How Sentiment Matters in International Relations: China and the South China Sea Dispute
of disrespect experiences and steadily reduce gaps in recognition and perception, a lack of respect sensitivity is anticipated to generate policy preferences and ultimately suboptimal policy responses impeding cooperation and stability in the SCS.
In so doing, a special focus is placed on the People’s Republic of China and its SCS policy. This case study is selected as China represents the primary and most influential claimant party to the dispute and is crucial for the future course of the dispute. Its collective respect expectations and disrespect experiences are assumed to essentially shape its policy preference formation and decision-making processes, thereby directly and particularly determining the future of the SCS in the decades to come. Essentially, the future of the SCS dispute is inextricably linked to the future position assumed by the PRC. Accordingly, the project’s research question reads as follows: ‘Are respect dynamics playing a substantial role in China’s approach toward the South China Sea dispute? To what extent is the perception of due respect (or disrespect) – as reflected in external behavior – shaping Chinese foreign policy preferences pertaining to the SCS?’ That said, in order to operationalize Chinese respect dynamics, elite discourses by leading Chinese foreign policy think tanks (FPTTs) between 2010 and 2016 are subject to scrutiny10. Three hypotheses guide the analysis and ultimately structure the discussion of the research question. In Hypothesis I, discursive manifestations of Chinese self-perceived status in Southeast Asia (and beyond) and national identity conceptions are examined in order to determine as to whether these correspond to China’s SCS policy and to qualify whether or not they have been subject to change over time (2007–201611). Hypothesis II seeks to identify respect and disrespect experiences on the Chinese side and critically reflects upon respect expectations manifested in expert discourses on the SCS between 2010 and 2016. This identification process is conducted by means of a fixed set of clearly defined indicators. Hypothesis III then traces and subsequently qualifies policy recommendations provided and policy measures and attitudes advocated by Chinese FPTT scholars relating to Beijing’s stance on the SCS dispute. In so doing, it is established as to whether or not patterns of a causal link between respect dynamics, on the one hand, and a specific degree of cooperation [19] suggested by FPTT scholars can be observed. This serves the purpose of determining whether disrespect collectively experienced on the Chinese side can account for the shift in Beijing’s SCS policy from restraint, low profile, stability and cooperation toward a much bolder, proactive and assertive approach that has been occurring in recent years. At the same time, implications of a potentially widening gap between Chinese self-evaluated status and identity conceptions and the extent to which these are actually viewed as adequately recognized by other SCS stakeholders on the type of policy recommendations put forward are subject to investigation as well. Moreover, the scope of critical reflection of Beijing’s conduct, on the one hand, and sensitivity and consideration pertaining to external countries’ needs and concerns (empathy), on the other hand, that is manifested in such elite discourses is scrutinized. In so doing, aforementioned deliberations and hypotheses are systematically applied to two sub-case studies, namely Chinese elite discourses on U.S. conduct in the SCS (sub-case I) and Philippine conduct in the SCS (sub-case II), respectively. Taken together, the sub-cases embody the case study design of this research.
In a nutshell, the book is structured as follows. The first chapter sketches the research interests and relevance underlying this project. Consecutively, the theoretical chapter (2) first and foremost outlines this project’s conceptualization of respect as an analytical variable of international relations theory and foreign policy analysis. In addition, it elaborates on the traditional role of respect, face and face-work in Chinese culture. Furthermore, it sets out the hypotheses and their respective links to the conceptual framework and discusses several issues of theoretical operationalization. Ultimately, the special relevance of Chinese think tanks as research subjects is elaborated upon. Chapter three provides for a brief introduction into the SCS dispute, its historical background and conflicting claims therein. Subsequently, chapter four represents the very heart of the analysis, namely the actual theory-guided examination using qualitative content analysis (QCA)12, including a detailed discussion of the hypotheses. In addition, the empirical results are streamlined and a detailed response to the research question is provided, including a critical assessment of likely limitations of the outcomes’ explanatory power. Thereafter, chapter five reflects on a set of empirical and theoretical implications that can be derived from this project’s findings and, further, puts forwards several recommendations with regard to the future of the SCS conflict and the role of respect dynamics in such conflicts at large. Finally, chapter six contains several concluding remarks while presenting a number of proposals for future research and discussion.
[20] 1. Research Interest and Relevance
“Beyond official doctrine and recent behavior, therefore, we must look deeper to understand the texture and complexity of Chinese national security thinking” (Steinberg & O’Hanlon, 2014, p. 31).
The focal point and superordinate case study of this book are Chinese elite discourses pertaining to the SCS dispute and the role of respect dynamics manifested therein. The Chinese perspective is vital for several reasons. First, the PRC represents the most influential SCS-claimant party. Its behavior and attitude directly and significantly determine the future of regional order and the SCS dispute at large. Any measure by the PRC in the SCS, no matter whether based on a misperception or deliberate action, is capable of exacerbating the dispute. The same holds true for other SCS stakeholders’ interpretation of Chinese gestures or measures in the SCS region. At the same time, Chinese conduct can easily cause spillover effects from the regional to the international level at any time, not least due to external actors’ profound stakes in the SCS, but also its vast significance for global trade, its strategic and geopolitical value, as well as its relevance for questions of international (legal) order and, arguably, international prestige and respect. Second, given the traditionally prevalent role of face and respect in Chinese culture (chapter 2.1.3), the focus on Chinese discourses is expected to represent a somewhat prototypical13 and likely case of the role of respect dynamics. Third, essentially motivated by the objectives of regional stability and conflict management, this [21] project intends to demonstrate as to why it is not feasible for scholars, experts and politicians alike, to blindly join the prominent ‘China threat’ and ‘new assertiveness/revisionism (cf. Friedberg, 2012; Lind, 2017; Mearsheimer, 2010; Thayer, 2010; Yahuda, 2013) discourses, thereby largely neglecting Beijing’s psychological motives, viewpoints and cognitive needs. That said, the decision in favor of the Chinese perspective also serves the purpose of addressing the still present (Western) bias regarding Chinese foreign policy in general, and China’s stance on the South China Sea particular. Fourth, this very case study is pursued to demonstrate that preliminary research, frequently adopting traditional international relations (IR) perspectives and analytical variables such as security and (relative) power interests, is too limited in terms of its explanatory power with regard to China’s modified SCS policy in specific and prospects of effective SCS conflict management at large. This equally applies to research employing economic variables such as economic interdependence, economic gains or economic diplomacy. They, too, are neither capable of providing a comprehensive account of the rapid increase in tensions in the SCS as of 2009 and particularly 2012, nor of potential variances in Chinese assessment of other SCS stakeholders’ attitudes and conduct vis-à- vis itself over time. Moreover, major schools of thought focusing on the aforementioned variables widely regard state behavior to be rational14, an assumption not shared by this book. Instead, seeking to overcome the rational-irrational dichotomy in IR research, it maintains that disrespect may fuel emotions15 and other psychological effects, which in turn lead to less rational preferences and responses that are not the result of any rational calculation. Hence, simply imposing traditional, Western-style international relations theory concepts and interpretations on China is not sufficient to provide a fully-fledged picture of Chinese viewpoints and causes of action:
“[B]ecause China, like any other power, big or small, is not alone in the world, there is a reciprocal influence that external powers and strategic thinkers will inevitably exert in setting [22] China’s path. This is yet another reason why gaining insider knowledge of the current Chinese strategic debate is of the utmost importance” (Zhou Liqun, 2010,