The effective strength of the Italian battle fleet at this period was estimated as three battleships fit for service, viz.: Vittorio Veneto, G. Cesare and A. Doria, the other three not having yet been repaired after damage sustained in the Fleet Air Arm attack on Taranto in November 1940. Of cruisers a strong force was available, namely seven 8-in. and at least nine 6-in. ships, whilst the number of Italian destroyers seems to have been at least double that of the British. In submarines the advantage was also heavily on the Italian side. With regard to air forces, the enemy, heavily reinforced by the German Luftwaffe, was in a very strong position and the area to the westward of Crete was well within bombing range of his aerodromes in Sicily, Southern Italy and the Dodecanese.
The Italian fleet10 was organised as follows:
(1) Battleships (Force Y11), Vittorio Veneto (Flag, Admiral Iachino), and four destroyers (13th flot.).
(2) 1st Cruiser Division (Force Z11), Zara, Fiume, Pola and four destroyers (9th flot.).
(3) 3rd Cruiser Division (Force X11), Trento, Trieste, Bolzano and three destroyers (12th flot.).
(4) 8th Cruiser Division, Giuseppe Garibaldi, Duea Di Abruzzi and two destroyers (6th flot.).
The Italian forces, consisting of one battleship, eight cruisers and thirteen destroyers left their various ports on 26 March and, making junction at a rendezvous east of Syracuse, proceeded to the south-east (See Italian Fleet, Plan 11).
Enemy Forces at Sea
At 1220 on 27 March, a British Flying Boat on reconnaissance reported a force of enemy cruisers12 and a destroyer off Sicily in 36° 54’ N., 17° 10’ E. steering 120°, but owing to bad visibility was unable to shadow.
On the strength of this report the C.-in-C., Admiral Sir Andrew Cunningham, decided to proceed to sea. Finding, however, that the original dispositions would leave the cruisers without sufficient support and the battle fleet without sufficient destroyers for a screen, he made the following alterations in his plans:
(a) The VALF with the cruisers (Force B) was to rendezvous at 0630/28 further to the eastward, S. of Gavdo Is., in 34° 20’ N., 24° 10’ E.
(b) The five destroyers of Force C were to remain with the battle fleet.
(e) The movement of T.B.R. aircraft to Cyrenaica was cancelled.
(d) R.A.F. reconnaissance was arranged for 28 March over the South Ionian Sea, the South West Aegean and south of Crete.
The British main fleet (Force A), consisting of three battleships, one aircraft carrier and nine destroyers, left Alexandria at 1900/27 and as dusk fell, shrouding its departure, steered westward on a course 300°, at 20 knots. Six hours before, the VALF, Vice-Admiral Pridham-Wippell, had left the Piraeus (Athens) at 1300/27, with four cruisers and two destroyers, having ordered the remaining two destroyers to leave Suda Bay and join his flag in 34° 20’ N., 24° 10’ E., 30 miles south of Gavdo Island, south of Crete, at 0630/28.
The three destroyers of Force D were assembled at the Piraeus on the morning of 28 March13 and after refuelling kept steam at short notice.
Instructions had already been given to the submarines Rover and Triumph and these were now amplified; they were ordered to patrol off Suda Bay and Anti Milo and wait for an enemy force or convoy expected to be entering the Aegean on 28 March. A message was also sent at 1822 to Captain Portal, Senior Officer at Suda Bay, warning him to withdraw patrols. Unfortunately that very morning his ship, the cruiser HMS York, had been attacked and hit by a new type of one-man motor explosive boat14 and was lying badly damaged and beached in Suda Bay, a mishap which seriously affected British signal communications with the Fleet Air Arm force at Maleme.
British Fleet Movements
At 0400/28 the C.-in-C. with Force A, on a course of 310° at 16 knots, was in 32° 22’ N., 27° 12’ E., roughly 205 miles from the rendezvous of the cruiser force. The latter at 0600/28, steering to the south-east at 18 knots, sighted an enemy aircraft, identified later as an R.O.43. This type, used chiefly with catapults, indicated the presence of surface ships, and accordingly VALF as soon as Ilex and Hasty joined his screen, turned at 0645 to 200°, away from the direction of probable reconnaissance.
Meanwhile the Formidable, an hour before, at 0555, in 32° 44’ N., 26° 57’ E., had flown off a number of aircraft, A/S and fighters, to search the area between Crete and Cyrenaica as far west as longitude 23° E.
An air search had started even earlier from Maleme, in Crete, where four T.B.Rs. armed with torpedoes took off at 0445 to search to the west of Crete. One of them experienced engine trouble and had to jettison its torpedo and return; the others continued in company and, sighting nothing, returned at 0845.
It was 0720 when the enemy was first sighted south of Crete by aircraft 5B of HMS Formidable, which at 0722 amplified her report of four cruisers and four destroyers in 34° 22’ N., 24° 47’ E., steering 230°. The next report was made by Formidable’s aircraft, 5F at 0739, which announced four15 cruisers and six destroyers, course 220° in 34° OS’ N., 24° 26’ E. (see Appendix D). These were part of the Italian Fleet, which at 0800 was south of Gavdo Island (Crete), steering 130°. It was disposed in three groups, termed by us Forces Z, X and Y as follows:
Force Z16 i.e. (1st Cruiser Division, 3 Zara cruisers and (first sighted 0722, 8th Cruiser Division, 2 Garibaldi cruisers). A/C B)
Force X16 i.e. 3rd Cruiser Division, 3 Trieste cruisers. (first sighted 0739, A/C F)
Force Y16 Vittorio Veneto. (first sighted 1058 by VALF)
As the force first reported by aircraft 5B at 0722 was identical in composition with the British Cruiser Force B and was only some 35 miles north-east of it, it seemed to the VALF and to the C.-in-C. that Force B (British) had been mistaken for the enemy, and the C.-in-C. asked R.A. (A) whether his aircraft knew the position of our cruisers. When the second report came in, only 25 miles from the position of the first, it seemed again that it might be referring to our own cruisers. In actual fact the two air reports referred to two separate enemy cruiser forces, some 25 miles apart. One (designated Force X in Plan 1) was some 15 miles north of VALF; the other (designated Force Z) was some 30 miles north-east of him. The uncertainty was soon resolved for at 0745 the Orion (flagship) sighted smoke astern bearing 010° and a minute later identified enemy ships, which belonged to enemy Force X. It was then 0746.
Plan 2
Commencement of Action
(Plan 2)
When 25 miles south of Gavdo at 0600/28 March and on a S.E.’ly course the VALF – as already noted – had sighted an enemy aircraft and, after the Ilex and Hasty had joined his screen, turned at 0645 to course 200°, speed 20 knots, with the intention of avoiding further enemy air reconnaissance. The 0739 enemy report from the Formidable’s A/C ‘F’ was still being studied by VALF at 0745 when the Orion sighted the enemy astern, and at 0752 the VALF altered course to 140° and increased speed to 23 knots. Shortly afterwards (0755) the ships astern were seen to be three cruisers with some destroyers, and speed was increased to 28 knots. Suspecting them to be 8-in. cruisers of the Zara class, which were faster than his own and could outrange them, he decided to try to draw them towards our battleships, some 90 miles to the eastward. At 0802 he reported their position17 and his own. Though not aware of it at the time he was “very uncomfortably placed” with a second powerful enemy cruiser squadron (Force Z) out of sight to the north-east in a position to cut him off from our battle fleet; also, the Vittorio Veneto was some 16 miles on his port quarter, steering S.E. His first enemy report was amplified at 0812 and simultaneously the enemy (3rd Division) opened fire, range 25,000 yards. Admiral Iachino comments on the opening range:
“The Trieste Division opened fire at 22,000 metres and the first salvoes fell very short... the distance between the two groups was in fact never less than 24,000 metres (i.e., 27,000 yards). Atmospheric conditions were most unfavourable for range finding at great distance, especially with the old range finders fitted in the Trento