tradition has shown signs of stress in which ‘the arrival of political democracy in 1994 has been associated with a decline in the intensity and vitality of local union democracy’ (Hirschohn 2011: 2). Reporting on the fourth iteration of a survey of members of Cosatu affiliates, Hirschsohn and the researchers associated with the Taking Democracy Seriously project present findings that suggest a weakening of the key role played by shop stewards in the workplace and in relation to the members they represent. Two findings, in particular, are striking. The first is the sharp decline between the first survey in 1994 and the fourth survey in 2008 in the number of respondents who agreed that shop stewards can only act on a mandate from members. This fell from 72 per cent in 1994 to 46 per cent in 2008. Despite a problem of comparability between the first and the following three surveys due to methodological changes, the fact that less than half of the respondents in 2008 felt that shop stewards may act without a mandate points to a decline in accountability between shop-floor leaders and union members. A similar finding emerged from the Cosatu Workers Survey where less than 40 per cent of the respondents felt they were able to exercise a lot of influence over their shop-steward representatives (Naledi 2012: 23).
A second striking finding is the decline in policy knowledge levels among shop stewards. When shop stewards were asked, for example, whether they had ever been in a meeting where there was a report-back on Nedlac, the number dropped from 59 per cent in 1998 to 21 per cent in 2008. As Hirschsohn (op. cit.: 20) concludes: ‘Although individual members are far removed from policy negotiations at Nedlac, the limited participation of their representatives in meetings where policy issues are discussed raises substantive questions about the extent to which effective mandating processes are in place.’ Not surprisingly, Hirschsohn concludes that although the formal structure of democracy remains in place in the country’s largest trade unions, the model of shop-floor democracy and worker control on which the unions were built has been substantially weakened.
This understanding of unions’ internal organisational problems has been echoed by a number of commentators over the past few years (see, inter alia, Buhlungu 2010). It was, however, the dramatic industrial conflict during 2012, particularly the conflict in the mining sector, that pushed these issues into the open and no doubt influenced the self-critical agenda of Cosatu’s 11th Congress in late 2012 and its collective bargaining conference in March 2013.
In his address to the collective bargaining conference, Zwelinzima Vavi (2013:7), the general secretary of Cosatu, outlined key organisational problems:
On the issue of the social distance of leaders, we have to acknowledge that even at the level of full time shop stewards, and even more so at the level of elected leadership, we have allowed a situation where a physical and material distance often exists. How often do we hear of full time shop stewards having absolutely no connection to their original constituency? Sometimes these are elected office bearers, who have not been re-elected by their constituency, and yet get protected by a fudging of their union constitution. Then there is often a material distance. Sometimes in an effort to find a solution to the challenge of a full time shop steward being taken out of the normal pay and progression structure of a company, we have agreed to conditions which provide undue privilege. This privilege becomes the source of envy as well as derision (disdain and scorn). Where it becomes the source of envy it produces leadership battles based not on principle but on material competition. Whether the response of workers is envy or derision, the ultimate product is the same – the creation of conditions ripe for splits and splinter unions.
The fact that the NUM became the victim of widespread member dissatisfaction in the platinum mining sector is perhaps instructive of the range of challenges that have been facing many Cosatu affiliates. In the case of unions such as the NUM, its sheer size and scale has presented it with the challenge of maintaining a balance between worker control and shop-floor democracy on the one hand, and maintaining an effective union administration and level of service to its members on the other. In the face of a high outflow of experienced unionists to the public service, political office and other pursuits, maintaining an effective organisational machinery would clearly be difficult – as it has been in many other institutional and organisational settings in the country.
The first significant change in union organisation highlighted by the 2012 conflicts has therefore been a gradual but systematic weakening of the organisational power vested in the tradition of shop-floor democracy and worker control. This is not to suggest that organisational weakness spans the entire union movement – but the fact that some of the largest and most influential trade unions have suffered setbacks highlights the significance of the problem and the potential for greater instability in union developments in the future.
A second key feature of 2012 that relates to problems of union organisation was the upsurge in independent and often uncoordinated worker action in the mining and agricultural sectors. In the mining sector, the relationship between the action by workers and trade unions was complex. On the one hand, workers engaged in industrial action after communication between the NUM, management and workers broke down (Alexander et al. 2012: 119). On the other hand, worker committees were established on some mines, and although they seemed to be independent it is possible that rival unions such as Amcu played a role in the formation and operation of certain committees. On the mines, independent worker action could therefore be viewed in the context of disillusionment with management, dissatisfaction with the established majority union, and a response to the emergence of a militant, rival union trying to gain a foothold among workers. Dissatisfaction with levels of pay, particularly among rock drill operators, was also a driving factor in the mining unrest from its inception at Anglo American Platinum in January 2012.
The upsurge of worker action in the Western Cape agricultural sector in September 2012, starting in De Doorns and spreading to Ceres, Robertson, Prince Alfred and Somerset West, saw worker action, independently of any union formation in the area, demanding a minimum wage of R150 per day. Within a short space of time, a number of trade unions established a presence among workers in areas such as De Doorns and engaged with government and employers in the talks that followed and that were aimed at reviewing the minimum wage contained in the sectoral determination. As was the case in the platinum mines, the underlying cause of worker action was dissatisfaction with existing levels of pay. Poor working and living conditions were frequently cited as aggravating factors fuelling the strikes and protest action among these workers. As Hartford (2012: 7-8) states: ‘There is no doubt that the gross poverty and inequality in South Africa (amongst the worst in the world in respect of Gini coefficient measures) provides the social and economic context to heightened expectations of wage increases.’
The industrial action of 2012 in agriculture, in particular, was perhaps the first widespread expression of how socioeconomic pressures on workers, on income levels and on general living conditions have led directly to instability in industrial relations.
A third feature of 2012 was the persistence of violent action during industrial disputes. The tragic shooting of mineworkers on 16 August 2012 at Marikana served as a grim reminder of the repressive capability of the state, irrespective of political regime. The violence of Marikana was accompanied by violence during the farmworker protest and the strike during August 2012 in the road freight sector. In both, violence was accompanied by the burning of vineyards and trucks. In many ways, the violence that characterised industrial conflict during 2012 served also as a reminder of the persistence of violence in South Africa’s industrial relations system. Strikes, and violence during strikes, has been a recurring theme from the early part of the twentieth century to the present.
The implications of recurring strike violence by unionised and non-unionised workers are twofold. On the one hand, violent action serves as a reminder of the limits to institutionalisation of industrial relations; irrespective of the legitimacy of industrial relations, the exercise of class power remains a possibility. On the other hand, the use