of Albertville. But we think that, at the present moment, there is a higher task facing our forces for the following reasons:
1. We have not been able to dislodge the enemy from enclaves within our natural defense system (these mountains).
2. We don’t have sufficient experience for such a large-scale initiative that would require the mobilization of units of at least battalion strength and their synchronization through an operational high command.
3. We don’t have enough military equipment for an action of this scale.
Albertville should fall as the result of gradual, tenacious action on our part—perhaps it would be more appropriate to speak of its being abandoned by the enemy. First, we must completely deflate the enemy’s fighting morale (which is relatively high at present), by means of systematic attacks on their lines of supply and reinforcements; then annihilate, or force the withdrawal, of the enemy forces from Kabimba, Front de Force, Lulimba, etc., combining the above tactics with frontal assaults where the relationship of forces is more favorable, clandestine action on all the roads leading to Albertville, frequent sabotage operations and ambushes and paralysis of the economy; then, finally the seizure of Albertville.
For reasons that I will develop in another report, the results of our reconnaissance lead me to think that Katenga would be the best place to start operations.
The reasons I can give today are the following.
1. Its garrison is relatively small.
2. We think we can ambush reinforcements as their supply line runs parallel to the mountains.
3. If Katenga were to fall and remain in our hands, this would isolate Lulimba, as the gateway to Kasongo.
Following this letter, I sent the reconnaissance report on Katenga, the analysis of the situation and a recommendation to attack. At that time it was relatively easy to attack Katenga because the total inactivity of our forces meant that the enemy’s vigilance in the area was practically nonexistent.
1. For Che, a characteristic of the guerrilla nucleus is that it must guarantee that revolutionary political power remains intact, being “relatively safe but not outside the war, not giving directions from some other country or from distant places. It should be within its own country, fighting.” Che stressed this in his 1961 article, “Cuba: Historical exception or vanguard in the anticolonial struggle?” in Che Guevara Reader (Ocean Press). This became one of his major criticisms of the Congolese leadership.
2. Prime Minister of the People’s Republic of China from its establishment in 1949 until his death in 1976. He was also minister of foreign relations (1949-58) and led the Chinese delegation to the Bandung Conference in 1955.
3. In Che’s original manuscript he wrote “Kabimba” in error. This is another place on Lake Tanganyika located further south, where Che never went.
Mitoudidi’s replacements embarked for Kigoma, and some, like Compañero Muteba, the bearer of my letter to Kabila, we never saw again for the duration of the war.
The base was again overcome by chaos with an almost conscious frenzy, as if to make up for time lost during Mitoudidi’s intervention. Orders and requests succeeded one another without the slightest trace of rationality. We Cubans were asked to staff machine guns spread along the lakeside, thereby condemning a number of compañeros to inactivity. Given the prevailing lack of discipline, it would have been impossible to use Congolese machine-gunners to defend the base from air attack as they didn’t know how to use those weapons and didn’t want to learn; with a few honorable exceptions, they never operated machine guns during our entire time in the Congo. They ran away from aircraft, instead of methodically doing something about them, even though machine guns played a role in driving away enemy aircraft. The crews were mainly mercenaries, and after one or two skirmishes, they lost interest in fighting against ground-based weapons and turned to the strafing and bombing of areas where there was no antiaircraft defense. Nevertheless, I think the fact that the men at the Lake [Base] were inactive was a pointless waste of our combat strength as the enemy was unable to mount an effective attack; four T-28s and two B-26s were the only force the enemy had.
We continued to face the same difficulties at the Upper Base, only with many compañeros suffering from Congo fever and with no trainees as those promised by Mitoudidi never arrived. We saw representatives of distant guerrilla units show up to take away arms and ammunition, which they would squander, waste or break for no purpose. Compañero Mundandi arrived around the middle of June, bringing some letters from Kabila. One, dated June 16, stated the following:
Comrade,
I have read and reread the report you sent with Brother Muteba for my attention. As I said before, comrade, I want to begin some ambushes; Comrade Mundandi will talk to you about this. Please allow a good 50 Cubans with the rank of combatant to take part in the attack of June 25 under the leadership of Mundandi.
You are a revolutionary and I ask you to put up with all the difficulties you find there as I will arrive very soon. You can also send a good dozen men to Kabimba.
Intimate greetings,
Kabila
P.S. I appreciated your plan concerning Bendera that Nando showed me. It is almost identical to what we had been thinking. Courage and patience. I know that you are suffering because of the poor organization, but we are doing everything to improve it. It’s the fault of our lack of leaders.
Hasta la vista,
Kabila
As Kabila said he agreed with the plan I had sent, we began discussing an attack with Mundandi, not on Bendera, but on Katenga a few kilometers away. Mundandi proved hard to pin down; he had no definite plan himself, just an order to attack on June 25. I asked him why on that date and again he had no answer. We discussed our plan for attacking, not Bendera directly, but the village of Katenga, in order to draw reinforcements that we could destroy on the road, but he would not respond yes or no. He seemed to be a simple soul, entrusted with a task beyond his capabilities; but there was also a large dose of dissembling.
Evidently, Mundandi and Kabila had decided between themselves to attack Front de Force, perhaps trusting that a surprise attack might lead to a large-scale victory over the enemy army. I feared for the safety of the Cubans and Rwandan compañeros, who were supposed to take part in the action, if they staged a direct attack on unknown positions in which there were trenches, natural defenses and heavy weapons. My first reaction was to participate personally in the operation. Kabila had specified that the men should put themselves under Mundandi’s orders, thus subtly rejecting my proposal that Cubans should lead the tactical actions involving mixed troops. I decided that this was not the most important aspect, thinking that with my authority I would be able to push through correct solutions in the course of discussions. Mundandi knew who I was and seemed to respect me. I therefore wrote Kabila a short note as follows:
Dear comrade,
Thank you for your letter. You can rest assured that my impatience is that of a man of action; it implies no criticism. I am able to understand things because I myself have lived through similar conditions.
I also eagerly await your arrival because I consider you an old friend and I owe you an explanation. At the same time, it is my duty to place myself unconditionally under your orders.
As you instructed, the Cubans will leave tomorrow for Front de Force. Unfortunately, many are sick and the total number will be a little lower (40). There are four comrades in Kabimba. We will send the others as they arrive.
I would ask you one favor: Give me permission to go to Front de Force, with no other title than that of my compañeros’ “political commissar,” fully under the orders of Comrade Mundandi. I have just talked to him and he is in agreement. I think this might prove useful. I would