return it received a well trained army and financial assistance in its defence through British subsidies. It was not the Convention of Cintra, but the removal of the Court to Brazil in 1807 and the ensuing six years of warfare, combined with the opening up of direct trade by other nations with Brazil, that caused seismic changes to the politics and economics of Portugal. While Britain’s failure to consult with the Portuguese over the proposals leading to the Convention of Cintra proved a real irritant, it is arguable Portugal emerged a winner.
Spain is not often thought of in terms of the Convention. However, it resulted in the repatriation of the imprisoned division of its army under Carafa. The march of the British army under Sir John Moore into central Spain and its subsequent withdrawal to La Coruña may have contributed to the saving of Andalucia in that Napoleon turned troops northwards which might otherwise have been used to crush resistance in the south. Finally, Spain no longer had an enemy behind it in Portugal, which enabled Spanish forces to concentrate elsewhere. A win also for Spain.
France lost Portugal, but in doing so recovered almost intact an army which was soon redeployed.116 With some justification, the Convention was portrayed as a diplomatic triumph, as while the British feared a long engagement in Portugal the reality was that with the additional forces at the disposal of Dalrymple, a French withdrawal would have been a strategically demanding affair and might have resulted in unconditional surrender. If not a win, then a measured loss. France was still in the driving seat on mainland Europe, including the Peninsula.
The removal of the French army from Portugal enabled British propaganda to present the Convention of Cintra in a favourable light, but there were losers under its terms. A number of Portuguese lost possessions, and national treasures were looted from museums, libraries, churches and palaces. The full extent of those losses is difficult to quantify, not least because as Junot observed to Napoleon 50 million Francs worth of goods had been removed from Portugal to Great Britain when Portugal had initially come under French threat.117 In addition, the Portuguese had already suffered a brutal taxation imposed by Junot. This situation should be set against the gain of a liberated country and the recovery of a considerable amount of goods and valuables. Without defending the theft of items, it is difficult to estimate the extent of plunder when it is recalled that substantial royal and independent valuables had been shipped to Brazil in 1807.118 Further, it was a surprising oversight that Dalrymple did not seek to incorporate in the Convention provision for the return to Portugal of Portuguese prisoners detained in France.
Dalrymple and Burrard certainly emerged as losers, not being given further commands. Poor Burrard lost three sons fighting in the Peninsula and is said to have died of grief in 1813. However, fortune did not entirely desert Dalrymple. Though his son’s military career suffered in that while he purchased promotion he was not given any future command, the General, with the support of Castlereagh, was created a baronet in 1815, perhaps in recognition that judgment on him had been somewhat harsh.119
The findings of the Board of Inquiry proved to be of great consequence. In supporting the actions of the military on the ground, those findings made it possible for Wellesley to be placed in command of Britain’s next foreign expedition. In the autumn and early winter of 1808, Beresford was to participate in the attempt of Sir John Moore to assist Spain deliver itself of the French invader. Beresford’s star was in the ascendant as a result of his efforts to limit the French interpretation of the Convention, his role in policing Lisbon, and in improving relations between the British military in Portugal and the Portuguese political elite remaining in that country. One British officer arriving in Lisbon at the close of September reckoned that the vigilance of Beresford had saved the populace of in excess of £200,000 in recovered private and public wealth. He credited Beresford with proving to the inhabitants that ‘we were not the sanctioners of robbery, the protectors of plunderers, and the carriers of violated property’.120 Given the reported strength of the ill feeling towards the British following the execution of the Convention of Cintra, it is not difficult to see why Beresford’s conduct in the implementation of the Convention would ensure he would be welcomed back to Portugal in 1809.121
5 PORTUGAL AND SPAIN: FROM LISBON TO LA CORUÑA, 1808–1809
‘I well remember what a fine looking soldier he was.
He was equal to his business too’1
Beresford was certainly very active while stationed in Lisbon. We have already seen his involvement with the implementation of the Convention of Cintra and his role in securing calm in Lisbon. Apart from his relationship with a number of Portuguese military personnel, it is clear that Beresford at this time began to forge contacts with the various members of the Regency Council. Dalrymple was using Beresford as a go-between with Forjaz and others during September and this continued under Burrard in October.2
In a move which may have had some bearing on subsequent events, Beresford studied the current state of the Portuguese army and sent a report on it to General Bernardim Freire de Andrade, commander of the Portuguese forces in the northern part of the country, as well as to the reconstituted Regency.3 Beresford had displayed an interest in the organisation of the Portuguese military while in Madeira, deliberately ignoring government instructions in order to do so. Now we see him exhibiting a keen interest in the means of defending Portugal. In the report, Beresford advocated that troops should be transferred away from their home towns in order to be trained, so that they could develop into a fighting unit.4 He also stressed the need for regular pay, proper equipment and ready supplies. Finally, he recognised the need to reform the officer corps. All of these recommendations were to play a part in the reform of the Portuguese army in the period after 1809, though Burrard, in sending a copy of Beresford’s ‘plan’ home in October 1808, expressed no great hopes for its implementation:
Major General Beresford gave in a plan to the Regency for the reorganization of the Portuguese army of which I send a copy, as I do not believe it has been transmitted home. I am afraid little has been done on it, but consultation and debate, and I must repeat that without a Minister here equal to the task of instructing, urging and conciliating the government and people I think nothing beneficial will ensue either to Portugal, Great Britain or the general cause of Europe.5
Beresford expressed his frustration at this time about both the inactivity of the British army and uncertainty as to who would command it, a frustration born perhaps of having missed the battles in August 1808. On 30 September he wrote to his old friend Edward Cooke referring to Dalrymple’s recall and expressing a desire shared by many: ‘who is finally to have command of this army is what we are all anxious to know, and we trust a speedy decision as we do not understand rotting here doing nothing, while our friends the Spaniards are, with such earnestness, demanding our assistance’.6
Beresford was soon given another task. No sooner had he handed responsibility for Lisbon back to the Portuguese when riots broke out in Porto, instigated it was widely believed by the Bishop, António de São José de Castro, who initially expressed the view that the Regency Council had no authority given their cooperation with the French.7 When appointed one of the Regency Council to replace those removed on the grounds of collaboration with the French, he feared that his influence might be threatened by that body.8 There is little room for doubt that this concern led the Bishop to avoid coming to Lisbon at this time. Beresford was directed to Porto with some 2,500 troops to put an end to the disturbances.9 Subsequently, some of the troops were intended to occupy Almeida, surrendered by the French on 2 October under the terms of the Convention of Cintra. The decision to send Beresford reflects his high standing at the time with Burrard writing to Castlereagh: ‘I trust Major General Beresford will be successful in putting a fortunate termination to insurrection, as he has been happy in conducting some very intricate and difficult affairs in this town.’10
Burrard directed Sir Robert Wilson, in command of the recently constituted Loyal Lusitanian Legion, to meet Beresford at Coimbra.11 When Beresford arrived there on 22 October he learnt that peace had been restored in Porto. Sending on the troops to garrison at Almeida, Beresford visited the Bishop personally in Porto on 31 October. He secured the agreement of the Bishop that the latter would go to Lisbon in about a month to join the other members of the Council. In the event it was April