by the West in a Muslim country is well nigh impossible to countenance. But he is determined not to abandon those fighting Gaddafi. He has been much influenced by a book, Last Chance: The Middle East in the Balance by David Gardner of the Financial Times. ‘Unless the Arab countries can find a way out of this pit of autocracy, their people will be condemned to bleak lives of despair’, Gardner writes.10 Cameron is full of zeal: his instincts are with the people on the streets. Weighing heavily in his mind is the human cost of inaction. His moral purpose is fully shared by Llewellyn.
A divide is opening up on the NSC with Richards, and less strongly John Sawers, warning about the risks of a ‘half-baked’ military intervention. They believe that the ‘idea of a simple no-fly zone’ will make no difference to the situation on the ground. Hague is in favour, cautiously, of military intervention. In Cabinet, George Osborne and Michael Gove are most supportive of action, as is – to Number 10’s surprise – Ken Clarke, who nine years before defied the Tory whip and voted against the Iraq War. Fox argues that Britain cannot possibly engage in an open-ended commitment at the very time, following the SDSR review, when it is regrouping its defence forces. The deteriorating position in Yemen and Bahrain concerns him, and he thinks it will be a mistake to put all the British military assets into Libya.11 A generational split is opening up in the daily meetings of the NSC. Younger members, dubbed the ‘forty-something generation’ – including Cameron, Clegg, Llewellyn and others – for whom Bosnia was a formative experience, are in favour of action; older voices, and almost all officials, are advising, ‘We will have to strike a deal with Gaddafi.’ Some military and intelligence officials believe Cameron’s team are ‘twenty years out of date when it comes to dealing with conflict’, having not been immersed in the Iraq and Afghan campaigns.
On 6 March, Gaddafi’s army launches a tank and artillery counter-offensive against the rebels, smashing their disorganised forces, and advances swiftly along the Libyan coast towards Benghazi where he plans to put down the uprising. On Monday 7 March, the differences between Cabinet members come out into the open at a special Cabinet meeting held in Derby. Cameron startles ministers by saying he does not regard UN support as a prerequisite for military intervention in Libya, desirable though it may be. He is becoming steelier by the day. He convenes a private meeting in Downing Street for Libyan exiles and specialists: their overwhelming message is that the uprising is genuinely nationalist and democratic, and Libya will not descend into a tribal war if the West intervenes.12
The NSC start meeting at least once a day: there are sixty-nine meetings of the full NSC or its Libya subcommittee over the entire episode. Cameron is becoming increasingly impatient with the Whitehall machine. He forces the pace and demands papers from the NSC secretariat. It produces a menu of options including air strikes and mentoring teams to guide the rebel forces. One option alone is off the table, ‘boots on the ground’, as in Iraq and Afghanistan. No one is advocating this. Cameron understands the risks of doing so. Rather he wants to strengthen the opposition to Gaddafi and he believes that support from the international community is necessary if they are to achieve that. Cameron says that he’s willing to risk failure; officials, however, are reluctant to consider failure as an option. An NSC meeting later in that month tellingly reveals the widening split between Cameron and his officials over Libya as well as illustrating the PM’s own motivations on the matter. Upon declaring to those assembled that ‘intervention in Libya is in the British national interest, speak now or hold your peace’, the prime minister is confronted by John Sawers, who disputes this is a matter of national interest. He wants to do it for humanitarian reasons, Sawers tells him. Cameron is surprised by the challenge, but quickly answers somewhat unsatisfactorily, ‘Yes, yes, but it is important that we do these things.’ It is answers like this that lead many in the intelligence and defence community to worry that the whole situation is ‘not clearly thought through’.
On 11 March, EU leaders meet at an emergency summit in Brussels to discuss the deteriorating situation. Cameron arrives wanting a very tough communiqué in support of decisive action. He has been talking daily to an increasingly emotional Sarkozy, who is saying that Libya is the great humanitarian issue of the day. On the other hand, some argue he has not been talking or working closely enough with Obama. At dinner with fellow leaders, Sarkozy becomes so angry with the failure of other leaders to support the emerging Anglo-French initiative that he storms out dramatically. Cameron follows him out of the room to placate him. ‘Forget it,’ the French president snaps at him, ‘I’ve had enough of these people.’ ‘Well Nicolas,’ Cameron replies, ‘I still think we should have a go and get some language that could be useful for us.’ ‘I disagree. It’s better to tell the media they are complete weaklings who are happy to see Gaddafi massacre innocent people.’ ‘No, no,’ replies Cameron, ‘it’s important to try and get at least some support as long as we have a chance.’ He soothes Sarkozy enough to bring him back to the table, but their fellow EU leaders are still far from convinced of the need for a strong EU response. Conspicuous in its opposition is Germany. Angela Merkel feels let down and out of the loop. Obama has had an eleventh-hour change of heart, and is now in favour of supporting a no-fly zone, although it is still unclear whether the US would take part. But his switch wasn’t communicated to Merkel earlier. The Americans feel that they are being bounced into action, due to a lack of communication, and this explains their later desire to ‘supersede what the Europeans had been doing’. Ever since 1945, a core tenet of German foreign policy has been to support the US and French line. Where they diverge, as over Iraq in 2003, the decision is always to go with one or the other. On Libya, Germany finds herself at odds with both of her traditional allies.13 Merkel later tells Cameron that one of her biggest regrets of her time as chancellor was for Germany to end up outside the coalition over Libya. But within her own closed circle, she is unapologetic about Libya, and feels vindicated by the subsequent course of events.
Cameron and Sarkozy have more success with the Arab League, who they have been intensively lobbying. Hague’s lobbying of the Egyptian Secretary General of the Arab League, Amr Moussa, is crucial. On 12 March, the Arab League calls for the UN Security Council to impose a no-fly zone over Libya, saying that the Gaddafi government has ‘lost its sovereignty’. On 14 March, however, embarrassment is caused in London and Paris when Saudi and Emirati troops help crush protests in Bahrain, shattering any illusion that the Gulf States are being supportive in Libya because of a newfound affection for democracy and human rights. Their concerns remain stability, not democracy.
Arab support, regardless of the niceties, is crucial in gaining UN Security Council support for Resolution 1973, advocating ‘all necessary measures’ to be taken to protect Libyan civilians. Cameron and Sarkozy concentrate their lobbying on the White House. Peter Ricketts’ contacts in the Obama administration help, as does lobbying by long-serving British ambassador, Nigel Sheinwald. Their task is not helped by the administration being split down the middle, which explains Obama’s wobbling. In favour of UNSCR 1973 are Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, Vice President Joe Biden, and UN ambassador Susan Rice. In opposition are most of the State Department, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, and National Security Advisor Thomas Donilon. The Pentagon and State Department talk to their opposite numbers in London, smelling their scepticism, which does nothing to increase their own enthusiasm for action.
It is St Patrick’s Day weekend, the big annual Irish celebration in the US calendar. Sheinwald talks to Obama in the margins of the celebrations. It’s clear there will be military action from the British and French, he says, with or without the Americans. Obama’s unclear position has been causing concern and anxiety in Downing Street. ‘He won’t take our calls because he doesn’t know where he stands. It’s not very impressive,’ spits out one aide.
On 12 March, with the UN Security Council debate imminent, Cameron phones Merkel. ‘I know you are very sceptical on this, but can you at least abstain? It will be a very close vote,’ he pleads. ‘I don’t want to vote against my comrades. I think I will abstain. But I will not participate militarily,’ she says. As an aside, she says to Cameron, to whom she’s becoming increasingly close: ‘One day, I really want you to tell me what it is with Libya: