evading military service. Another 1,347 individuals identified themselves voluntarily as wrong-doers. Fifty-nine “criminal” families—a total of 142 individuals—were displaced. Four hundred and thirty-eight shelters containing food and other provisions were found (some of them had been set up by farmers in order to hide their produce and assets so as to avoid the obligation to provide the required in-kind contribution) alongside fourteen shelters with arms. During the operation, there were ten minor clashes with UPA fighters in which the NKVD lost three soldiers killed and another four wounded.19
The operation carried out on 21 March 1945 near the village of Sadzhava in Bohorodchany raion, Stanislav oblast’, was a major success for the Soviets. It involved a violent confrontation of an UPA kuren (the equivalent of a battalion) known as “Smertonostsy” with an NKVD unit. 110 insurgents were killed. Another operation in Stanislav oblast’ was carried out between 17 and 29 April 1945. It covered the difficult mountainous areas of Zhabe, Yabluniv, Kuty, Zabolottya, Kolomyia, Yaremche raions. Two UPA kurens were stationed there (including the one led by “Nedobity”) together with nine training sotnias (squadrons). According to the Soviets, the operation triggered panic among the guerrilla fighters. The units scattered and moved on in small groups. 547 “criminals” were killed, 2,502 were captured, and 1,745 individuals identified themselves. The Soviets lost two soldiers killed and another twenty-six wounded.20
The operations carried out by the Soviets in winter 1945 decimated the Carpathian UPA units. They were also intended as a signal that the Soviet leadership was not going to leave even the most remote areas unattended. Once a wave of major cleansing and blocking operations swept through the region, the NKVD tried to “saturate” the area covered by guerrilla fighter activity with Reconnaissance-Pursuit Groups (RPG) which patrolled the area, organized ambushes in locations where guerrilla fighters were likely to appear, and also covered those officers who contacted their spy network. Deployment of small garrisons of NKVD troops in bigger towns enabled the pursuit groups to chase guerrilla fighters whenever these carried out their actions; some of these groups were specially appointed to fight specific units. The use of dogs was recommended during such pursuit. Throughout this period, based on information provided by spy networks, targeted operations to eliminate the spotted guerrilla fighters were being carried out as well.
Frequent NKVD dragnet operations forced the guerrilla fighters to remain constantly vigilant. They made some fighters doubt in the prospects of victory. In addition, they forced the fighters to operate in small groups only—this, in turn, enabled the Soviets to send smaller sub-units, which were constantly maneuvering in this area, to carry out operations against guerrilla fighters. Although most of these operations (and there were literally thousands of them) failed to bring any positive results, they triggered constant tension in the areas “infected with criminal activity.”
During combat activities, units of NKVD troops were accompanied by at least one or two officers representing operational security bodies. They contacted the spy network, made decisions regarding operational deployment of specific soldiers, and carried out interrogations of captured guerrilla fighters and members of the underground movement on the spot immediately after the clashes. Although no monograph discussing the NKVD’s investigative methods has been published, one thing is certain: these methods were surprisingly effective. Available materials indicate that Soviet officers were capable of pressurizing a major portion of arrested individuals into speaking. Heroic attitudes were rare. What is the most surprising is the speed at which members of the underground movement cracked under interrogation—and it was frequently the speed that determined whether the information obtained was useful (there were cases when the detainees disclosed the hiding place of their closest family members within one or two hours). Perhaps the answer to this puzzle can be deduced from a medical report compiled regarding the last commander of the Lithuanian underground movement, Adolf Ramanauskas, who was captured on 12 October 1956. Three days later, he was taken to hospital unconscious and the doctors described his condition in the following way:
The right eye is covered by a hematoma, six wounds on the eyelid have been found … they were most likely inflicted on him using a thin wire or a nail which was inserted deep into his eyeball. Numerous hematomas on the abdomen, the middle finger of his left palm has been cut off … a major bloody scar was revealed on the right-hand side of his scrotum … both testes and both deferent ducts have been removed.21
There is no reason to think that the NKVD operating in Ukraine was more lenient than its equivalent operating in Lithuania.
In addition, the NKVD troops used all sorts of tricks. One of such tricks involved provoking the UPA to attack in locations where ambushes had been set up. On routes which were particularly frequently attacked by the UPA, situations were staged involving for example a car breakdown. A portion of soldiers remained hiding in a truck filled with weapons ready to fire, whereas several others were busy mending the vehicle. Sometimes a poorly protected car “broke down” in a location where another group of Soviets had already secretly assumed their positions. In addition, ambushes were set up for example in the vicinity of village grocery stores immediately following the delivery of goods, and near trucks with supplies whose drivers were “thoughtless” enough to leave them in the village overnight. The Soviets also set up ambushes near the bodies of killed guerrilla fighters and near the agent who stayed in the village overnight. For example, on 4 December 1945 an NKVD operational group killed three UPA members in the village of Ustya in Ternopil oblast’. Their bodies were left where they were killed, however, an ambush was secretly set up in the vicinity of this location. On the same night, another three guerrilla fighters were killed in this ambush.22
One important method of fighting the guerrilla movement involved forced displacement of the civilian population. In line with recommendations issued by Beria, the deported individuals included not only those who were suspected of contacting the underground movement but also entire families of identified members of the underground. These measures effectively intimidated the local residents and discouraged them from supporting the activity of the underground movement. Although they were unable—for example, for technical reasons—to displace entire nations, the communists focused their repressive measures on families of individuals linked to the guerrilla fighter movement and the underground movement. The lists of names of individuals to be deported were compiled by an NKVD/NKGB officer.
The first transport of displaced persons departed on 7 May 1944. It carried around two thousand individuals. In the initial period, fifteen to twenty individuals were placed in one car. This triggered protest from Deputy People’s Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR Chernyshev, which resulted in thirty to thirty-five individuals being placed in one car “in conformity with the standards.” In this way, the already difficult travel conditions got even worse as winter came. In some transports no stoves were available. Due to freezing weather, in transport no. 49339, which departed from Ternopil’, twelve children died and many other individuals fell ill. The displaced persons were transported for example to the Komi Republic and to Irkutsk oblast’, where they were used as labor during tree felling and in mining. In 1944–45, a total of more than thirty thousand individuals were displaced and transported deep into the USSR.23
Numerous party members frequently criticized the NKVD Internal Troops for their ineffectiveness. NKVD commanders refuted these accusations, arguing that many of their failures resulted from the lack of reliable information received from the NKGB and within the NKVD itself. During a meeting in Rivne oblast’, defending himself against these claims, General Bragin astutely reminded the employees of the party obkom that without the involvement of the Internal Troops the party would not have been able to operate in the field and that his soldiers fight “and at the same time they endure many hardships, eat too little, have too little sleep and risk their necks.”24 Bragin argued that the NKVD troops showed… excessive “humanism.”