Christian von Wolff

The Law of Nations Treated According to the Scientific Method


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      §§ 136, 142, part 1, Phil. Pract. Univ.

      § 5, part 8, Jus Nat.

      § 136, part 1, Phil. Pract. Univ.

      § 4, part 8, Jus Nat.

      The immutability of the necessary law of nations arises from the very immutability of natural law, and is finally derived from the essence and nature of man as a source whence flows the very immutability of natural law. The law of nature therefore rules the acts of nations, because men coming together into a state and thereby becoming a nation, do not lay aside their human nature, consequently they remain subject to the law of nature, in as much as they have desired to combine their powers for the promotion of the common good.

      § 6. The nature of the obligation which comes from the necessary law of nations

      § 4.

      § 142, part 3, Phil. Pract. Univ.

      In like manner since the necessary law of nations consists in the law of nature applied to nations, and consequently the obligation which arises from the necessary law of nations comes from the law of nature, furthermore, since this obligation itself, which comes from the law of nature,

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      is necessary and immutable, the obligation also which comes from the law of nations is necessary and immutable; consequently neither can any nation free itself nor can one nation free another from it.

      §§ 150, 156, part 1, Jus Nat.

      These things are to be well considered, lest some one may think, when he sees that a certain licence of action must be tolerated among nations, that the necessary law of nations is of no use. For this would be just as if one should argue that the law of nature is of no use, because the abuse of their liberty must be allowed to men in a state of nature and the same is turned to licence of action, nor can this be prohibited except by positive law in a civil state, where they can be compelled by a superior by force to do what they are unwilling to do of their own accord. The abuse of power remains illicit even among nations, even though it cannot be checked. Nor do good nations do all they can, but they have respect for conscience no less than every good man has, who does not gauge his right by might, but by the obligation that comes from the law of nature. A good nation differs from a bad in the same way that a good man differs from a bad, or, if you prefer, the virtuous from the vicious.

      § 7. Of the society established by nature among nations

      § 138, part 1, Jus Nat.

      § 135, part 1, Phil. Pract. Univ.

      § 142, part 1, Phil. Pract. Univ.

      § 5, part 8, Jus Nat.

      § 26, part 8, Jus Nat.

      § 5, part 8, Jus Nat.

      Nature herself has established society among all nations and binds them to preserve society. For nature herself has established society among men and binds them to preserve it. Therefore, since this obligation, as coming from the law of nature, is necessary and immutable, it cannot be changed for the reason that nations have formed a state. Therefore society, which nature has established among individuals, still exists among nations and consequently, after states have been established in accordance with the law of nature and nations have arisen thereby, nature herself also must be said to have established society among all nations and bound them to preserve society.

      § 5, part 8, Jus Nat.

      If we should consider that great society, which nature herself has established among men, to be done away with by the particular societies, which humans enter, when they unite into a state, states would be established contrary to the law of nature, in as much as the universal obligation of all toward all would be terminated; which assuredly is

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      absurd. Just as in the human body individual organs do not cease to be organs of the whole human body, because certain ones taken together constitute one organ; so likewise individual men do not cease to be members of that great society which is made up of the whole human race, because several have formed together a certain particular society. And in so far as these act together as associates, just as if they were all of one mind and one will; even so are the members of that society united, which nature has established among men. After the human race was divided into nations, that society which before was between individuals continues between nations.

      § 8. Of the purpose of that state

      § 7.

      § 142, part 7, Jus Nat.

      § 144, part 7, Jus Nat.

      § 141, part 8, Jus Nat.

      Since nature herself has established society among all nations, in so far as she has established it among all men, as is evident from the demonstration of the preceding proposition, since, moreover, the purpose of natural society, and consequently of that society which nature herself has established among men, is to give mutual assistance in perfecting itself and its condition; the purpose of the society therefore, which nature has established among all nations, is to give mutual assistance in perfecting itself and its condition. Consequently the common good must be promoted by its combined powers.

      Just as one human being alone is not sufficient unto himself, but needs the aid of another, in order that thereby the common good may be promoted by their combined powers; so also one nation alone is not sufficient for itself, but one needs the aid of the other, that thereby the common good may be promoted by their combined powers. Therefore since nature herself unites men together and compels them to preserve society, because the common good of all cannot be promoted except by their combined powers, so that nothing is more beneficial for man than man; the same nature likewise unites nations together and compels them to preserve society, because the common good of all cannot be promoted except by their combined powers, so that nothing can be said to be more beneficial for a nation than a nation. For although a nation can be thought of which is spread over a vast expanse, and does not seem to need the aid of other nations; nevertheless it cannot yet be said that it could not improve its condition

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      still more by the aid of other nations, much less that other nations could not be aided by it, however much it could itself dispense with the aid of others. Just as man ought to aid man, so too ought nation to aid nation.

      § 9. Of the state which is made up of all nations

      §§ 7, 8.

      §§ 4, 9, part 8, Jus Nat.

      § 504, part 5, Jus Nat.

      § 5, part 8, Jus Nat.

      All nations are understood to have come together into a state, whose separate members are separate nations, or individual states. For nature herself has established society among all nations and compels them to preserve it, for the purpose of promoting the common good by their combined powers. Therefore since a society of men united for the purpose of promoting the common good by their combined powers, is a state, nature herself has combined nations into a state. Therefore since nations, which know the advantages arising therefrom, by a natural impulse are carried into this association, which binds the human race or all nations one to the other, since moreover it is assumed that the others will join it, if they know their own interests; what can be said except that nations also have combined into society as if by agreement? So all nations are understood to have come together into a state, whose separate nations are separate members or individual states.

      § 138, part 7, Jus Nat.

      § 7.

      Note, § 142, part 7, Jus Nat.

      Reasoning throws a certain light upon the present proposition, by which we have proved that nature has established society among men and compels them to protect society. Nay, rather the state, into which nature herself orders nations to combine, in truth depends on that great society which she has established among all men, as is perfectly evident from the above reasoning. But that those things may not be doubtful which we have said concerning the quasi-agreement,