instance, also deceive us in another, and all cases? Can that be a certain criterion which sometimes fails? Why not stop with the purely subjective? The madman, the lunatic, are deceived in the object, not in the subject; although what they think is not true, it is still very true and certain that they think it.
This is a specious objection; but it does not remove the difficulties under which the system, in favor of which it is adduced, labors; and it may, on the other hand, be solved in so far as it tends to weaken objective truth.
The madman, the lunatic, have also recollections of things that never existed. These recollections do not relate solely to external, but likewise to their internal acts. The madman who calls himself king, acts in accordance with his thought, with what he felt when crowned, when dethroned; and yet, these intellectual phenomena never existed. And, however this may be, he himself may have produced these recollections. We hold, then, that the criterion with respect to memory is wrong in this case, and can be of avail in no case. Therefore, even, although we had not shown that without objective truth there is no recollection even of the internal, the arguments of our adversaries would have sufficed. This objection, if it prove any thing, confirms all that we have advanced in demonstrating that without objectiveness there is no consciousness properly so called, and this even our opponents do not admit.
263. Moreover, we at once see what weight an argument based on craziness should have at the tribunal of reason. It all, at the most, only proves the weakness of our nature, that in some unfortunate individuals the established order of humanity is reversed; that the rule of truth, as it exists in so weak a creature, admits of some exceptions; but these exceptions are known, for their characters are marked. The exception does not destroy, it only confirms the rule.(25)
CHAPTER XXVI.
CAN ALL COGNITIONS BE REDUCED TO THE PERCEPTION OF IDENTITY?
264. Immediate evidence has for its objects those truths which the intellect sees with all clearness, and to which it assents without the intervention of any medium, as its name denotes. These truths are enunciated in propositions called per se notæ, first principles, or axioms, in which it is sufficient to know the meaning of the terms to see that the predicate is contained in the idea of the subject. Propositions of this class are few in all sciences; the greater part of our cognitions are the fruit of reasoning which proceeds by mediate evidence. In geometry the number of truths that do not require demonstration, but only explanation, is very limited. The body of geometrical science, with its present colossal dimensions, has proceeded from reasoning: even in the most comprehensive works the axioms occupy but a few pages; the rest is composed of theorems, propositions not of themselves evident, but requiring demonstration. The same is true of all other sciences.
265. Since in axioms the intellect perceives the identity of the subject with the predicate, intuitively seeing that the idea of the latter is contained in that of the former, there arises a very grave philosophical question which may prove very difficult, and cause strange controversies, if care be not taken to place it upon its true ground. Is every human cognition reduced to the simple perception of identity? and can its general formula be this: A is A, or: a thing is itself? Some philosophers of note maintain the affirmative; others the contrary. We think there is a confusion of ideas not so much as to the question itself as to its state. Clear and exact ideas of what judgment is, and of the relation affirmed or denied by it, will greatly facilitate the accurate solution of the question.
266. There is in every judgment perception of identity or non-identity, accordingly as it is affirmative or negative. The verb is does not express the union, but the identity of the predicate with the subject; and when accompanied with the negation not, it simply expresses non-identity, abstracting union or separation. This is so true and so exact, that in things really united an affirmative judgment is impossible, because they have no identity. We must, then, in such cases, if we would be enabled to make an affirmation, express the predicate in the concrete, that is, in some sense involving the idea of the subject itself in it; for the same property affirmed in the concrete cannot be in the abstract, but must rather be denied. Thus we may say, man is rational; but not, man is rationality: a body is extended; but not, a body is extension: paper is white; but not, paper is whiteness. Why is this? Is it that rationality is not in man, extension is not united to body, nor whiteness to paper? Certainly not; but if rationality be in man, extension in body, and whiteness in paper, we have only not to perceive identity between the predicates and subjects, to render affirmation impossible; on the contrary, despite the union, we have negation: thus we may say, man is not rationality; a body is not extension; paper is not whiteness.
We have said that, in order to save the expression of identity, we used the concrete instead of the abstract term, and involved in the former the idea of the subject. It cannot be said that paper is whiteness, but it may be said that paper is white; for this last proposition means that paper is a white thing; that is, we make the general idea of a thing, or the idea of a modifiable subject, enter into the predicate while in the concrete; and this subject is identical with the paper modified by whiteness.
267. Thus it is easy to see, that the expression, union of the predicate with the subject, is, at the best, inexact. Every affirmative proposition expresses the identity of the predicate with the subject. Use authorizes these modes of speaking, which still produce some confusion when we endeavor perfectly to understand these matters. And it must be observed, that ordinary language here, as often elsewhere, is admirably exact and appropriate. Nobody says, paper is whiteness, but, paper is white. It is only when we would greatly heighten the degree, to which a subject possesses a quality, that we express it in the abstract, and then we join with it the pronoun itself. Thus, speaking hyperbolically, we say a thing is beauty itself, whiteness itself, goodness itself.
268. Even what in mathematics is called equality, also means identity. Thus in this class of judgments, besides what we have observed of general in them all, to wit: the identity saved by expressing the predicate in the concrete, the very relation of equality denotes identity. This needs explanation.
Whoever says 6 + 3 = 9, expresses the same as he who says 6 + 3 are identical with 9. Clearly in the affirmation of equality, no attention is paid to the form in which the quantities are expressed, but to the quantities themselves alone; otherwise we should be unable to affirm not only identity, but also equality; for it is evident that 6 + 3, as to their form, neither written, spoken, nor thought, are identical with, or equal to, 9. The equality is in the values expressed, and these are not only equal but identical; 6 + 3 are the same as 9. The whole is not distinguished from its united part; 9 is the whole, 6 + 3 its united parts.
The different manner of conceiving 6 + 3 and 9 does not exclude the identity. The difference is in the intellectual form, and occurs not only here but also in the perceptions of the simplest things; there is nothing which we do not conceive under different aspects, and whose conception we may not decompose in various ways; but we do not therefore say that the thing ceases to be simple and identical with itself.
What we have said of an arithmetical equation may be extended to algebraical and geometrical equations. If we have an equation whereof the first member is very simple, as Z, and the second very complicated, as the development of a series, we cannot say that the first expression is equal to the second; the equality is not in the expression but in the thing expressed, in the value designated by the letters; in this sense it is true, in the former it is evidently false.
Two circumferences having the same radius are equal. Here we seem to treat solely of equality, since there are two distinct objects, the two circumferences, which may be traced on paper or represented in the imagination; yet not even in this case is the distinction true, it is only apparent, for here, as in algebraical and arithmetical equations, there is distinction and even diversity in form with identity at bottom. The principal argument, on which the distinction is founded, may be combatted by observing that the circumferences which may be traced or represented, are only forms of the idea, not the idea itself. Whether traced or represented they have a determinate size and a certain position on the planes seen or imagined;