killing large numbers of people. It’s not like Darfur or Cote d’Ivoire,’ two places where recent massacres had occurred, he responds. She pauses. ‘I think I see why you see it differently.’ She likes Cameron and seeks to understand why they are at loggerheads.
On 17 March, to the surprise of many who thought that the Russians would block it, UNSCR 1973 is passed by ten votes to zero, with five abstentions (Russia, Germany, Brazil, China and India). Cameron now has legal cover from the UN. In his mind and that of his aides, he must avoid anything akin to the anarchic decision-making process of Blair in the run-up to the Iraq War. He knows that the first fresh British military intervention since Iraq will be much the stronger for explicit UN authorisation. All involved weigh the possibility that they will face the prospect of Iraq-style inquiries hanging over them in the future. No one wants to be involved in any decision which is not completely defensible, not least with the Chilcot Inquiry, the last of several into the Iraq War, still in full swing. Support of the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) and Arab League has fortified the cause immeasurably: there is genuine regional support from other Arab and Muslim states. This is to be no Holy War against Islam.
On Friday 18 March, Cameron holds an emergency Cabinet meeting. It is briefed out to the media that no ministers are considering resigning in disagreement, as Robin Cook and Clare Short did from Blair’s Cabinet over Iraq in 2003.14 Fox, despite earlier qualms, is now totally behind the action proposed. As ministers arrive at the meeting, the written legal advice from the Attorney General, Dominic Grieve, giving his opinion on the legitimacy of any actions is placed in front of each seat around the Cabinet table.15 Later that day, Cameron makes a statement in the House of Commons, flanked by the Attorney General, emphasising again that there are no difficulties on the legality of any action that might take place. The PM commits British forces to enforcing a no-fly zone in Libya. As Matthew d’Ancona, the journalist closest to the Cameron team, writes in his column for the Sunday Telegraph two days later, ‘whatever now happens in the skies of Benghazi and the streets of Tripoli, there will be no allegations in the months and years to come that the PM misled the Commons, or that the conflict was conducted by a “sofa government”’.16 Cameron’s team remain acutely aware of the lessons of the build-up to the invasion of Iraq in 2003. They knew they could not proceed without full legal cover and proper consultation of the Cabinet.
An important message is received at Number 10. Now that the UN Resolution has passed, Obama at last wants to speak to him. He is blunt, telling him that America will help for the first week of action. ‘After that, it’s going to be a British and French operation,’ Obama tells him. Cameron and the team sit down after the call to puzzle out exactly what the president means. ‘What do you think we should now do?’ Cameron asks each in turn. ‘Accept the offer but try and tease more out of him’ is the consensus. They are massively bolstered by having Obama’s support, difficult though it has been to secure. They know that without it, they would be very exposed.
By 18 March, the Libyan army is at the outskirts of Benghazi. The atmosphere in London and Paris is very tense, the expectation being that Benghazi might fall at any moment. Had Gaddafi pulled his forces back from threatening the city, indeed the UN Resolution might not have passed. On Saturday 19 March, Sarkozy convenes a summit in Paris to affirm the coalition’s commitments in the wake of UNSCR 1973 passing. While Clegg chairs the NSC in Whitehall, Cameron boards a Eurostar train to Paris. Every half an hour, he receives updates from the NSC on latest developments. As the train slows down into Gare du Nord, he gives his authorisation for British military action. Later he describes this as the moment he ‘took the decision to go to war on a mobile phone in France’. On an open line he instructs the NSC: ‘We’ve got to do this.’
Moments later, they pull into the station, and are whisked through the streets at seventy miles an hour to the Elysée Palace. The PM’s party are pointed to a room, followed shortly after by Hillary Clinton, who has just flown in. Sarkozy is also present, accompanied by a French general who briefs the small group about French attacks that day. ‘What about air defences?’ Cameron asks the French president. Sarkozy hasn’t a clue. He wheels around to his general and asks, ‘What about air defences?’ Satisfied with the general’s response, they go through to lunch where they meet fellow leaders conjoined in military action, including representatives from Arab states. As they begin their meeting that afternoon, French fighter planes are going into action. To Ricketts, it is nothing if not a ‘dramatic meeting’.17 The British ambassador to France, Peter Westmacott, comments how Cameron is happy letting Sarkozy chair the meeting and take the credit for launching the Franco-British operation.18 Some of the leaders are not happy, and murmur that Sarkozy is taking too much of the limelight: they think he is trying to glorify ‘La France’. When they are told about French aircraft going into action in Libya, without their being warned, discontent rises. The participants nevertheless conclude the summit, signing a joint declaration to enforce UNSCR 1973 with all necessary actions, including military force.
On the train back to London, Cameron is thoughtful. He realises that for his first time as prime minister, he has agreed to a plan of action himself in which people will die. Libya, for better or worse, will be his war. There can be no disguising this. Part of him always felt that Afghanistan belonged to someone else. This war will have his name on it. Once back in Downing Street, he goes quietly to his office and closes the door. He reads his brief for what he will shortly say to the camera. Once he has the text clear in his mind, he walks back down the corridor and out into Downing Street to announce that British planes that evening will be in action with the United States Air Force in the skies above Libya.
Intense fighting is taking place around Benghazi. On the evening of Saturday 19 March, British war ships and submarines in the Mediterranean launch Tomahawk cruise missiles against air defence system targets, and in the early hours of 20 March, RAF fighter jets strike against Gaddafi’s forces along the coastal highway south of Benghazi. Most of his air defences are knocked out, and Gaddafi’s forces are in retreat.19 On Monday 21 March, Cameron opens the Commons debate on military action in Libya. MPs vote 557 to thirteen in support of military operations, with only one Conservative MP, John Baron, voting against the measure. On 24 March, NATO takes over command of the no-fly zone from the United States. As Obama indicated before the operation began, the US participates for a short while, then steps back. There is a debate over whether Britain and France should jointly lead the operation from headquarters in Northwood, Hertfordshire, instead of using NATO command structures, given the reticence of members such as Germany and Turkey. The White House insists, however, that their ‘air support’ functions (required for target mapping, analysis and refuelling) – set to continue after their military operations have ceased – only be available to the allies through NATO HQ. This helps to pressurise sceptics, above all Germany, to agree to a NATO-led operation. There is still no consensus amongst the allies on whether to target the air campaign against Gaddafi’s ground forces.
On 26 March, rebel Libyan forces begin a major offensive against the Gaddafi regime, which demands a response from London, Paris and their allies. What now? On Tuesday 29 March, Cameron opens a conference in London attended by UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon and leaders across the coalition, to remind them of their core mission, to assess the mission to date, and to begin planning for a post-Gaddafi Libya. Cameron reminds the conference poignantly that many would have died in Benghazi had Gaddafi’s forces been allowed to take the city, before handing the chair to Hague. However, no clear sense of purpose emerges from the conference, particularly over a post-war strategy.20
Despite the reservations in Whitehall, Cabinet and the military, Cameron has achieved virtual unanimity behind British action. But in the following weeks and months, as progress against Gaddafi becomes bogged down, it all becomes very messy. Ken Clarke breaks cover, to the irritation of Number 10, saying that he was ‘still not totally convinced anyone knows where we are going now’.21 There are several tense