no use in an appeal to it. Submission of the complicated details to the country is an obvious absurdity.”
Whenever confederation was in political danger, Macdonald would raise the spectre of problems south of the border. He had faced problems of his own with the Americans when, on October 19, 1864, in the village of St. Albans, Vermont, 13 Confederate agents, dressed in civilian clothes, escaped to Canada after robbing three banks of $200,000. One American pursuer was killed. The raiders were arrested in Canada East, but were later released on a technicality by a Montréal police magistrate. There was pressure on President Lincoln to invade Canada and capture the raiders, but he declined, fearing an international incident. Even though the raiders were recaptured and returned to America, other retaliatory measures were contemplated, including the abrogation of the Reciprocity Treaty and an executive order requiring passports from all persons entering the United States from the provinces. (The next time Americans would invoke the passport provisions was in 2006 in response to fears that terrorists might enter the U.S. via Canada.)
Macdonald thought complaining about retaliation over the proposed passport measure would only strengthen American resolve and make Canada look weak. He was not prepared to give the Americans this satisfaction, since “it would give [U.S. Secretary of State] Mr. Seward an exaggerated idea of the inconvenience and the loss sustained by Canada and would be kept up as a means of punishment or for purposes of coercion. The sure way to succeed is for the Canadian government to assume an indifferent tone in the matter.”
Macdonald took the Québec resolutions to the legislature in the Province of Canada, where he made his belief in the principle of a monarch who was beyond the reach of politics in the House. His case for a strong central government and subordinate local governments, with lieutenant governors appointed by the general government, was central to this argument.
Meanwhile, all was not well in the Maritime provinces. Prince Edward Island did not make it into the first phase of Confederation. In Nova Scotia, Joseph Howe took up the struggle against the Québec plan and demanded a referendum or election on the issue. He believed that Confederation would weaken the bond with the British; that it would be used by the British to justify withdrawing its troops from Nova Scotia, and thus weaken commercial ties.
One particularly contentious element of the Québec plan was the construction of the intercolonial railway. This key commitment promised to build an intercolonial railway from Rivière-du-Loup through New Brunswick to Truro in Nova Scotia. When pressed, Macdonald would not say whether this provision represented a constitutional guarantee. This caused concern in New Brunswick. “Now I can assure you,” New Brunswick Premier Leonard Tilley wrote to Macdonald in 1865, “that no Delegate from this Province will consent to the Union unless we have this guarantee [of a railroad].” Macdonald, speaking without authorization, pledged that the guarantee would be inserted into an Imperial Act.
Both the Québec resolutions and Premier Tilley were defeated in the New Brunswick legislature. With an anti-confederation government in place in New Brunswick, expanding the union seemed doubtful. But, supported with ample secret donations arranged by Macdonald and railway supporters, Tilley was returned to power in short order and the Confederation resolution was adopted in 1866.
The Nova Scotia legislature approved the union in 1866, but its approval expired in the spring of 1867. Unless Confederation was a reality by that date, a new bill would have to be introduced. A provincial election was likely before then, providing another opportunity to derail Confederation in Nova Scotia.
Enter the Fenians. Irish immigrants to America, the Fenian Brotherhood was a radical group that sought independence for their home country from Great Britain. The Fenians’ strategy was to take Canada hostage, then boldly negotiate Irish independence with England. In June 1866, the Fenians did defeat a small Canadian force along the Niagara frontier, but most Fenian attacks were haphazard and inconsequential. That same year, several hundred of the Brotherhood marched six miles into Canada to plant a green flag. They entered unopposed, then amused themselves by stealing food and liquor. Anticipating Canadian opposition, they bid a hasty retreat, only to have their guns confiscated upon reentering American territory. The incident was ludicrous, but Macdonald used it to his advantage. What better way to protect British North America from American invasion, he suggested, than to bind the colonies together, backed by the full might of British military force? To reinforce the seriousness of the threat, Parliament was called into an emergency session to provide increased support for its military.
Within Canada West and Canada East, the Confederation debate drew generally positive conclusions, but for different reasons. In Canada East, George Brown triumphantly declared, “. . . constitution adopted—a most credible document—a complete reform of all the abuses and injustices we have complained of. Is it not wonderful? French-Canadianism is entirely extinguished.” Brown’s newspaper, the Globe, elaborated: “We desire local self-government in order that the separate nationalities of which the population is composed may not quarrel. We desire at the same time a strong central authority. Is there anything incompatible in these two things?” In Canada East, Quebecers viewed Confederation as a framework that would allow them to control their own destiny. Editors at La Minerve, a newspaper closely aligned with the Tories, proclaimed, “As a distinct and separate nationality, we form a state within a state. We enjoy the full exercise of our rights, and the formal recognition of our national independence . . . In giving ourselves a complete government we affirm our existence as a separate nationality.”
In Canada East, the threat of American domination came into play. Cartier observed, “The question is reduced to this: we must either have a British North America Federation or else be absorbed into the American Federation.” Indeed, just as Confederation was becoming a reality, American expansionist designs included the purchase of Alaska from the Russians for US $7.2 million. American Senator Charles Sumner boasted that the purchase was “the visible step to the occupation of the whole North American continent.” Perhaps Confederation had arrived in the nick of time.
The final battleground for Confederation was England, where the Imperial Parliament would be asked to pass the British North America Act. But first, the “London Conference” was convened on December 4, 1866 to hold hearings on the matter. Macdonald was chosen conference chair. Sir Frederick Rogers of the Colonial Office commented on Macdonald’s mastery at nation-building. “Macdonald was the ruling genius and spokesman and I was very greatly struck by his power of management and adroit ness. . . . the slightest divergence from the narrow line already agreed on in Canada was watched for—here by the French and there by the English—as eager dogs watch a rat hole; a snap on one side might have provoked a snap on the other; and put an end to the accord. He stated and argued the case with cool, ready fluency, while at the same time you saw that every word was measured, and that while he is making for a point ahead, he was never for a moment unconscious of any of the rocks among which he had to steer.” To secure agreement at the London Conference, a limited number of amendments to the Québec resolutions was required. Specifically, the Senate design was altered, enabling the Queen to appoint three or six additional senators, representing the three divisions of Canada. The central government was also given responsibility to protect the rights of minorities in education by invoking “remedial” legislation if required.
The style given to Canada was also debated. While Macdonald preferred the prefix of “Kingdom,” British officials worried it would annoy American “Republican” sensibilities. The Colonial Office proposed the designation “Dominion”: “And he shall have dominion also from sea to sea” from Psalm 72, verse 8—which was readily accepted.
Despite Joseph Howe’s pleas to delay legislation until after the Nova Scotia election, the bill establishing Canada was first read in the British House of Lords on February 12, 1867 and passed four days later. Macdonald commented that the bill received the same consideration “as if it were a private Bill uniting two or three English parishes.” Nonetheless, the Colonial Secretary, Lord Carnarvon, remarked, “We are laying the foundation of a great State, perhaps one which at a future date may overshadow this country.” In addition to being knighted, Macdonald was chosen by Queen Victoria, in advance of an election, to be Canada’s first prime minister. He was, of course, the logical choice. He had carried the day on matters of vision with abundant