Wellesley made it clear he had not negotiated the armistice, but had merely signed it at Dalrymple’s request, given that he held a rank of equivalence with the French signatory, General Kellerman. Furthermore, Wellesley stated that he had objected to various terms of the armistice including that pertaining to the Russian fleet in the Tagus (which Cotton rejected in any event) and the agreement to give forty-eight-hours’ notice to end the suspension of hostilities. Wellesley confirmed he had in fact suggested the suspension of hostilities should be only for forty-eight-hours.
All three of these Generals expressed the opinion that if the Convention had not been entered into, the French might have passed the Tagus and gone to either Almeida or Elvas and therefore frustrated the British desire to help Spain. Furthermore, they might have held up the British by defending Lisbon and other strongholds which would have required protracted siege warfare with the same result. Indeed it was widely reported that Junot had threatened to destroy Lisbon rather than let it fall into British hands intact.101
The attention of the Board was drawn to earlier Conventions, including those whereby the French had been allowed to evacuate Genoa (1800), Malta (1800), Egypt (1801) and indeed the arrangement whereby terms for the repatriation of Dupont’s army had been agreed following the French defeat at the hands of the Spaniards at the Battle of Bailén (1808); though these were not subsequently honoured.102 Dalrymple solicited the assistance of two generals in his own defence, with Anstruther and Lord William Bentinck furnishing supportive letters.103 Though neither Beresford nor Proby were called as witnesses (they remained in the Peninsula), the correspondence with the Commissioners employed to carry the provisions of the Convention into effect was listed with a view to bolstering the cases of the generals as the subject of scrutiny, as they were able to demonstrate their determination to prevent the French taking home items of value not encompassed by the articles.104
The Board of Inquiry Report accepted that Burrard’s conduct in not advancing after the battle of Vimeiro had been justified, particularly when two commanders succeeded each other within the space of twenty-four-hours. Further, the Convention had immediately liberated Portugal and relieved a large section of the Spanish frontier from the danger of attack, enabling the Spanish to make a more effective defence of Spain without an enemy at its back. It noted much firmness had been taken in restricting the French interpretation of the Convention, with the French being forced to disgorge their plunder. The Convention was similar to those entered into in Egypt, where the garrisons of Alexandria and Cairo could not have held out for long and had no prospect of succour. The Convention had not been objected to by five experienced Lieutenant Generals and in the opinion of the Board ‘no further military proceeding is necessary’. The Report concluded with the statement that while the Board might have differences respecting the fitness of the Convention it was unanimous in recognising the unquestionable zeal and firmness of Dalrymple, Burrard and Wellesley.
The Commander in Chief, the Duke of York, was not impressed with one aspect of the Report. Three days later, on Christmas Day, he ordered the Board to express their opinion on whether the conditions of the Armistice and Convention were advisable and should have been agreed upon. As a result, the Board agreed that each member should indicate whether he approved of the Armistice, and separately whether he approved of the Convention. The results of those deliberations on 27 December showed a 6:1 majority in favour of the Armistice but only a 4:3 majority in favour of the Convention. The minority felt that the appearance of John Moore with reinforcements, together with the arrival of the 3rd and 42nd regiments following the Armistice, meant that Dalrymple could have taken a stronger position in the discussions leading to the Convention and would in all probability have obtained a more advantageous result had he done so. Only Moira felt there should have been no armistice as it effectively established the terms of the Convention.105
It is well known that Dalrymple and Burrard were never again given active commands. The King went further. While he adopted the unanimous opinion of the Board that no further military proceeding was necessary, he made a formal declaration of his disapprobation of the Armistice and Convention which was communicated to Dalrymple. It is most interesting that in doing so he highlighted his disapproval of the Articles in which stipulations were made directly affecting the interests or feelings of the Spanish and Portuguese nations. It was declared improper and dangerous to include in military conventions articles of such description. While the King’s disapprobation does not list the articles complained of, it is easy to see that these must be those that had caused so much grief in Portugal. The inclusion of Spain may relate to the promise to secure the restoration of French subjects, whether military or civilian, detained in Spain. Dalrymple was being criticised for his acceptance of political articles in a military convention.106
Napoleon initially reserved his opinion on Junot and the Convention, writing to General Clarke on 2 October saying that on landing Junot should be told Napoleon did not know if he should approve the Convention but that there had been no harm to French honour in that the troops did not lay down their arms and no standards had been lost.107 He seems to have felt that Junot should have entrenched himself and waited for reinforcements and is reported to have been considering a court martial, but the establishment of an Inquiry by the English avoided the need for him to punish an old friend.108 Indeed, on his return to France Junot was given command of the 3rd Corps to prosecute the siege of Zaragoza.109
The holding of the Inquiry bears the hallmarks of political expediency. No inquiry had been called for under circumstances where deals had been done in recent years to allow the French home on surrender, and indeed such arrangements were the norm for other countries as well.110 Indeed, Whitelocke’s army had been allowed home from Buenos Aires111 so why was the case of Portugal so different? The Report exculpated all three Generals in respect of their military conduct but clearly Portugal was felt to be a valuable ally whose feelings needed to be assuaged.112 Furthermore, the fact that some of the French returnees were back in Spain by the beginning of December and the more immediate realisation they would be available to fight again caused considerable upset. Criticism of Dalrymple and Burrard as military commanders may be justified and it may be that a better result could have been obtained by making use of Moore’s army, but is it sustainable to argue that all the parties to the conflict benefitted considerably by the Convention?113
While it was hard to get the message accepted, Britain had removed the French from Portugal without suffering serious losses and on a short time scale. The early capture of Lisbon enabled the provisioning of an army to go into Spain under Sir John Moore, and the deliverance of Portugal made the march on Spain feasible. All the other strongholds in Portugal were secured without fighting and Portugal became the British base for future operations. Furthermore, the British now had a safe harbour for their navy. On the negative side there was a perception that Britain could have struck a tougher bargain with Junot, perhaps ensuring the troops did not return to the Peninsula. There was also the more cosmetic criticism of the recognition of Napoleon’s Imperial title for the first time, as well as the recognition of Junot as the Duke of Abrantes. The British Generals in overall command had failed to take the Portuguese into account, a situation which was recognised within government. Moreover, the psychological effect of winning victories in the Peninsula at a time when British forces were faring dismally elsewhere must have been a great morale booster for the British army and the government. Condemnation of the convention was not universal, and often depended on political allegiance. On balance it is argued Britain emerged a winner.
The English government was perhaps fortunate that the hullabaloo concerning Cintra died down remarkably quickly because of a fresh scandal which erupted in late January 1809, shortly after the publication of the report of the Board of Inquiry.114 The new scandal concerned alleged corruption in the army arising from the sale of commissions under the influence of the Commander in Chief’s mistress, Mary Ann Clarke. While the Duke of York was acquitted of the charges against him, he had to stand down for a considerable time as Commander in Chief.
Portugal had rid itself of the French army of occupation. While plundered to a degree, the Convention had saved Lisbon.115 Henceforth, it obtained protection from a British army which paid its way. The fact that Moore was able to take an army into Spain and draw the French towards northern Spain and La Coruña probably prevented a fresh and more substantial invasion of Portugal by the French at this time. Of course, the involvement with Britain drew it into a lengthy war and huge suffering