries who entice them away.
As to those emissaries who come into a country to entice away useful subjects, the sovereign has a right to punish them severely, and has just cause of complaint against the power by whom they are employed.
In another place, we shall treat more particularly of the general question, whether a citizen be permitted to quit the society of which he is a member. The particular