should resist, all are forbidden. Now considering the Cause.
Fourthly, was there ever more cause of resistance than in those dayes? Were not the Kings then not only conceived to be enclined so and so, but even actually were enemies to Religion, had overthrown Lawes and Liberties? And therefore if any should from the Apostle’s reasons that he gives against resistance in the 3, 4, 5, verses, (For Rulers are not a terrour to good works but evill, and he is the minister of God to thee for good) reply, That Rulers so long as they are not a terrour to the good, but minister for our good, are not to be resisted. The consideration of those times leaves no place for such exception, because the Powers then (which the Apostle forbids to resist) were nothing so, but subverters of that which was good and just.
If it be replied, That prohibition was temporary and fit for those times, as it is said by some, I answer, 1. This is a new exception never heard of (I think) but in these times. 2. It is groundlesse, and against the Text, for the reasons of the prohibition in the 3, 4, 5, 6, verses, are perpetuall, from that order, that good, for which the powers are ordained of God, which will be of force as long as there is government, and will alwayes be reasons against resistance; because resistance (though it be made against abused powers as then they were) doth tend to the dissolution of that order, for which the power itself is set up of God. By which also that other distinction of theirs is made void, when as they reply, as they think, acutely, That they resist not the power, but the abuse of the power.
It is also answered by some, that the Emperors then were absolute Monarchs, and therefore not to be resisted. I answer: They did indeed rule absolutely and arbitrarily, which should have, according to the principles of these dayes, been a stronger motive to resist. But how did they make themselves of Subjects such absolute Monarchs, was it not by force and change of the government, and was not the right of the people & Senate (according to the Principles of these days) good against them with as much or more reason, than the right of the people of this Land is against the succession of this Crown descending by three Conquests?2 And this I speak not to win an Arbitrary power or such as Conquerours use, unto this Crown, but only to shew that Resistance can be no more made against the Kings of England, than it could against those Emperours. Nay, with lesse reason against them, than these.
Lastly, it is replied, That Christian Religion was then enacted against by Law; but the Religion contended for is established by Law. I answer: But is the Religion established denied to any that now fight for it? Shall the Apostle’s prohibition be good against Christians in the behalfe of actuall Tyrants persecuting that Religion, and not against Subjects freely enjoying the Religion established? Or may Protestants upon a jealousie resist a Protestant King professing the same Religion, and promising to conserve it entire to them?
2. The prohibition does not only concern Christians, but all the people under those Emperours, and not only Religion was persecuted, but liberties also lost, the people and Senate were enslaved by Edicts and Lawes then inforced upon them, & they (according to the principles of these dayes) might resist, notwithstanding the Apostles’ prohibition, & the Laws then forced upon them; or else the State, as they usually say, had not means to provide for its safety. Thus one fancy of theirs thwarts another, because both are groundless. But more anon of those means of safty they suppose to be in every State, by the power of Resistance.
Hitherto of Scripture, which is most powerful against Resistance, in the prohibition & the reasons of it, by which Conscience will clearly see, it can have no warrant from Scripture for Resistance. Now let us try what Reason can enforce.
Sect. III.
For proving this Power of resistance, there is much speech used about the Fundamentals of this government, which because they lie low and unseen by vulgar eyes, being not written Lawes, the people are easily made to believe they are such as they (that have power to build new Laws upon them) say they are. And indeed none so fit to judge of them as they. Yet this we know, and every one that can use his reason knows, that the Fundamentalls must needs be such as will bear the settled government of this Land, such as are not contradictory to the written established Laws: but both the government we see used in this Land, and the written Laws which we reade, must have a correspondency and analogie of reason to these, Fundamentalls, and they to these.
Well then, they that plead for power of resistance in the people, lay the first ground work of their Fundamentals thus: Power is originally in and from the people and if when by election they have intrusted a Prince with the power, he will not discharge his trust, then it falls to the people; or, as in this Kingdom, to the two houses of Parliament (the representative body of the people) to see to it; they may reassume the power.
This is the bottom of their Fundamentals as they are now discovered to the people. But here we may take notice by the way, that however the Fundamentals of this Government are much talked of, this is according to them the Fundamentall in all Kingdomes and Governments; for they say power was everywhere from the people at first, and so this will serve no more for the power of resistance in England, than in France or Turkey. But if this must be a Fundamentall, it is such a one as upon it this Government cannot be built, but Confusion and Anarchy may readily be raised; as shall appear by the clearing of these two particulars, Whether the power be so originally and chiefly from the people as they would have it; then, Whether they may upon such causes reassume that power.
First, of the originall of power, which they will have so from the people, that it shall be from God only by a kind of permissive approbation, as we may see by the Observator, and all other that plead for this power of resistance. Wee must here distinguish what the writers of the other side seeme to confound, to wit, the Power itselfe, (which is a sufficiency of authority for command and coercion in the governing of a people) from the designing of the Person to beare that power, and the qualification of that power according to the divers wayes of executing it in severall forms of government; and then we grant that the designing of the person is sometimes from the people by choice, and that the power of the Prince receiving qualification by joint consent of himselfe and the people, is limited by the laws made with such consent; but the power itself is of God originally and chiefly, which we prove by Scripture and Reason.
First, by such places of Scripture as plainly shew an ordaining and appointing, rather than a permission or approbation:
1. The Apostle speaks it expresly, The powers are of God, Rom. 13.1 and the ordinance of God, v. 2. S. Peter indeed saith, every ordinance of man, I Epist. 2. but of man there, and of God here is much differing; there it is ἀνθρωπίνῃ, of man, subjective, that is, every ordinance or power set up amongst men; but here it is ἀπὸ θεοῦ, of God, causaliter,3 that is, from him, his ordinance; and if in that ἀνθρωπίνῃ there be implied any creation or causality, or invention of man, it respects the qualification of the power according to the forms of severall governments and offices in them, which are from the invention of man; it does not make the power itselfe the creation of man, which is the constitution and ordinance of God. And men are not only naturally bent to society, but also are bound, as they are reasonable creatures, to set up and live under government, as under an order of that providence by which the world is governed.
2. He is called the minister of God, v. 4. but if so from the people and no otherwise from god than they would have him, he should be minister populi rather; he is indeed their minister for their good, which makes the people to be the end of this governing power, not the fountain and originall of it. Therefore the necessity of subjection urged in v. 5. has a double ground the ordinance of God, whose ministers Rulers are, there’s the fountain and originall of power to govern; then the people’s good, upon which Rulers ought to attend, that is an end of the governing power.
3. To the same purpose speake those other places, by me Kings reign: and, I have said, ye are Gods, Psa. 82. in relation to which our Saviour saith, Joh. 10. they are called Gods to whom the word of God came, that dixi, that word is the command, the issuing out as it were the commission for the setting up of a governing power among the people.
These places cannot be satisfied with that poor part, they on the other side leave to God in the setting up of power for the governing of men, that is, to approve