Glossary
| CJ | Northern Ireland Files |
| DE | Dáil Éireann, official debates |
| DFA | Department of Foreign Affairs |
| DT | Department of the Taoiseach |
| DUP | Democratic Unionist Party |
| EEC | European Economic Community |
| FCO | Foreign and Commonwealth Office |
| GUBU | Grotesque, unbelievable, bizarre and unprecedented |
| HA | Home Affairs |
| HO | Home Office |
| IRA | Irish Republican Army |
| IRB | Irish Republican Brotherhood |
| LDF | Local Defence Force (Irish) |
| LHL | Linen Hall Library |
| LSF | Auxiliary Local Security Force (Irish) |
| NAI | National Archives of Ireland, Dublin |
| NATO | North Atlantic Treaty Organisation |
| NAUK | National Archives of United Kingdom, London |
| NLI | National Library of Ireland, Dublin |
| PDs | Progressive Democrats |
| PIRA | Provisional Irish Republican Army |
| PREM | Prime Minister’s Office |
| PRONI | Public Records Office of Northern Ireland |
| RUC | Royal Ulster Constabulary |
| SDLP | Social Democratic and Labour Party |
| SE | Seanad Éireann, official debates |
| UCDA | University College Dublin Archives, Dublin |
| UN | United Nations |
| UDA | Ulster Defence Association |
| UUP | Ulster Unionist Party |
| UVF | Ulster Volunteer Force |
| WR | War Office |
Note on Capitals
Readers should note that, in general, this study has followed the Irish Historical Studies rules for capital letters and punctuations. The use of a capital U for Unionists or Unionism denotes organised unionism, i.e. the Ulster Unionist Party; the use of lower case, unionist opinion, etc., refers to those citizens of Northern Ireland who wished to maintain the Union between Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Likewise, a capital N for Nationalists refers to organised nationalism, i.e. the Nationalists Party in Northern Ireland; the use of lower case, nationalist opinion, etc., refers to the nationalist population of Northern Ireland who opposed the partition of Ireland. The use of lower case is, likewise, used to refer to political/government positions associated with politicians and civil servants, i.e. the use of lower case is used when referring to ‘taoiseach’ and ‘prime minister’. The use of capitals is employed to refer to government departments, i.e. ‘the Department of the Taoiseach’ and the ‘Foreign and Commonwealth Office’.
Note on Primary Sources
As a successful accountant by profession, Charles J. Haughey was aware that the most dangerous trail of all was the paper trail. In his financial affairs he always sought to conceal his wealth – he tried his upmost to deal in cash and preferred for others, chiefly his account Des Traynor, to ‘manage’ his financial dealings. Haughey’s reluctance to maintain a financial paper trail naturally found its way into other aspects of his live. As this book illustrates, he was a very secretive, indeed cunning, man. It is for this reason that we will never be able to provide an unbridled story of Haughey’s involvement with the Northern Ireland question, not least when assessing his involvement with the scandalous Arms Crisis of 1970. He refused to ever speak about his involvement in the Crisis, never mind provide a written record.
Despite the many challenges facing the historian when examining Haughey’s private and public attitude to Northern Ireland and more generally Anglo-Irish relations, all is not lost. In fact, this book has brought together an assortment of archival material never before correlated into a single study. It is no coincidence that the analysis contained within this study focuses predominately on Haughey’s Northern Ireland policy during his period as Fianna Fáil leader (1979–92), chiefly from 1979 to 1987. The explanation for this approach is straightforward. This was a period when Haughey was either taoiseach or leader of the opposition. As a result, a substantial selection of archival material exists that relates directly to Haughey’s involvement with Northern Ireland and more generally Anglo-Irish relations during this timeframe.
Under the Irish government’s current ‘30-year rule’, departmental government files from the National Archives of Ireland (NAI), specifically the Department of the Taoiseach (DT) and Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), have proved invaluable during the research stages of this book.1 For instance, access to an array of files from these government departments enables a fresh examination of the development and implementation of the Irish governments’ Northern Ireland policy during Haughey’s first period in government from December 1979 to June 1981.2
Extensive research at the NAI was complemented with the availability of a treasure trove of archival materials held by the National Archives of the United Kingdom (NAUK), primarily, files from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), Cabinet Office (CAB), Prime Minister’s Office (PREM) and Northern Ireland Office (CJ). Significantly, due to the British government’s decision in 2013 to introduce a new ‘20 year rule’ policy this book has accessed archival departmental files from the NAUK up to and including 1986.3
The availability of relevant files held by the Public Records Office of Northern Ireland (PRONI)4 and the Northern Ireland Political Collection (NIPC) held by the Linen Hall Library (LHL), have likewise proved invaluable to this book. The Linen Hall Library’s collection of the ‘H-Block/Hunger Strike’ files were of particular importance, helping to unearth the Republican movements’ private attitude to Haughey and his Fianna Fáil government during the early 1980s.5
Moreover, this book utilised the personal papers of Margaret Thatcher, held by the Churchill Archives Centre (CAC), Cambridge University. Access to the Thatcher papers proved extremely important when analysing the Haughey–Thatcher relationship during the 1980s.6 Additionally, the availability of an extensive online database hosted by the Margaret Thatcher Foundation, chiefly the personal files dealing with Thatcher’s period as British prime minister from 1979 to 1985, helped to add a further laying of analysis.7
On publication of this book, the personal papers of Charles J. Haughey, held by Dublin City University, remain closed to the public.8 My requests to access these papers were declined by the Haughey family.9 This issue is compounded by the fact that Haughey never wrote an autobiography or authorised an official biography of his life.10 Fortunately, however, this book has benefited greatly from access to the various personal papers held by University College Dublin Archives (UCDA), including the Fianna Fáil Party Papers (P176), Frank Aiken Papers (P104) and T.K. Whitaker Papers (P175).11
The availability of the Fianna Fáil Party Papers was particularly important, chiefly those files related to the following organs of the organisation: the Ard Fheiseanna; parliamentary party; national executive; and general election materials. Despite the many positive features associated with the Fianna Fáil Party Papers, a few limitations must also be recorded. Given the tradition of Fianna Fáil not to commit the most sensitive material to paper, a practice espoused by Haughey personally, historians are inevitably left with gaps in research possibilities regarding the development of Northern Ireland policy at party level.
For instance, there was reluctance to record discussions on Northern Ireland at Fianna Fáil meetings of the parliamentary party and the national executive, respectively. This is naturally frustrating. The records may show that on occasions ‘special’ parliamentary party meetings convened to discuss Northern Ireland policy. Such meetings could go on for hours, into the early hours of the morning. Yet, all the record shows, at best, are several lines denoting decisions reached.12 This approach continued at cabinet level as all that was recorded were decisions made and not the details of what was discussed.
This problem is compounded by the unavailability of the minutes of the Fianna Fáil parliamentary