of march to the northward checked. Diverging to the westward for nearly 200 miles, they entered the province of Shensi, and on the 4th of September captured the city of Yuen-keuh. This was the first city of magnitude taken since leaving Nankin, and the treasure and supplies found at this place proved very acceptable to the worn and destitute army. They once more turned northwards, and marched steadily forward in the direction of Pekin, capturing many important cities on the way. Late in the same month they entered Chih-le, the most northern province of the empire, and that in which Pekin is situated. Advancing with rapidity, and capturing city after city, towards the end of October they reached the Grand Canal, and proceeding by this, in a few days arrived at and captured the town of Tsing-hae, distant some twenty miles from the port of Tien-tsin. Tsing-hae now became the head-quarters of the Ti-ping army; while the main body occupied the place, a column was detached against Tien-tsin, before which city it appeared on the 30th October; but being repulsed with considerable loss, the whole army went into winter quarters at Tsing-hae.
In the meanwhile, the Manchoo court at Pekin was seriously alarmed at the progress the Ti-pings were making, they being now distant but a few days' march. Every exertion was made to stop their further progress; not only was the Manchoo garrison of Pekin despatched against them, but large bodies of Mongols were engaged and sent before Tsing-hae early in November; and these forces combining with the Imperialist troops that had followed the Ti-pings from the first day they crossed the Yang-tze, and continually receiving reinforcements from every garrison town they passed, now closely blockaded the Ti-ping position.
Soon after the departure of the first northern army, in May, a large force was marched back upon the old route taken by the Ti-pings in their advance upon Nankin. Proceeding up the Yang-tze-kiang, Ngan-king, the capital of the province of Ngan-whui, was captured and made a base for further operations. Many cities were captured, and their stores and treasuries convoyed down to Nankin. Two strong columns were now detached from Ngan-king, one in a westerly direction, penetrating through the provinces of Kiang-si and Hoo-nan, while the other started due north to the reinforcement of the army blockaded at Tsing-hae. Early in 1854, the western army having passed the Tung-ting lake, retraced a part of their old line of march, capturing the numerous cities on the bank of the Yang-tze river. About May this army arrived before the three cities of Han-kow, Han-yang, and Wu-chang, the capital of Hoo-peh, conveying the immense supplies they had already captured; after a short siege, these important places fell, thus placing the Ti-pings in possession of all the principal cities from thence to Chin-kiang, a distance of more than 450 miles, and comprising the richest and most fertile portion of the Yang-tze provinces.
In the meanwhile the northern column (which left Ngan-king some time in November, 1853), making forced marches through Ngan-whui, struck the Grand Canal in the province of Kiang-su, and rapidly following its course through Shang-tung, city after city falling before its victorious march, crossed the Yellow River in March, 1854, and captured by storm, on the 12th April, the strongly-fortified city of Lin-tsing, on the border of the northern province, Chih-le.
During this time the army at Tsing-hae remained closely blockaded. While, entirely cut off from all supplies or reinforcements, it became fast reduced by sickness, famine, and the sword; the enemy, upon the contrary (but a few days' march from Tien-tsin, the great northern commercial city and grain depôt; in the immediate vicinity of Tartary, and, moreover, hardy and inured to the keen wintry storms, so trying to the lightly-clad southerners, comprising the Ti-ping forces) had everything in their favour. Large bodies of Mongolian troops were hired and despatched by the Manchoo government against the blockaded rebels—the Manchoo reserves, and even a large contingent of volunteer Chinese, were sent to swell the imperialist ranks; and while time fast reduced the number and efficiency of the Ti-pings, their foe day by day became more numerous and formidable. The small Ti-ping army at the first scarcely mustered seven thousand strong. Owing to the rapidity of their march, the numbers who joined them by the way were inconsiderable, compared with the resources of the enemy; the only addition they received of any importance was in the province of Ho-nan, where a detachment of local insurrectionists, nearly five thousand strong, joined them; but this reinforcement was more than cancelled by their losses in battle and from disease. The courage and discipline of this small army must have been something wonderful. The steadfast perseverance of their onward march, in the face of seemingly insurmountable difficulties; their steady resistance to the overwhelming numbers of the fur-clad hardy Tartar cavalry—an arm in which they were totally deficient, and could not effectually oppose; their firm endurance of the rigours of the northern winter, close to the icy steppes of Tartary, to which they were unaccustomed, and for which they were unprepared; their isolated march of more than fourteen hundred miles; the heroism with which they supported attack, and finally their successful escape—all constitute one of the most remarkable campaigns of modern times.
During the months of November and December the besieged made several desperate but unavailing sorties, the enemy in each case repulsing them with heavy loss. At last, early in February, 1854, after an occupation of more than three months, hopeless of success, with famine in their camp, and no prospect of succour from their friends, the whole garrison sallied out and succeeded in cutting their way through the besiegers. With gallantry hitherto unknown to the Chinese, this small but heroic band commenced the most arduous operation of any army—a retreat in the presence of a vastly superior enemy. Inch by inch they retired, continually facing about to repel the pursuing host. Masses of Tartar cavalry whirled around them, now charging impetuously on front, rear, and flanks, now hurrying in advance to dispute some difficult passage; heavy columns of infantry, surrounding them on every side, rushed incessantly to the attack, confident in their overwhelming numbers, and encouraged by the hope of reward; yet never for a moment did they succeed in breaking the unfaltering and orderly retreat of the Ti-ping army, which slowly retired with its face to the foe, until, after three months' endurance, a junction was effected with the forces which garrisoned the city of Lin-tsing.
It is a singular fact that the Manchoo government dreaded the approach of the small Ti-ping army more than the advance of the allied English and French upon Pekin in 1860. An extract from a memorial of the Board of Censors to the Emperor, found in the Summer Palace, runs thus:—
"In 1853, when the Cantonese rebels overran the country, advancing impetuously towards the north, the alarm excited in the capital was many times more serious than that now manifested."
The fate of the Manchoo rule hung trembling in the balance, and the consciousness of well-merited destruction struck terror to the hearts of the corrupt and sanguinary government. A little more energy and determination at this period would have won the empire; had the first northern army been able to maintain itself at Tsing-hae until the arrival of the second, the dynasty of Ta-tsing would have terminated. The combined forces could assuredly have captured and held Tien-tsin until the arrival of further reinforcements from Nankin, even if the possession of that city, the grand supply depôt of Pekin, had not caused the fall of the capital. The extraordinary northern march, and the length of time that little army was able to retain its menacing position, afford ample evidence that greater strength would have ensured its success. Through neglecting that favourable and momentous opportunity, the Tien-wang forfeited the grand object of his efforts when open to his grasp. That his powerful mind was unequal to the occasion is far less probable than that his expectations of his countrymen were not realized. It is impossible that he could be ignorant of the advantages of combination, and it appears certain that he reckoned upon the general rising of the Chinese, as well as on the omnipotent assistance of God. This is, in fact, manifestly plain from his proclamations, and affords the only reasonable explanation of his sending several small armies unsupported in totally divergent courses, rather than concentrating all his available forces, and aiming directly at the head-quarters of the Manchoo dynasty.
Although several smaller detachments joined the Ti-ping army at Lin-tsing, it was unable to advance upon Pekin again; the favourable moment having once passed, did not return. Several severe actions were contested with no material advantage upon either side, and the semi-steel-clad warriors of inner Mongolia were well matched by the undefended revolutionists. Greatly harassed by the numerous cavalry of the enemy, in May, 1854, the Ti-ping army slowly turned towards the south, continually engaging the Imperialist forces and capturing many important cities to the north of the Yang-tze river.
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