Bastiat Frédéric

Economic Sophisms and “What Is Seen and What Is Not Seen”


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Is it credible? Oh! This generosity is suspect and you would be wise to reject it.

      PUBLISHING HISTORY:

      Original title: “Théorie, pratique.”

      Place and date of first publication: No date given. First published in book form.

      First French edition as book or pamphlet: Economic Sophisms (First Series) (1846).

      Location in Paillottet’s edition of OC: Vol. 4. Sophismes économiques. Petits pamphlets I, pp. 79–86.

      Previous translations: 1st English ed., 1846; 1st American ed., 1848; FEE ed., 1964.

      People accuse us, advocates of free trade, of being theoreticians and not taking sufficient account of practical aspects.

      “What a terrible prejudice against M. Say,”1 said M. Ferrier,2 “is this long

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      line of distinguished administrators, this imposing line of writers, all of whom have seen things differently from him,” a point M. Say does not hide from himself! Listen to him:

      It has been said, in support of old errors, that it is necessary to have some foundation for the ideas so generally adopted by every nation. Should we not be suspicious of observations and reasoning that overturn what has been taken to be constant up to now, what has been taken to be certain by so many leading figures to whom their enlightenment and intentions give credence? This argument, I admit, is worthy of making a profound impression and might cast doubt on the most incontrovertible points if we had not seen in turn the most erroneous opinions, now generally acknowledged to be such, accepted and professed by everyone for many centuries. It is not so long ago that every nation, from the coarsest to the most enlightened, and all men, from street porters to the most learned philosophers, recognized four elements. Nobody thought of disputing this doctrine, which is nevertheless false, to the extent that today there is no assistant biologist who would not be decried if he considered the earth, water, and fire as elements.

      At which point, M. Ferrier makes the following observation:

      If M. Say thinks that he has answered the strong objection put forward, he is strangely mistaken. That men, who were nevertheless highly enlightened, have been wrong for several centuries on some point of natural history is understandable and proves nothing. Were water, air, earth, and fire, whether elements or not, any the less useful to man? Errors like this are inconsequential; they do not lead to upheavals; they do not cast doubt into people’s minds and above all do not harm any interests, and for this reason they might be allowed to last for thousands of years without mishap. The physical world therefore moves forward as though they did not exist. But can this be

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      so for errors that attack the moral world? Can we conceive of an administrative system that is totally false and consequently harmful being followed for several centuries and in several nations with the general consent of all educated men? Could we explain how a system like this could be allied to the increasingly great prosperity of nations? M. Say admits that the argument he is combating is worthy of making a profound impression. Yes, certainly, and this impression remains, for M. Say has argued more in its favor than destroyed it.

      Let us listen to M. de Saint-Chamans:3

      It was scarcely before the middle of the last century, the eighteenth century in which all subjects and every principle without exception were subject to discussion by writers, that these suppliers of speculative ideas, applied to everything without being applicable to anything, began to write on the subject of political economy. Before that, there was an unwritten system of political economy that was practiced by governments. Colbert, it was said, was its inventor, and it was the rule for all the states in Europe. The strangest thing about it is that it is still so, in spite of anathema and scorn and in spite of the discoveries of the modern school. This system, which our writers called the mercantile system, consisted in … obstructing, through prohibition or import duties, foreign products that might have ruined our factories by competing with them.… This system was declared by economist writers of all schools4 to be inept, absurd, and likely to impoverish any country; it has been banished from all books, reduced to taking refuge in the practice of all peoples, and we cannot conceive that, with regard to the wealth of nations, governments have not drawn their counsel from scholars

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      rather than from the long-standing experience of a system, etc.… Above all we cannot conceive that the French government … is determined to resist the progress of enlightenment with regard to political economy and to retain the practice of old errors that all of our economist writers have pointed out.… But this is dwelling too much on this mercantile system which has only facts in its favor and which is supported by no writer!5

      Hearing this, will some people not say that when economists call for each person to have the free disposal of his property, they have given birth, like the followers of Fourier, to a new social order, fanciful, strange, a sort of phalanstery that is unprecedented in the annals of the human race? It seems to me that if there is anything in all this that has been invented, contingent, it is not freedom, but protection; it is not the ability to trade but indeed the customs service, which is applied to upsetting artificially the natural order of income.

      But it is not a question of comparing or judging the two systems. The question for the moment is to know which of the two is based on experience.

      Thus, you monopolists claim that facts are on your side and that we have only theories to support us.

      You even flatter yourselves that this long series of public acts, this old experience of Europe’s that you invoke, appeared imposing to M. Say, and I agree that he has not refuted you with his customary sagacity. For my part, I do not yield the domain of fact to you, for you have in your support only exceptional and restrained facts, while we have in opposition the universal facts, the free and voluntary acts of all men.

      What are we saying and what do you say?

      We say:

      “It is better to purchase from others what it would cost more to produce ourselves.”

      You, on the other hand, say:

      “It is better to make things ourselves even though it costs less to purchase them from others.”

      Well, sirs, leaving theory, demonstration, and reasoning, all things that appear to nauseate you, to one side, which of these two statements has the approval of universal practice on its side?

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      Just pay a visit to fields, workshops, factories, and stores, look upward, downward, and around you, scrutinize what is being done in your own households, observe your own everyday acts, and tell us what principle is governing all these laborers, workers, entrepreneurs, and merchants. Tell us what your personal practice is.

      Do farmers make their own clothes? Do tailors produce the grain they consume? Does your housekeeper not stop making bread at home as soon as she finds it cheaper to purchase it from the baker? Do you mend your own boots instead of writing, in order not to pay tribute to the cobbler? Does the entire economy of society not rest on the separation of occupations, the division of labor, in a word, on exchange? And is trade anything other than this calculation that makes us all, whatever we are, cease direct production when indirect acquisition saves us both time and trouble?

      You are thus not men of practice, since you cannot show us a single man anywhere in the world who acts in accordance with your principle.

      But, you will say, we have never heard of our principle being used as a rule for individual relations. We fully understand that this would disrupt social links and force men to live like snails, each in his shell. We limit ourselves to claiming that it dominates de facto the relations established between