by the French and Spanish at Trafalgar would presumably have encouraged both Popham and Beresford to believe they had a secure exit strategy if events went against them in the Rio de la Plata; in that they were unlikely to be challenged at sea. On his own return to England, Popham had suggested his expedition had been supported in concept by a now-deceased Pitt. The Times rejected this argument and summed up the position adroitly:
Who will believe that Mr Pitt, or any other person who might be the Prime Minister of England, would, if he had actually determined to occupy La Plata, consider 1046 soldiers and 480 seamen and marines, to be a force adequate to such an object? The first temporary success of this small expedition ’twas all that was contrary to probability; the ultimate failure, and the capture of all the troops that comprised it, was what might have been expected.79
In truth the British government had merely tried to capitalise on the initial success of the expedition under Popham and Beresford. Ultimately, the venture ended in the collapse of the military objective after Beresford had left South America. There had for some time been a faction within government advocating the development of commercial ties rather than physical conquest with South America, and this group now gained the upper hand.
In Great Britain, the legacy of this foreign expedition is perhaps best remembered in terms of the ‘treasure’ sent to England. As such the events of 1806 have been seen as a ‘derring-do’ voyage of virtual piracy along the lines of Drake, Raleigh and others. In the words of one soldier present, ‘the object of our enterprise is to cripple the pecuniary resources of Spain’.80 However, it seems highly likely that its consequences were far greater. The ease with which Beresford’s small force had dismissed the Spanish colonial forces demonstrated to others that this was an empire in serious decline; and so it proved when the colonials moved against the Spanish monarchy less than four years later. Beresford clearly understood that it was going to be very difficult for Spain to recover control of the Rio de la Plata for he expressed that view in correspondence with the British government.
While the war of independence in what is now Argentina did not conclude until 1818, full independence was declared in 1816. One commentator has summed up Beresford’s campaign by stating it ‘cracked the monumental edifice of the Spanish Empire and began the process by which it collapsed into rubble’.81 As such, while modern-day Argentines celebrate the Reconquista, Beresford is remembered today in Buenos Aires more with admiration than hatred.
While there are suggestions that Beresford was not inimical to the desire of a number of the inhabitants of the Rio de la Plata for greater freedom, and even independence, he prudently followed a cautious line. Supporting independence in a rival empire’s colonies created potential danger in Britain’s own dependencies. Napoleon’s forcing of the Portuguese royal family into exile in 1807 and his seizure of the Spanish throne in 1808 made it important for Britain that the colonies of those nations did not succumb to French influence, an objective that was achieved by British naval power. The quid pro quo for British support for Portugal and Spain was the loosening of trade restrictions enabling British commerce with South America to grow considerably. Those in Britain who sympathised with aspirations for independence in the various colonies of South America appreciated that so long as Spain was fighting the Napoleonic threat, it was against the British interest to weaken Spain by encouraging insurrection by the colonials of South America. Whereas in early 1808, Britain was still planning a substantial expedition to South and even Central America in response to Napoleon’s takeover of Spain, the subsequent Spanish revolt and the request for British assistance transformed policy, providing Britain with the opportunity to open up a new European front.82
What of the fate of the three principals in the expedition to the Rio de la Plata? The expedition had been unauthorised and both Baird and Popham faced criticism and risked serious censure. Baird was roundly criticised by the Secretary of State for War for authorising the expedition to South America without sanction or authority, and it was made clear to him that if the government had wished to attack the Spanish settlements at the Rio de la Plata, a more appropriate sized force would have been employed than that which Baird had dispatched under Beresford.83 He was recalled from his position as Lieutenant-Governor of the Cape and he left there on 19 January 1807, arriving in England in March. He was soon employed again, taking part in the Copenhagen expedition of 1807 before going on to serve in the Peninsula under Sir John Moore. Later in life he was to be appointed Commander in Chief of the forces in Ireland between March 1820 and June 1822.
Popham was not so fortunate. On his return to England he was arrested and tried by Court Martial for both leaving the Cape in a defenceless state and for undertaking an expedition for which he had ‘no direction or authority whatsoever’. Following a robust defence, in which Popham pleaded his various papers presented to and conversations with Pitt, Melville and Miranda, he was found guilty of both charges, but was only severely reprimanded ‘in consideration of the circumstances’.84 The finding does not seem to have inhibited his career even in the short term, for not only did he take part in the Copenhagen expedition of 1807, but he did so as First Captain in the fleet commanded by Lord Gambier.
For his part, Beresford was clearly not felt to be culpable. He had neither devised nor authorised the expedition, and the letter of recall to Baird makes it clear that a larger force would have been utilised had the British wished to attack the Spanish in the Rio de la Plata; the implication being that he had done well with the force at his disposal. His conduct of his small force was admired by those present and recognised by the government.85 Beresford’s own feelings that he had perhaps let the side down by surrendering rather than fighting to the end were not shared by others. Pack neither blamed him for the subsequent disputes surrounding the terms of surrender, nor for the act of surrender observing:
A more gallant and honourable officer than General Beresford there cannot be, and I am fully persuaded he has acted from the purest motives of humanity, and I cannot help thinking it was to us a dreadful sacrifice. If the place ought to have been defended, I am afraid it will be thought we lost too few in the attempt; if not, too many.86
Beresford’s experience in the Rio de la Plata colony was to stand him in good stead in the years to come in the Iberian Peninsula. He had demonstrated administrative abilities, an adherence to discipline and personal courage in leading his troops. Within six months of his return to England he was appointed to command an expedition to take control of the Portuguese island of Madeira. It was only following the abdication of Napoleon in 1814 that he was able to attend the Guildhall in the City of London on 11 June in that year and receive in person the Freedom of the City together with the freedom box and sword voted to him in 1806. In accepting this honour, Beresford described it as the proudest moment of his life.
While it was undoubtedly a high point of an already distinguished career, it was to prove one step in a life which subsequently saw him rise to become Marshal-General of Portugal and a cabinet minister in Wellington’s government of 1828. His reputation was enhanced rather than tarnished by his South American experiences, though arguably had he thought through Popham’s proposal he would not have agreed with it, as conquest of the Rio de la Plata had little chance of success with such a small force. Did he let an opportunity for glory cloud proper judgment? If he had not wished to support the decision of Baird to endorse Popham’s proposal for the invasion of the Rio de la Plata, he would have had to resign from the expeditionary force at the Cape and return to England and might have been criticised in some quarters for such conduct; though this is what Sir Robert Wilson did when chastised by Home Popham for expressing doubts regarding the project.87
Even in Argentina Beresford was not without his admirers. The capture and 47-day occupation of Buenos Aires is frequently acknowledged by Argentine historians as part of the process which enabled Argentina to secure its own independence, beginning four years later.
3 MADEIRA, 1807–1808
Portugal had long held a strategic importance for Great Britain and others. To this had been added a commercial relationship of considerable importance. The Portuguese had developed an empire based on maritime trade and Portugal proved to be invaluable to Britain in the latter’s politico-economic struggle with first Spain and later France. In 1807,