Meigs. He crossed the Sound with one hundred and seventy men under convoy of two armed sloops, and landed near Southhold, whence the boats were conveyed across the land, about fifteen miles, into a bay where the troops re-embarked. Crossing the bay, they landed at two in the morning, four miles from Sagg Harbor, which place was completely surprised, and carried with charged bayonets. At the same time another division of the detachment secured the armed schooner, which, with the stores, were consumed by fire.
The object of his expedition being effected without the loss of a man, Colonel Meigs returned with his prisoners, “having transported his men by land and water ninety miles in twenty-five hours.” Congress directed a sword to be presented to him, and passed a resolution expressing their high sense of his merit.
The exertions made during the winter by the commander-in-chief to raise a powerful army for the ensuing campaign had not been successful; but that steady and persevering courage which had supported himself and the American cause through the gloomy scenes of the preceding year, did not desert him. Supposing that Burgoyne,5 would either attempt to seize Ticonderoga, and join General Howe on the Hudson, or would transport his troops by water to New York, whence the combined army would proceed to Philadelphia, he adopted his arrangements to meet and counteract either plan of operations. With a view to the three great points, Ticonderoga, the Highlands of New York, and Philadelphia, the troops of New England and New York were divided between Ticonderoga and Peekskill, while those from Jersey to North Carolina inclusive, were directed to assemble at a camp to be formed in Jersey. The more southern troops remained in that weak part of the Union.
As the recruits were collected, the camp at Morristown was broken up, and the army assembled, on the 28th of May, at Middlebrook, just behind a connected ridge of commanding heights, north of the road leading to Philadelphia, and about ten miles from Brunswick. These heights afforded a full view of any movements which might be made by the enemy. On the 20th of May, the total of the army in Jersey, excluding cavalry and artillery, amounted to only eight thousand three hundred and seventy-eight men, of whom upwards of two thousand were sick. More than half these were recruits, who had never looked an enemy in the face.
General Washington, anticipating a movement by land towards Philadelphia, had taken the precaution to give orders for assembling an army of militia strengthened by a few continental troops, on the western bank of the Delaware, to be commanded by General Arnold, who was then in Philadelphia employed in the settlement of his accounts.
The first object of the campaign on the part of General Howe, was Philadelphia. He intended to march through Jersey; and to cross the Delaware on a portable bridge constructed in the winter for that purpose. If the Americans could be brought to an action on equal ground, victory was inevitable. Should Washington decline an engagement, and be again pressed over the Delaware, the object would be as certainly obtained. But it would be dangerous to attack him in his lines at Middlebrook; for although his camp might be forced, victory would probably be attended with such loss as to disable the victor from reaping its fruits.
An attempt to cross the Delaware in the face of an army collected on its western bank, while that commanded by General Washington in person remained unbroken on his flank and rear, was an experiment of equal hazard. It comported with the cautious temper of Sir William Howe to devise some other plan to which he might resort, should he be unable to seduce the American General from his advantageous position.
The two great bays of Delaware and Chesapeake suggested the alternative of proceeding by water, should he be unable to manoeuvre General Washington out of his present encampment.
On the 12th of June, General Howe assembled the main body of his army at Brunswick, and gave strong indications of an intention to reach Philadelphia by land.
General Washington, believing this to be his design, posted a select corps of riflemen under Colonel Morgan, a partisan6 of distinguished merit, at Vanvichton’s bridge on the Raritan, to watch the left flank of the British army, and seize every occasion to harass it.
June 1777
Early in the morning of the 14th, Sir William Howe, leaving two thousand men in Brunswick, advanced in two columns towards the Delaware, which reached Somerset Court-House and Middlebrook about the same time.
On receiving intelligence that his enemy was in motion, General Washington formed his army to great advantage on the heights in front of his camp. The troops remained in order of battle during the day; and, in the night, slept on the ground to be defended. The Jersey militia took the field in great numbers, and joined General Sullivan, who had retired from Princeton behind the Lowland hills towards Flemingtown, where an army of some respectability was forming, which could co-operate with that under the immediate inspection of the commander-in-chief.
The settled purpose of General Washington was to defend his camp, but not to hazard an action on other ground. That of General Howe seems to have been, by acting on his anxiety for Philadelphia, to seduce him from his strong ground, and tempt him to approach the Delaware in the hope of defending its passage. The motives which restrained Howe from marching through Jersey, leaving the American army in full force in his rear, determined Washington to allow him to proceed to the Delaware should such be his intention. In that event, he purposed to maintain the high strong grounds north of the road to be taken by his enemy, and to watch for any opportunity which might be used to advantage.
Finding the American army could not be drawn from its strong position, General Howe determined to withdraw from Jersey, and to embark his army for the Chesapeake or the Delaware. On the night of the 19th, he returned to Brunswick, and on the 22d to Amboy, from which place, the heavy baggage and a few troops passed into Staten Island on the bridge which had been designed for the Delaware.
On the march to Amboy, some sharp skirmishing took place with Morgan’s corps; but the retreat was conducted with such circumspection, that no important advantage could be gained.
In order to cover and co-operate with his light parties, General Washington advanced six or seven miles to Quibbletown, on the road to Amboy; and Lord Sterling’s division was pushed still further to Metucking meeting-house.
In the hope of bringing on an engagement, General Howe, on the night of the 26th, recalled his troops from Staten Island, and, early the next morning, made a rapid movement in two columns: the right, commanded by Lord Cornwallis, took the route by Woodbridge to the Scotch plains; and the left, led by Sir William Howe in person, marched by Metucking meeting-house. The left was to attack the left flank of the Americans at Quibbletown, while Lord Cornwallis should gain the heights on the left of the camp at Middlebrook.
At Woodbridge, the right column fell in with an American party of observation, which gave notice of this movement. General Washington, comprehending his danger, put the army in motion, and regained the camp at Middlebrook. Lord Cornwallis fell in with Lord Sterling, and a sharp skirmish ensued, in which the Americans lost three field-pieces and a few men; after which they retreated to the hills about the Scotch plains. Perceiving the passes in the mountains to be guarded, and the object of this skilful manoeuvre to be unattainable, the British general returned to Amboy, and crossed over to Staten Island.
General Washington was again left to conjecture the plan of the campaign. Intelligence had been received of the appearance of Burgoyne on Lake Champlain, and that Ticonderoga was threatened. This strengthened the opinion, that the design of Howe must be to seize the passes in the mountains on the Hudson, secure the command of that river, and effect a junction between the two armies. Without abandoning his camp at Middlebrook, he made dispositions to repel any sudden attack on the posts in the Highlands.
While the General anxiously watched the motions of his adversary, an agreeable piece of intelligence was received from New England. The command of the British troops in Rhode Island had devolved on General Prescot. Thinking himself perfectly secure, he indulged himself in convenient quarters, rather distant from camp, and was remiss with respect to guards. Information of this negligence was communicated, and a plan was formed to surprise him. This spirited enterprize was executed with courage and address7 by Colonel Barton, of the Rhode Island militia.
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