attendance ‘very large’, with estimates ranging from a minimum of 300 to a maximum of 1,100. The final figure was more than likely closer to the maximum because the unit of organisation, which was allowed for representation purposes, was that of the company.8 Either way, ‘All of the prominent men in the republican physical force movement of that time were present.’9
There were two long discussions. The first resulted from a proposal that, because his countermand so negatively affected turnout for the Rebellion, MacNeill should be court-martialled.10 (Others had already been held to account by the Volunteers for non-attendance, resulting in, for example, the two Cork city brigades being cleared of all wrong doing. In a similar manner, the IRB had conducted its own inquiries. For example, its Dublin audit yielded the counterintuitive result that, if anything, the IRB had excelled itself.11) The following is the likely pattern of that debate. Brugha initially spoke strongly in favour of court martial.12 But de Valera refused to allow any censure of MacNeill, revealing that he, MacNeill, possibly as a token of goodwill, had forwarded to him the pre-1916 Volunteer funds.13 (From as early as his imprisonment in Dartmoor de Valera seemed intent on securing as united a front as possible,14 apropos of which strategy it would appear that he also shelved the usual rules of formal debate during the convention.15) Brugha then rose and praised MacNeill’s integrity, but nonetheless argued that MacNeill should never again hold any position of responsibility in the Volunteers.16 Even so, vis-à-vis the motion which was proposed, no agreement was secured. Instead, the issue was forwarded to the incoming national executive for solution.17 Then, in the second debate, which was a long one, the topic up for discussion was the inter-relationship between the Volunteers and party politics. Clearly many Volunteers had already shown a desire to help promote Sinn Féin.18 Even so, once again, the incoming executive was laboured with a solution.19
The next item on the agenda was the matter of the membership of the executive and, in comparison to the previous two items, this was dealt with quickly.20 The assembly divided into five groups, representing the four provinces and the Dublin area.21 Each group then elected its own members.22 However, the evidence is not compatible on the numbers allocated to the provinces. For example, an important authority like Florrie O’Donoghue provides no numbers at all.23 Richard Walsh (Mayo), a man who, on face value, was endowed with an alert mind and a good memory, tentatively suggested that each province was allocated three members.24 However, his opinion takes no account of local circumstances. This is why Mulcahy’s own figures are probably the most trustworthy, namely Munster (4), Ulster (4), Leinster (2) and Connacht (3).25 In any event, the three men agree that Dublin elected seven members, i.e. when de Valera, as president, is included. All told, therefore, the executive was composed of twenty members.
But, in terms of the unit where the most power would repose on a week by week basis,26 all three commentators were agreed that, with de Valera included, the resident executive contained seven members who were elected by the whole convention.27 Other than that, there were two additional groupings, called directors (specialists, e.g. DT) and co-opted members. Walsh did not refer to either of them. But O’Donoghue and Mulcahy did. And Mulcahy’s evidence, though contradictory, is probably the most reliable:
Cathal Brugha was appointed Chairman of the Resident Executive which would consist of the members of the National Executive elected for the Dublin area together with the persons from outside that area who had been appointed directors, and such co-opted persons as were considered necessary by the Resident Executive [in acknowledgement of probable absences during testing times, and, intermittently, to fill the need for particular skills and talents?].28
Given those complexities, the full complement of dramatis personae was as follows: de Valera, President; Brugha, Chairman, due to de Valera being absent so often on other business; Mulcahy, DT; Staines, Director of Supply and Treasurer; McGarry, Secretary; O’Connor, Director of Engineering (DE), and M.W. O’Reilly, all from Dublin; Collins, Director of Organisation (DO), and Lynch, Director of Communications, both elected from Cork to the Munster panel; and Eamon Duggan, Deputy Chairman; along with Gearóid O’Sullivan, Fintan Murphy, Diarmuid O’Hegarty, Dick McKee and Paddy Ryan, all nominally from Dublin.29
Eight days later, on 4 November, at its inaugural meeting which was held in Fleming’s Hotel, the national executive, in addressing the topic that the upcoming members of the GHQ should work full time and be paid a wage,30 was faced for the first time with the organisational consequences of the current feeling that the Volunteers were becoming, both by accident and design, the nucleus of the army of an emerging Irish State. Quite a number of the members were not happy with that development.31 Whatever their reasons were, one meeting did not solve the matter. Hence, two weeks later, it was agreed that a sub-committee should be formed for the purpose of interviewing suitable Volunteers and forming a list of ‘men of outstanding ability and integrity … [who would] eventually be prepared to give up their civil occupations and devote all their time and ability to staff work’. Also, because the organisation of itself could not finance a professional command, it was decided that the best agency to approach for the necessary cash was the IRB. Bizarrely, then, Brugha vouched for the Organisation’s bona fides and Collins chipped in that he personally knew some IRB sources who could be productively contacted!32
The membership of the subcommittee is uncertain. One opinion was that it was made up of de Valera (as interviewer), along with Brugha, Collins, Staines and Rory O’Connor.33 And another opinion, Mulcahy’s, suggested that it was composed of ‘the military directors’, i.e. Collins, Mulcahy, Staines, O’Connor and Lynch.34 But, either way, there was a flaw in the interview process, in that some of the main candidates, who were eligible for high office, remunerated or otherwise, were part of the shortlisting panel. Also, the best part of five months had to pass before findings were presented to a meeting of the national executive.
Regardless, it transpired, according to Mulcahy, that, on the evening before said executive meeting, he, Collins, Staines35 and O’Connor, i.e. four from the list of military directors, together with O’Hegarty, O’Sullivan, Seán MacMahon and Dick McKee, made their preparations, one alleged decision of which was that they would put Mulcahy’s name forward for the CS position.36
The following is Mulcahy’s account of that chain of events:
The Resident Executive invited the military directors to prepare proposals for submission to a meeting of the National Executive which was called for the early part of March at the Dublin Typographical Society’s rooms at 35 Lower Gardiner Street. The evening before a small group of men met at the Keating Branch of the Gaelic League, 46 Parnell Square, to frame their recommendations … [And,] When the National Executive of the Volunteers met on the following night, our proposals were unanimously accepted. The General Headquarters Staff was constituted and suitably empowered and appointments made: Chief of Staff, Richard Mulcahy; Adjutant General [AG] and Director of Organisation, Michael Collins; Quartermaster General, Seán MacMahon; Director of Training, Dick McKee; and Director of Engineering, Rory O’Connor.37
Yet, there has been a general acceptance that it was Brugha who became CS.38 In particular, Béaslaí, in his 1926 biography of Collins, maintained that Mulcahy had been appointed Deputy Chief of Staff (DCS).39 Ernie O’Malley held the same opinion.40 Even Mulcahy himself ended up making the appointment a much more complex issue than it already was, when he later acknowledged that Collins, sometime during May, which was three months after the event, could have referred to him as DCS.41 Also, once again years later, he even said, rather confusingly, that his promotion was down to ‘Availability … [being] as important as suitability’42 and that it was an amicable settlement as to whether he himself or Collins would be nominated.43
But, at that time, unlike during November 1921, when three auxiliary Chiefs existed, there could have been only one DCS and Stack was the man who almost certainly occupied that position. The following are the reasons why. Firstly, Mulcahy himself said so: ‘as he [Stack] was there at the [national executive] meeting and had not been assigned any position on the staff I mentioned that I “would like to have Austin on the Staff”, and for want of some definite position for him I suggested that we might call him “Deputy Chief of Staff”’.44 Secondly, Stack was accorded that title in the GHQ correspondences of November 1919. Thirdly, his biographer placed him at GHQ meetings in that capacity for the eight to nine months previous to him resigning his position during