a law, is not just (§7); not to add that this principle is not evident enough, nor that all human offices are not deducible from it.†
SECTION LXXI
Nor in the consent of all nations.
None, I think, will rashly go into the opinion of those learned men, who held the consent of all nations, or of all the more civilized nations, to be the principle of natural law. For it is not true, that what all nations agree in, is also conformable to the divine will;* nor is this universal consent evident to all, since it must be collected from various testimonies of authors, antient and modern; nor is it sufficiently adequate to point out all duties.*.<48>
SECTION LXXII
Nor in the seven precepts of Noah.
But as those who endeavour to establish the law of nature and nations from the consent of nations, not only lay down a false, unevident, and unadequate principle; but likewise go out of the question into one of another kind, while they derive the law of nature not from nature itself, but from the traditions or opinions of nations: so the opinion of those who have attempted to deduce the law of nature and nations from the precepts given to Noah, labours under the same defects, as hath been sufficiently proved (§16).
SECTION LXXIII
Nor in the right of all to all things, or in the study of external peace.
What shall we then say of the whole philosophy of Hobbes1 in his books de Cive, or his Leviathan? when he asserts the right of every man in a state of nature to all things, he affirms a proposition which is neither true, nor evident, nor adequate, since the duties of men to God and themselves cannot be deduced from that principle; yea, while he goes about in <49> that manner, pretending to establish the law of nature, he really subverts it, as Hen. Cocei.2 def. de jure omnium in omnia, has shewn. Hence it is plain what we are to think of this other principle, viz. “that external peace is to be sought and studied if it can be obtained, and if not, force and war must be called to our aid.” For here likewise Hobbes lurks behind a curtain.*
SECTION LXXIV
Nor in the state of integrity.
That principle laid down by Val. Alberti3 professor of divinity and philosophy at Leipsic, hath a specious shew of truth and piety, viz. a state of integrity. But Puffend. Specim. controv. 4. 12. and Thomas. jurisp. divin. 4. 40 & seq. have proved it to be false. And granting it to be true, that whatever is agreeable to a state of primitive integrity, is truly of the law of nature; yet how unevident this principle must be, not only to Pagans, but even to Christians, is manifest. Further, since the laws of citizenship, of war, of contracts, and many others, for which there was not place in that most happy state, cannot be deduced from the idea of it, who can call this principle adequate?*<50>
SECTION LXXV
Nor in sociability.
Grotius, Puffendorf, and several antients, were wonderfully pleased with the principle of sociability; nor can it be denied, as we have afterwards expressly proved, that men are so framed that they must live socially: but that this is not the true, evident, and adequate principle of the law of nature, hath been already demonstrated by the learned and worthy Sam. de Coccius de principio juris nat. diss. 1. qu. 2. §9.4 I shall only add this one thing, that many of our duties to God, and to ourselves, would take place, even tho’ man lived solitary, and without society in the world.*<51>
SECTION LXXVI
Nor in the order of nature, and such like hypotheses.
Other principles of natural law are highly boasted of by others; such as the order of nature, which the Creator intends in his works; the interest of mankind; a moral Theocracy, and other such like principles.† But it is agreed to by all, that these principles are not evident or adequate; and some of them indeed cannot be admitted without some cautions and restrictions.
SECTION LXXVII
The will of God intends our happiness.
But to give the opinion, which, upon a mature examination of this subject, appears to me the most solid, first of all I would observe, that God being infinitely wise and good, cannot will any thing else with relation to mankind but their happiness. For being perfect, he stands in no need of any thing; and therefore men, who of all the beings within our cognizance, alone are capable of felicity, were not created by him <52> for his own advantage, but that he might render them capable of true happiness.*
SECTION LXXVIII
To this the will of God obliges us.
This being the will of God, that man should aim at and pursue true happiness, and his will being the rule of human free actions, and therefore the source of the law of nature and justice (§62); by consequence whereas, human legislators being themselves indigent in several respects, have their own advantage no less in view than that of their subjects in making laws, God, on the contrary, must have made laws to men solely for their own benefit, and have intended nothing by them but their attainment to true happiness, by conforming themselves to them.†<53>
SECTION LXXIX
That happiness consists in the fruition of good by love; and therefore love is the principle of the law of nature.
If therefore God intend the happiness of mankind, and the law of nature be directed towards it as its end (§78), and true happiness consist in the enjoyment of good, and the absence of evil; the consequence must be, that by the law of nature God must intend that we may attain to the enjoyment of true good, and avoid evil. But since we can only enjoy good by love, hence we infer that God obliges us to love, and that love is the principle of natural law, and, as it were, a compend of it.*
SECTION LXXX
What is love and hatred?
Love in us is the desire of good, joined with delight in its perfection and happiness. Hatred is <54> aversion from evil, joined with satisfaction in its unhappiness; wherefore what we love, we receive pleasure from its perfection and happiness, and we are disposed to promote that perfection and happiness to the utmost of our power. What, on the contrary, we hate, we rather desire its misery than its happiness.
SECTION LXXXI
Love does not give uneasiness.
Since we receive satisfaction from the excellence and happiness of what we love (§80) it is obvious that the lover does not will to give uneasiness to what he loves; nay, he rather suffers pain if any other should attempt any such thing. For because he who gives uneasiness to one, or suffers it to be done without feeling any pain, takes pleasure in another’s unhappiness; but to take delight in the suffering of any one, is the same as to hate (§80); and to love and hate the same object at one and the same time is a contradiction; the consequence is, that it is inconsistent or impossible at the same time to love one, and to hurt him; or to bear his being hurted by another without disturbance and pain.
SECTION LXXXII
Hence the first degree of love, which we call the love of justice.
One may be hurt two ways, either by doing something which makes him more unhappy than he is by nature, or by depriving him of some happiness he is already possessed of. But seeing to do something which conduces to render one more unhappy than he is, is to hurt one; and to dispossess one of something he hath justly acquired, and which contributes to his happiness, is to deny one, or to take from him something that belongs to him; hence it follows, that he violates the law of love in the highest manner who hurts one, and disturbs his possession, or takes it away, and hinders his enjoyment of it; and, on the other hand, the lowest degree of love is to hurt no person, but to render to every one <55> what is due to him, or leave him in the undisturbed possession and enjoyment of what he hath; which degree of love we call the love of justice.*
SECTION