Keith D. Dickson

American Civil War For Dummies


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Union had a core of over 16,000 regular (semiprofessional) soldiers who were capable of overseeing conditions on the frontier but were far from capable of providing the leadership and training necessary to turn masses of unruly volunteers into soldiers. The U.S. government as a result kept regular units separate from volunteers. Thus, the regular army remained small throughout the war, much of its strength still parceled out on the western frontier guarding against American Indian raids. The Confederacy, of course, had no regular army, but did make the best use of those regulars who had joined the Confederate army. These officers were integrated into the volunteer units to provide valuable leadership and training. For both armies, the process of turning civilians into soldiers fell to a combination of professional officers and former West Point graduates who returned to active service.

      Responding to the call: The militia

      Nearly every state had militia units, the forerunner of our National Guard units today. Militia units were locally recruited volunteers that the state intended to use in an emergency or to be called up to join the regular army during a war. Over the years, largely due to neglect from the state government, they had become more social drinking organizations than military units. The few called up for the Mexican-American War were so poor that they were never used in combat. In reality, other than having a rudimentary knowledge of military formations and use of weapons, the vast majority of militia units were of no immediate use.

      Joining to fight: Volunteers — then Conscripts

      Volunteer units were the most common military organizations at this early stage of the war. Young men from towns and cities formed ad hoc military organizations, usually companies, volunteering for military service for 90 days (others volunteered for three years). These units would report to their state capital, where they would be combined with other volunteer units to form regiments. Volunteer companies elected their own officers, usually the most popular or best politician among the group.

      ELECTING OFFICERS IS A BAD IDEA

      While a good idea for the Kiwanis club, having the rank and file elect leaders in military units is not wise. Military leaders have the unenviable task of ordering their soldiers to do things that will result in possible wounds or death. Friendship in this case must be set aside, and those who are ordered to face such danger have to have confidence in the man giving the order. The one who won the popularity contest might not necessarily be up to such a task or the responsibility. Although the election of officers continued for some years (especially in the Confederate armies), the practice mostly died out, and a system of merit promotions based on demonstrated ability took its place.

While volunteers are usually plentiful at the onset of any war, wars do not grow in popularity after the onset of combat. The pool of volunteers quickly dries up, leaving the government only one choice: conscription, or as the U.S. government in 1862 conveniently put it, “universal military liability.” This meant all able-bodied male citizens by law could be enrolled in the army by compulsion (force). Both the Union and Confederate governments resorted to conscription early in the war to maintain manpower requirements.

      After volunteer regiments were formed (initially made up of about 1,000 men), they were shipped to an assembly point, most often the capital city (either Richmond or Washington), were equipped as best as possible, organized into brigades and divisions, and then into a corps. Once the command structure had been established, the new soldiers were introduced to the discipline and drill necessary to maneuver and fight in battle. In most cases, the regimental, brigade, division, and corps commanders of these new units had only a bit more experience than their soldiers did.

      In the Union army, state governors gave rank to officers of the newly formed regiments. Some of these officers inevitably were political friends, given a plum assignment because they had influence at election time. President Lincoln appointed generals. While many generals he appointed had experience as regular army officers, a fair number of appointments went to Democrats or influential Republicans in key states who helped Lincoln maintain his precarious wartime coalition. Others — representatives of key immigrant groups with powerful voting blocs (the Irish and the Germans) — received general’s stars. West Point graduates, who had some exposure to military discipline and structure, were highly valued and contributed a great deal to molding capable units.

      When comparing the overall quality of officer talent between the Union and the Confederacy, the advantages initially clearly lay with the Confederacy. Some of the most capable officers in the U.S. Army had joined the Confederacy. The South was also blessed with a superior cadre of mid-level officers who had graduated from the many military colleges found in nearly every Southern state. These men easily integrated into the army and immediately made their presence felt, providing leadership and discipline for the often unruly volunteers. The depth of military talent and experience within the Confederate officer ranks helped them to create a viable military force within a relatively short period of time, especially in the Eastern Theater. Regardless of their officer leadership, both the Union and Confederate armies would discover that the battlefield would teach the hardest lessons.

      Military bloopers: The political generals

      The political generals, as the generals who were appointed for solely political reasons were known, continued to plague both armies throughout the war. Lacking any military talent and blundering from one disaster to another, they nonetheless remained as a symbol of the critical link between politics and war. Most of these generals sought more useful (and safer) opportunities for national service outside of the army after their first taste of combat. To be fair, some officers who received their commissions through political connections displayed skill and talent, but these were the exceptions.

      Rookies learning a new trade: the blind leading the blind

      In the early months of the war, it was not unusual to see newly commissioned captains, majors, colonels, and generals in the camps of both armies pouring over instruction manuals, trying to stay one step ahead of their trainees. Because so many officers were required for the large new armies, there was not enough expertise to go around. Officers with military experience were usually promoted to high rank early in the war. That left all the ranks of junior officers to be filled with volunteers who often had no idea what their role was in a military organization. Not only did the privates have to learn what soldiers did, but also the new officers had to learn soldier skills in addition to learning their own jobs. Even President Lincoln took time to study military science to acquaint himself with the terms and concepts of military operations — in just about the same way you are doing now!

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