minutes. People threw themselves into the water to save him, and one of these, his orderly, also drowned; Commander François, who was accompanying him on the journey, also disappeared (I never found out whether he fell in at the same time or jumped in to save Mitoudidi). When the accident happened, they stopped the outboard motor, which made it impossible to maneuver the boat in any way. Then they started it up again, but it seems that some magical force prevented them from approaching the spot where Mitoudidi was floundering. In the end, while he continued to call for help, the boat headed for shore and the compañeros saw him go under shortly afterwards.
The nature of human relations among the Congolese leaders is so complex that it’s hard to know what to make of this. What is certain is that the man in charge of the boat at the time, who was also an army commander, was later sent to a different front—the explanation given to me being that the compañero had been involved in a number of incidents at the base.
Thus, a stupid accident took the life of the man who had begun to implant some organization in the terrible chaos of the [Kibamba] base. Mitoudidi had been young (no more than 30 years old), and had served as a functionary with [Patrice] Lumumba and a combatant with Mulele. Mitoudidi had said that Mulele had sent him to this area at a time when no revolutionary organization was functioning there. In our frequent conversations, he said Mulele had diametrically opposed methods, and described the completely different character of the struggle in that other part of the Congo, although he never gave any hint of criticism of Kabila or Massengo and he attributed all the disorganization to the peculiarities of the region.
I don’t know the reason—perhaps it had something to do with race or former reputation—but when Kabila arrived in the region, he was the chief and Mitoudidi became the head of his General Staff. The truth was that the only person with authority had now disappeared in the lake. The next day, the news was already known in the surrounding area, and Kabila gave signs of life by sending me the following brief note:
I have just heard about the fate of brother Mitu, and of the other brothers. As you can see, I am deeply hurt by it.
I am worried about your safety; I want to come right away. For us, this sad story is our destiny. All the comrades with whom you arrived should remain where they are until my return, unless they want to go to Kabimba or to see Mundandi in Bendera.
I trust in your steadfastness. We will put everything into motion so that we can transfer the base on a date certain.
During my absence, I have sorted out some matters with Compañero Muteba, and with Bulengai and Kasabi.
In friendship,
Kabila
Compañero Muteba, who was deeply affected by Mitoudidi’s death, came to see me to ascertain exactly our views about what had happened. It was probably due to superstition that they were contemplating the move to a different base; but I didn’t want to raise any objections because it seemed a very delicate issue and I thought it wiser to avoid giving a clear answer. We discussed the most important problems that had brought us to the Congo; we had been there nearly two months and still had achieved absolutely nothing. I mentioned the reports I had written for Compañero Mitoudidi that had disappeared with him, and then he asked me to do a general report for him about the situation to forward to Kabila. I took on this task and wrote the following. (I should explain that this text is slightly different from the original, as in several places, my deficient French forced me to look for the word I knew, rather than the one I really intended. The letter is addressed to Compañero Muteba and was confidential.)
General considerations: Given that my experience of the Congo is limited to a month and a half, I cannot venture many opinions. I believe that we face one main danger: US imperialism.
It is not necessary to analyze why the North Americans are a specific danger. The Congolese revolution is in a stage of regrouping its forces, after the most recent defeats it has suffered. If the Yankees have learned lessons from other revolutions, now is the moment they would choose to strike hard and, first of all, take measures such as a neutralization of the lake; that is, to do everything necessary to close our main supply route. On the other hand, world events such as the struggle in Vietnam and the recent intervention at Santo Domingo are tying their hands somewhat. Time is therefore an essential factor for the consolidation and development of the revolution, which can be achieved only through heavy blows against the enemy. Passivity is the beginning of defeat.
But our own lack of organization hinders us from mobilizing all our forces and attacking those of the enemy. This can be seen in a number of interconnected aspects.
1. There is shortage of cadres with no unified central command with real power over all the fronts, which would confer what is known in military terms as a unity of doctrine (I refer specifically to this area, not to the Congo in general).
2. The general shortage of cadres with sufficient level of education and absolute loyalty to the revolutionary cause results in a proliferation of local chiefs, each with his own authority and both tactical and strategic freedom of action.
3. The dispersal of our heavy weapons through an egalitarian distribution that leaves the command without reserves—quite apart from the poor way these weapons are used.
4. There is a lack of discipline in the military units, which have been infected by the prevailing localism and have had no prior training.
5. The commanders are incapable of coordinating the movements of units beyond a certain size.
6. There is a general lack of the minimum training necessary to handle firearms, a lack all the more serious in the case of weapons requiring special combat preparation.
All this produces an inability to carry out substantial tactical operations, and therefore strategic paralysis. These are problems that every revolution has to face, and there is no cause for alarm; it is only necessary to take systematic measures to rectify them.
Cuban involvement: Our black population suffered the worst exploitation and discrimination in Cuba. Their involvement in the struggle was very important, especially the peasants in Oriente [province], most of whom were illiterate.
As a result, there were very few blacks among our main military figures or properly trained middle cadres. When we were asked to send black [Afro-] Cubans by preference, we looked to the best elements in the army who had some combat experience. As we see it, our contingent has a very good fighting spirit and precise knowledge of tactics on the ground, but has little academic preparation.
The foregoing is by way of an introduction to our proposals for action. Given the characteristics of the soldiers, our involvement should mainly be in combat and tasks related to the direct struggle.
We could do this in two ways:
1. We could split our contingent among the various units at the front as instructors in the handling of weapons and as combatants with Congolese forces.
2. Create mixed combat units, initially under Cuban command, that would carry out clearly defined tactical missions and expand their radius of operations through the development and training of Congolese command cadres. (Given the small size of our force, there should be no more than two of these units.) A central training base would be maintained, with Cuban instructors insofar as they were needed.
We favor the second proposal, for both military and political reasons: military, because it would guarantee leadership in accordance with our concept of guerrilla struggle (which we think is correct); political, because our successes would dispel the atmosphere that surrounds foreign troops who have different religious, cultural and other ideas, and would enable us to control our own forces better. A greater degree of dispersal could lead to conflicts due to the lack of understanding of Congolese reality that our command believes is being acquired.
We could perform (necessary) complementary work, such as plans for training units, help in the training of a General Staff (and understanding of the services and, above all, of the weapons are weak areas), the organization of public health or military sanitation, or any other task we might be assigned.
Our assessment of the military