the heart of Derry. The arrival of the British army was initially welcomed by the Bogside Catholics. On the morning of 15 August the Irish Times led with the title: ‘Troops greeted by Bogside defenders’. It reported that ‘the troops had been welcomed by the defenders of the Bogside, who joked with them and at one point gave three cheers for the British’.31 However, this honeymoon period between the Bogside residents and the British army was to be short-lived.
News of the British army’s arrival in Northern Ireland caught Lynch by surprise and in the words of Gilchrist left the taoiseach ‘shaken’.32 Although the British army’s presence had calmed tensions in Derry, by the early hours of 15 August, Lynch received reports of fierce gun battles occurring across Northern Ireland. On the night of 14 August, six people, including a child, were killed in Belfast and Co. Armagh. In Belfast, the Irish government had received reports of sectarian riots, the widespread burning of Catholic homes and the setting up of emergency shelters in schools and churches throughout West Belfast. In the Irish Republic, the Irish army went ahead with the cabinets’ orders to establish several field hospitals, under the control of the Medical Corps, along the Irish border. The field hospitals were situated at Castleblaney, Cavan, Dundalk, Fort Dunree on Lough Swilly and Letterkenny, ‘from where the entire operation was being commanded’.33 News that the Northern Ireland government had also decided to send out the B-Specials to police the streets only added fuel to the fire. It seemed that Northern Ireland was on the brink of anarchy.
Alarmed by the unfolding events, in the early hours of the morning of 15 August, the taoiseach sent a Gárda car to the house of the secretary of the Department of Finance, Thomas Kenneth (T.K.) Whitaker, who was renting a holiday home in Carna, Co. Galway.34 Whitaker was Lynch’s key adviser on Northern Ireland from 1966 to 1971. They had been close since Lynch’s period as minister for finance. Previously, on intermittent occasions, Whitaker had also advised Seán Lemass on Northern Ireland and had been a key player in instigating the Lemass–O’Neill meetings of the mid-1960s.35 As taoiseach, Lynch now continued this informal, but important, function. Lynch greatly valued his friend’s recommendations, knowing he could talk to him in absolute confidence.
At 10 am, Whitaker travelled to the Gárda barracks in Carna where he contacted the taoiseach via telephone. During the conversation, Whitaker advised Lynch on a number of key points and later that day Whitaker posted a summarised letter of the conversation from Galway city to Dublin. Central to Whitaker’s thesis was the unequivocal argument that the use of physical force would not secure a united Ireland. Rather he argued that Lynch must attempt to ‘woo’ the Protestant population of Northern Ireland. He warned the taoiseach of any ‘temptation’ to ‘cash in on political emotionalism’. Irish unity, he said, could only come about by ‘scrupulously’ respecting the right of Northern Ireland Protestants.36
Following Lynch’s council from Whitaker, later that morning at 11.30am, the Irish cabinet convened for the third time in as many days. All ministers were present except for Hillery who was in London. Ministers discussed the present situation in Northern Ireland. Again the possibility of sending the Irish army into Northern Ireland was considered, but by this juncture the Blaney–Haughey anti-partitionist camp realised that proposal had no chance of being accepted by the cabinet collectively. Instead ministers reached agreement that Hillery inform the British government that:
In anticipation of their agreement to the proposal regarding a United-Nations Peace-Keeping Force in the Six Counties, or failing that, to an alternative proposal, which the Minister is putting to them regarding the provision of a joint Irish–British military Peace-Keeping Force in the Six Counties, the Government have authorised the mobilisation of the First-Line Reserve of the Defence Forces, so as to ensure that they will be in readiness at the earliest practicable date.37
Kevin Boland was not satisfied with the government’s decision. Instead, he called for Irish soldiers on United Nations peace-keeping duty to be recalled to the country immediately. Boland recollected that ‘I had gone to the Cabinet meeting intending to resign,’ he explained, ‘unless the Cabinet was prepared to give a real indication to the United Nations of the seriousness of the position in the country by the recall of our troops from Cyprus and by calling up a second-line reserve.’38
By this meeting Boland had ruled out the use of the Irish army because it would have undoubtedly invited the massacre of nationalists in Northern Ireland. However, he failed to realise the danger of threatening an invasion by recalling the Irish troops in such a public manner.39 Pádraig Faulkner later wrote that if the troops were recalled from Cyprus, in his view ‘it would have been interpreted by the Unionists and British government as a sign that we were preparing to use military force’. Although Boland was on record as being opposed to such action, he did not see the contradiction involved at the time. Faulkner later explained that, ‘If we’d agreed to his proposal it would have involved us in a futile and dangerous gesture.’40 This would have only led to heightening the tensions that had reached almost fever pitch following Lynch’s televised speech two days earlier.
Boland was to later confess: ‘I looked around the Cabinet and saw a no-good pathetic lot.’41 He promptly announced his resignation and walked out of the meeting, shouting ‘treachery and betrayal’.42 The Irish president, Éamon de Valera, was asked to try and convince Boland to reconsider his resignation, which he quickly did. Faulkner later recalled how he was ‘particularly perturbed as Kevin left the meeting’. At previous meetings, Faulkner explained, Boland had walked out of gatherings because he had not been given enough money for social services and he felt that this was simply another instance of Boland venting his frustration.43
Following that Irish cabinet meeting, on the evening of 15 August the British army arrived on the streets of Belfast. What had begun as a minor riot in the Bogside of Derry had now erupted into a full-scale humanitarian and indeed political crisis. Within the Irish cabinet, for the interim at least, it seemed as though Lynch’s moderation had won out over the anti-partitionist extremists led by Blaney and Haughey. The taoiseach’s success at curtailing the republican faction within the heart of the Irish government, however, was short-lived.
In a blatant act of defiance of an essential constitutional obligation on any Irish minister, that of ‘collective responsibility’ of the government, Haughey played an integral role in a subversive scheme to arm Northern Ireland nationalists with guns and ammunitions. The net result of Haughey’s actions would lead to his sacking as a government minister and see him face criminal prosecutions for allegedly using government monies to import arms. This defining chapter in contemporary Irish history is famously known as the ‘Arms Crisis’.
Covert republican or political opportunist? Haughey and the Arms Crisis
To this day Haughey’s role in the Arms Crisis continues to fascinate many. In truth, there will never be a definitive account of Haughey’s involvement with the Arms Crisis – such an account is impossible. The three investigations charged with examining the Arms Crisis, the two Arms Trials in 1970 and the Dáil Committee of Public Accounts in 1971, failed to arrive at any concrete conclusions with regard to what occurred, and more specifically Haughey’s role.44 Moreover, although there has been some first-class investigative journalism devoted to this subject, notably by the Magill magazine in 198045 and several published works on the Arms Crisis,46 many questions still remain unanswered regarding Haughey’s role. The job in assessing Haughey’s involvement with the Arms Crisis is made all the more difficult because of the lack of available archival sources, together with his categorical refusal to speak about the Arms Crisis throughout his lifetime.
Despite the many barriers that confront the historian when trying to address Haughey’s role in the Arms Crisis, this study does analyse four central research questions. Firstly, was Haughey aware that senior figures within the Irish state, including members of Irish Military Intelligence (IMI), were involved in attempts to import guns and ammunitions into Ireland in order to arm Northern nationalists? Secondly, if he was aware of these activities, did he exploit his position as minister for finance to facilitate such actions? Thirdly, did Haughey, albeit indirectly, play a role in helping to facilitate the emergence of the nascent Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA)? And lastly, whether Haughey’s involvement with the importation of arms was sanctioned at the highest level of the Irish government, or alternatively, did he