probable conjectures.
112. The representative force may emanate from any one of these three sources: identity, causality, or ideality. We will explain ourselves. A thing may represent itself; and this we call representation of identity. A cause may represent its effect; and this is what we understand by representation of causality. A being, whether substance or accident, may represent another distinct from itself, which is not its effect; and this we call representation of ideality.
We do not see how it is possible to assign any other source of representation: holding, therefore, the division to be complete, we will examine its three points; and we beg to call the attention of the reader more especially to this matter, because it is one of the most important in philosophy.
113. That which represents must have some relation to the thing represented: whether essential or accidental, inherent or communicated, this relation must exist. Two beings, having absolutely no relation, one of which nevertheless represents the other, are a monstrosity. There is nothing without a sufficient reason; and there being no relation between the thing representing, and that represented, there is no sufficient reason of the representation.
It is here to be borne in mind that, for the present, we abstract the nature of this relation; we do not assert it to be either real or ideal; we only say that, between the thing representing and that represented, there must be some link, whatever that link may be. Its mysteries, its incomprehensibility, do not destroy its existence. Philosophy perhaps may be unable to explain the enigma; but it can demonstrate the existence of the link. Thus, abstracting all experience, it is possible to demonstrate a priori, that there is a relation between the me and other beings, by the mere fact of their representation existing in the me.
The incessant communication of intelligences with each other, and with the universe, proves that there is a point of union for them all. Representation, alone, is a convincing proof of this: so many beings, apparently dispersed and unconnected, are intimately united in some centre, so that the simple phenomenon of intelligence leads us to affirm the common link, the unity in which plurality is joined. This unity, with pantheists, is universal identity; with us, it is God.
114. Here observe that this relation between the thing representing and that represented, is not necessarily direct or immediate; it suffices that it be with a third object: thus, they who explain representation by identity, and they who account for it by intermediate ideas, must equally admit it; for, on the present matter, there is no difference between those who hold these ideas to be produced by the action of objects upon our mind, and those who make them proceed immediately from God.
115. Whatever represents any thing, contains in some sense the thing represented; for an object cannot be represented unless it is in some manner or other in the representation. It may be the object itself, or its image; but this image cannot represent the object, unless it is known to be its image. Every idea then involves the relation of objectivity; otherwise it could not represent the object, but only itself. The act of intelligence is immanent, but in such a manner, that the intellect does not need to go out of itself to attain its object. When we think of a star a million leagues distant, our mind certainly does not go to the point where the star is; but by means of the idea, it destroys in an instant this immense distance, and unites itself with the star. What it perceives is not the idea, but its object: if this idea did not involve a relation to the object, it would cease to be an idea to the mind, and would represent nothing except itself.
116. There is then, in every perception, a connection of the being that perceives with the thing perceived. When this perception is not immediate, the medium must be such as to contain a necessary relation to the object; it must conceal itself in order to offer to the eye of the mind only the thing represented. From the instant that it presents itself, and is seen, or even noticed, it ceases to be an idea and becomes an object. The idea is a mirror, which is most perfect when it creates the most perfect illusion. It must necessarily present only the objects, and project them at the proper distance, without allowing the eye to see the crystalline plane which reflects them.
117. This union of the thing representing, with that represented, of the intellect with its objects, may, in some instances, be explained by identity. In general, no contradiction is discovered in any thing representing itself to the eye of the understanding, if we suppose them to be united in some way or other. In case then that the thing known is itself intelligent, we see no difficulty in its being its own representation, and consequently none in confounding ideality and reality in the same being. If an idea can represent an object, why may it not represent itself? If an intelligent being can know an object through the medium of an idea, why may it not know that object immediately? The union of the thing known with the intellect is to us a mystery, it is true; but is the union effected by the medium of an idea less so? To the idea may be objected all that can be brought against the thing itself; and it is even more inexplicable how one thing represents another, than how it represents itself. The thing representing and that represented, have between them a sort of relation of containing and contained. It is easily conceived that the identical contains itself, since identity expresses much more than to contain; but it is not so easily conceived how the accident can contain the substance, the transitory the permanent, the ideal the real. Identity is then a true principle of representation.
118. We would here make the following remarks necessary to avoid equivocations.
I. We do not assert a necessary relation between identity and representation; for this would make every being representative, since every being is identical with itself. We establish this proposition: identity may be the origin of representation; but we deny the two following: identity is the necessary origin of representation; representation is a sign of identity.
II. We determine nothing as to the application of the relations between representation and identity, so far as finite beings are concerned.
III. We abstract the duality which results from supposing only subject and object, and enter into no question on the nature of this duality.
119. These ideas being fixed, we may observe that we have an incontestable proof that there is no intrinsic repugnance between identity and representation in two dogmas of the Catholic religion: the beatific vision and the divine intelligence. The dogma of the beatific vision teaches us that the human soul in the mansion of the blessed is intimately united to God, and sees him face to face in his very essence. No one ever said that this vision was made by the medium of an idea, but theologians, and among them St. Thomas, expressly teach the contrary. We have then identity united with representation, that is, the divine essence representing, or rather presenting, itself to the eyes of the human mind. The dogma of divine intelligence teaches that God is infinitely intelligent. God does not need to go out of himself, nor employ distinct ideas in order to understand; he sees himself in his essence. Here, too, identity is united with representation, and the intelligent being identified with the thing understood.(11)
CHAPTER XII.
IMMEDIATE INTELLIGIBILITY.
120. Neither active nor passive representation can be predicated of all things; we mean to say, that there are some beings which are not endowed with intellectual activity, and cannot be even passively the object of the acts of the intellect.
As regards the power of active representation, which is at bottom only the faculty of intelligence, it is evident that many beings are destitute of it. There may be greater difficulty with regard to passive representation, or the fitness to be the immediate object of the intellect.
121. An object cannot be known immediately, that is, without the mediation of an idea, if it do not itself perform the functions of this idea, and unite itself to the intellect which is to know it. This alone takes from all material objects the character of being immediately intelligible: so that if a mind be imagined having no idea of the corporeal universe, it could know nothing of it, although for all eternity in the midst of it.
Hence it follows that matter neither is, nor can be, intelligent or intelligible: the ideas which