Gerrymandering. Stephen K. Medvic

descriptive representation, particularly with respect to race.

      44 44. Weissberg, Robert. 1978. “Collective vs. Dyadic Representation in Congress.” American Political Science Review 72: 535. See also Hill, Kim Quaile and Patricia A. Hurley. 1999. “Dyadic Representation Reappraised.” American Journal of Political Science 43: 109–37.

      45 45. Buchler, Justin. 2005. “Competition, Representation and Redistricting: The Case Against Competitive Congressional Districts.” Journal of Theoretical Politics 17: 431–63; Brunell, Thomas L. 2008. Redistricting and Representation: Why Competitive Elections are Bad for America. New York: Routledge; Buchler, Justin. 2011. Hiring and Firing Public Officials: Rethinking the Purpose of Elections. New York: Oxford University Press.

      46 46. On the benefits of competitive elections, generally, see Lipsitz, Keena. 2011. Competitive Elections and the American Voter. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press.

      47 47. Weissberg, “Collective vs. Dyadic Representation in Congress,” 536.

      48 48. For a discussion of how collective representation is measured, see Hurley, Patricia A. 1982. “Collective Representation Reappraised.” Legislative Studies Quarterly 7: 119–36.

      49 49. There is a very long literature on this phenomenon. For those interested, a good place to start would be Tufte, Edward R. 1973. “The Relationship between Seats and Votes in Two-Party Systems.” American Political Science Review 67: 540–54; and Taagepera, Rein. 1973. “Seats and Votes: A Generalization of the Cube Law of Elections.” Social Science Research 2: 257–75.

      50 50. Ideally, from this perspective, seat distribution in the House of Representatives would match the aggregate national vote for House candidates. Of course, there is no controlling authority who could ensure that result, as redistricting is done on a state-by-state basis.