Soon after, Zara, Fiume and the destroyer Alfieri were all fatally hit. Fiume sank shortly after while Zara, Alfieri and the destroyer Carducci were later finished off by RN and RAN destroyers from Cunningham’s escort group, the battleships having withdrawn to safety. Finally, having removed survivors, the stricken Pola was sunk by two torpedoes.
Meanwhile, Mack and Pridham-Wippell had continued their pursuit of Vittorio Veneto; however the chase was unintentionally lost when VALF responded to Cunningham’s signal for all forces not engaged in sinking the enemy to retire north eastwards to avoid attack from the Luftwaffe once daylight returned. The next day (30 March) the British Mediterranean Fleet returned safely to port having dealt a devastating blow to the Regia Marina’s surface fleet: for the loss of just one British aircraft and its three-man crew the Italians had lost three heavy cruisers, and two destroyers; their newest battleship had suffered significant damage while some 3,000 men had been killed, injured or captured. Nevertheless, in Cunningham’s final analysis, quoted in the Summary: ‘‘The results of the action cannot be viewed with entire satisfaction since the damaged Vittorio Veneto was allowed to escape’’.16
Certainly the war for control of the Mediterranean was far from won and the Royal Navy and its allies would continue to suffer devastating losses. But these losses would be at the hands of aircraft and submarines. Had the Regia Marina’s surface fleet survived, Allied casualties could only have been greater, not least during the subsequent evacuations from Crete and Greece. The failure of such operations could have proved fatal for the future of campaigns around the Mediterranean. By the time of the Battle of El Alamein in October – November 1942, the British Eighth Army was better armed and better supplied than Rommel’s Afrika Korps, despite a considerably longer supply route.17 It may be a truism but ultimately a war between nations can only be won on land. A war can, however, be lost at sea when the survival of peoples and their fighting forces is dependent upon safe and open access to the seas.
References
1. Hough, R. (1999), Naval Battles of the Twentieth Century, Constable, London, pp.120-121.
2. Greene J. & Massignani, A. (1998), The Naval War in the Mediterranean 1940–1943, Chatham Publishing, London, pp.143-144. Provides a detailed examination of Italian fuel supplies and their impact on Italian operations; ultimately it is impossible to know if the Regia Marina would have ventured out more if there had been a greater supply of fuel available.
3. See following Battle Summary, for ratio of RN/RAN to Regia Marina ships.
4. Pack, S. W. C. (1961), The Battle of Matapan, B.T. Batsford Ltd, London, p.7.
5. Goldrick, J. ‘Cunningham: Matapan, 1941.’ In Grove, E. (ed.) (1994) Great Battles of the Royal Navy as Commemorated in the Gunroom, Britannia Royal Naval College, Dartmouth, Bramley Books, London, p.198.
6. Brown, D. (2001), The Royal Navy and the Mediterranean. Vol. II November 1940–December 1941, Frank Cass, London, p.xiv.
7. Hough, R. (1999), Naval Battles of the Twentieth Century, Constable, London, p.123.
8. Greene, J. & Massignani, A. (1998), The Naval War in the Mediterranean 1940–1943, Chatham Publishing, London, p.146.
9. See following Battle Summary. The Admiral is also quoted complaining at not been consulted with regard to the preceding Italo-German naval conference held at Merano, 13-14 February.
10. See following Battle Summary.
11. Greene, J. & Massignani, A. (1998), The Naval War in the Mediterranean 1940–1943, Chatham Publishing, London, pp.159-160. It was widely suspected by the Italians that the loss of the element of surprise was due to the presence of a traitor.
12. Scalzo, A. M. (2001): Battle of Cape Matapan: World War II Italian Naval Massacre, www.historynet.com./battle-of-cape-matapan-world-war-ii-italian-naval-massacre.htm.
13. See following Battle Summary.
14. Goldrick, J. ‘Cunningham: Matapan, 1941’ in Grove, E. (ed.) (1994) Great Battles of the Royal Navy as Commemorated in the Gunroom, Britannia Royal Naval College, Dartmouth, Bramley Books, London, p.203.
15. Brandreth, G. (2004), Philip and Elizabeth: Portrait of a Marriage, Century, London, p.152-153.
16. See following Battle Summary.
17. Macintyre, D. (1964), The Battle for the Mediterranean, B.T. Batsford Ltd, London, p.15.
Bibliography
Brandreth, G. (2004), Philip and Elizabeth: Portrait of a Marriage, Century, London.
Brown, D. (2001), The Royal Navy and the Mediterranean. Vol. II November 1940–December 1941, Frank Cass, London.
Goldrick, J. ‘Cunningham: Matapan, 1941’ in Grove, E. (ed.) (1994), Great Battles of the Royal Navy as Commemorated in the Gunroom, Britannia Royal Naval College, Dartmouth, Bramley Books, London.
Greene, J. & Massignani, A. (1998), The Naval War in the Mediterranean 1940-1943, Chatham Publishing, London.
Grove, E. (ed.) (1994), Great Battles of the Royal Navy as Commemorated in the Gunroom, Britannia Royal Naval College, Dartmouth. Bramley Books, London.
Holloway A. (1993), From Dartmouth to War: A Midshipman’s Journal, Bucklands Publications Ltd, London.
Hough, R. (1999), Naval Battles of the Twentieth Century, Constable, London.
Macintyre, D. (1964), The Battle for the Mediterranean, B.T. Batsford Ltd, London.
Pack, S. W. C. (1961), The Battle of Matapan, B.T. Batsford Ltd, London.
Scalzo, A. M. (2001), Battle of Cape Matapan: World War II Italian Naval Massacre, www.historynet.com./battle-of-cape-matapan-world-war-ii-italian-naval-massacre.htm.
BR. 1736 (35) Restricted
NAVAL STAFF HISTORY
SECOND WORLD WAR
BATTLE SUMMARY No. 44
THE BATTLE OF CAPE MATAPAN
28 March, 1941
This book is the property of His Majesty’s Government and is for the use of persons in His Majesty’s Service only. It must not be shown, or made available to, the Press or to any member of the public.
T.S.D. 72/49
Tactical and Staff Duties Division (Historical Section), Naval Staff, Admiralty, S.W.1
Abbreviations
A.A. Anti-Aircraft.
A/C Aircraft.
A.P.C. Armour-Piercing, Capped.
A/S Anti-Submarine.
A.S.V. Anti-Surface Vessel (Airborne Radar Set).
A.T.O. Assisted Take-Off (Launching Gear For A/C).
B/S Battleship.
C.S. Cruiser Squadron.
D.F. Destroyer Flotilla.
D/F Direction Finding (From W/T Reception).
E.B.I. Evershed Bearing Indicator.
F.A.A. Fleet Air Arm.
F/B Flying Boat.
G.A.B. General Alarm Bearing.
H.E. High Explosive.
R.A. (A) Rear-Admiral, Aircraft Carrier.
RAF Royal Air Force.
S.A.P. Semi-Armour-Piercing (R.A.F. Bombs).
T/B (A/C) Torpedo-Bomber.
T.O.O. Time Of Origin.
T.B.R (A/C) Torpedo-Bomber-Reconnaissance.
T.S.R (A/C) Torpedo Spotting Reconnaissance.
VALF Vice-Admiral Of Light Forces.
General Situation, March 1941
In June