both. The fate of the English in Canada East was of no concern to him.
Macdonald disagreed with Brown’s intent to isolate the French, but he agreed with the design. For Macdonald, keeping the British colonies strong both affirmed Canada’s independence from America and assured its connection with Great Britain. As a result, his government was fully committed to a general federal union of British North America when, on August 29, 1864, he and some colleagues set sail aboard the Queen Victoria for Charlottetown, PEI, to drop in on a conference that was considering a possible union of the Maritime provinces. Unlike Brown, Macdonald was determined that the Atlantic provinces would join in Confederation.
Together with Galt and Cartier, Macdonald persuaded the Maritimes to set aside the idea of a Maritime-only union, not a difficult sell because the federated model would enable each Maritime province to retain its border (whereas the proposed Maritime union would have created a single entity). A second conference to consider the larger national union was scheduled for October at Québec City.
Cartier spoke there of the benefits for the French in Confederation: “Confederation is a tree whose branches extend in different directions, all of which are firmly attached to the trunk. We French Canadians are one of those branches. It is for us to understand this, and to work for the common good ...[T]olerance is indispensable ...it is on that condition only that we can always conserve the rights acquired by our distinct nationality. We shall enjoy these rights as long as we remain worthy of them.”
The seventy-two resolutions passed at Québec City became the basis for the British North America Act. Canada would be a federal union, formed under its “mother country” Great Britain. There would be a general government charged with matters of common interest to the whole country and local governments charged with the control of local matters in their respective sections. (It is noteworthy that the term “general” was used rather than “federal”; “local” rather than “provincial.”)
The Maritime provinces, fearful that their interests would be subservient to the larger populations of Canada East and Canada West, wanted equal representation in the Senate. However, the Senate was designed with regional, not provincial, equality in mind. There were to be 24 members each for Canada East and Canada West; and 24 for the Maritime provinces (Nova Scotia: 10, New Brunswick: 10, and Prince Edward Island: 4). Members of the Senate would be appointed by the Crown, after being nominated by local governments. Those nominated were to include those from opposition par ties in each province so that all political parties would be fairly represented. Macdonald believed an appointed Senate composed of men of substance was necessary. “The rights of the minority must be protected, and the rich are always fewer in number than the poor.”
With notable exceptions, the House of Commons was to be representation by population. The allocation at Confederation was: Canada West 82; Canada East 65; Nova Scotia 19; New Brunswick 15; Newfoundland 8 and PEI 5. Representation from each section was to be readjusted on the basis of population after every decennial census. One exception was that Canada East was permanently assigned sixty-five members; with each of the other sections entitled to representation on a proportionate basis. Another exception was that the numbers of federal representatives could not be reduced unless the population in a section decreased by five percent.
The general Parliament, which required elections at least every five years, had the power to make laws for peace, welfare, and good government in a broad range of categories. Critically, the Parliament would hold residual powers for all general matters that weren’t reserved for the local governments and legislatures. Parliament also enjoyed the power to appoint the lieutenant governor of the provinces, a position Macdonald considered the equivalent of a chief executive officer. This power of appointment gave the general government something of an oversight role over the local governments.
The local legislatures had more limited responsibilities including direct taxation; agriculture; immigration; education (except any rights and privileges which the Protestant or Catholic minority might possess for denominational schools); sea coast; inland fisheries; the establishment, maintenance and management of hospitals, asylums, charities, and charitable institutions; municipal institutions; licensing for shop, saloon, tavern and auctioneers; incorporation of private companies; and property and civil rights. The provinces also enjoyed residual rights. These were limited to private or local matters not assigned to the general Parliament. To ensure the authority of the general government, its laws were to be supreme in any area of shared jurisdiction. Macdonald hoped that the provinces would, in effect, ultimately become municipalities.
Both English and French were to be used in the general Parliament and in the local legislature of Canada East, and also in the federal Courts and the courts of Canada East.
The weighting of powers and jurisdiction was, as Macdonald had sought in the negotiations, precisely toward a strong federal Parliament. “We . . . make the Confederation one people in one government, instead of five peoples and five governments, one united province, with the local governments and legislatures subordinate to the general government and legislature.”
Macdonald’s centrist orientation produced a division of responsibilities that was appropriate at the time. However, he did not anticipate the dramatically increased presence that governments would have in the lives of Canadians in the generations that followed. Had Macdonald foreseen state controlled health care he would probably have placed it in the hands of the federal government. Macdonald would be astonished that today the collective revenues of provincial governments exceed those of the federal government. In contrast to Macdonald, most Conservatives since Bob Stanfield have generally been advocates of provincial rights, as they are set out in the Constitution of 1867. Indeed, the 2006 Constitution of the Conservative Party of Canada states as a basic principle, “A belief in the federal system of government as the best expression of the diversity of our country, and in the desirability of strong provincial and territorial governments.” This principle would have troubled Macdonald.
Among the more controversial provisions incorporated into Canada’s governance at Confederation was the power of disallowance. In addition to the power of the Queen to disallow legislation of the general government, the governor general also had the right to disallow local government legislation within one year of its passing. The authority of the governor general to disallow generally fell upon the general government to exercise, and was consistent with the strong general government that Macdonald wanted. But this power proved problematic for him. Whenever a province passed legislation that upset either minorities in that province or the sensibilities of another province, pressure was placed on the prime minister to intervene. Macdonald did not fully appreciate the dilemma until certain provinces sought to squelch the right of the French-speaking minority to educate their children in their native tongue.
At Confederation, the general government took ownership of the assets and liabilities of the local governments. Annual grants, based on population at 80 cents per head, were to be given as an offset for the loss in authority and taxing power. Positive adjustments were made for provinces that brought proportionally less debt into Confederation. As today, Canada was then a financial bargain box filled with transfers, equalization payments, and promises to build infrastructure.
The resolutions adopted at the Québec Conference had no authority until sanctioned by the imperial and colonial Parliaments. But for Macdonald, the man who had authored a majority of the resolutions, it was an impressive start. Only a month after inviting himself to Charlottetown, he was leading the ambitious design for a new nation. Because none of the participants had experience in drafting constitutions, it is no surprise that the ensuing documents contained flaws—the more serious of which were the failure to consider an amending formula, the terms under which dissolution might be caused, and the status of Aboriginal people.
The next stage of the journey was passage through provincial legislatures and the imperial Parliament in London. Because the conferences in Prince Edward Island and Québec took place behind closed doors, public opinion would now have to be brought onside. However, Macdonald did not see this as a matter that needed to be brought before the public for approval: “It would be unconstitutional and anti-British to have a plebiscite. If by petitions in public meetings Parliament is satisfied the country do not want the measure, they will refuse to adopt.