technology of machines and the technology of the social thus went hand in hand, their common telos being efficient order and the elimination of waste and redundancy. In such a technology-oriented society, the model subjects were technicians and engineers.32
In this Fordistic society, mass production was coupled with mass consumption. Instead of antagonism between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, what appeared was the so-called “levelled middle-class society” of employees and skilled workers, who all participated in the consumption of standardized goods. This society promised a high standard of living for all. Especially during the trente glorieuses – the years 1945 to 1975 – this “affluent society” provided the imaginary backdrop of organized modernity. On the political level, this economic and technological formation was flanked by a socially regulating state, by a welfare state with a Keynesian and social-democratic or socialist plan to ensure social inclusion. The society formed along these lines was characterized by the expansive legal codification of social life and by political representation, which took place chiefly through people’s parties with their massive support and their promises to fight for the common good.33 On the spatial level, the functional city was the place where organized modernity crystallized. Both in the suburbs and in high-density public housing, the industrial city was based, as mentioned above, on functionalistic serial architecture and the spatial separation of work and domestic life.34
Whether in the economic, technological, political, or spatial sphere, organized modernity was guided by the semantics of the social, understood as the regulated collective.35 The collectivized social – whether in the form of a crowd, group, political party, workforce, or even the nuclear family – now took on an independent and superior existence, to which the individual was subordinate. Quite fittingly, then, William Whyte and David Riesman referred to the post-bourgeois subject as an “organization man.” This was a subject who developed an extreme sensitivity to the social expectations of his peers, to which he adapted accordingly. Orienting oneself toward the social standards of normality went hand in hand with a radical disciplining of emotions. As noted above, organized modernity was essentially a society of equals, of equality before the law, and of social uniformity. This culture of equality correlated with the uniformity of subjects: individuals were compelled to shape their lives to fit a “normal biography” with clear stages and with the aim of achieving life goals.36 In Simmel’s terms, the subjects of organized modernity were thus representative of an “individualism of equality.”
All of this suggests that the social logic of the general – in the forms of standardization, generalization, and formalization, which industrial modernity enforced throughout the first two-thirds of the twentieth century – has some obvious downsides. These include social inhibition and repression on a large scale and the elimination of genuinely unique characteristics in a radical, systemic, and historically unprecedented way. These downsides affected all social entities: things, people, collectives, spaces, and times. In organized modernity, the particular or the unique was tendentially regarded as the insignificant, undesirable, or even repulsive “other” that had to be overcome (with violence, if necessary) because it did not fit into the generally valid functional order of society. Such things were treated as vestiges of the premodern, retrograde, and decadent past or – at best – as unintended and riskily peculiar marginal phenomena of modernity.
The social struggle against this “other” and against anything apparently non-rational was waged above all against ostensibly abnormal or asocial subjects, who were classified by the psycho-social complex as exhibitors of deviant behavior.37 This struggle also led to a distaste for things and objects produced outside of industrial mass production, and encouraged the neglect or destruction of local and historical spaces – and the unique culture associated with them – in favor of the functional city. With its practices, industrial modernity thus enforced the de-singularization of the social. In the practices of observation, a vast system of general concepts and scales was developed for differentiating the general-particular, and this came at the expense of a now marginalized conceptual and perceptive sensitivity to the complexity of singularities. In the practices of evaluation, the result was to discriminate against or pathologize anything that could not be made to fit into the achievement differences determined by the logic of the general. In the practices of production, unique things were either created by mistake or were relicts of premodern niche practices. In their practices of appropriation, subjects thus became successively accustomed to adopting objectifying approaches to things and in large part “unlearned,” so to speak, how to deal with singularities.38
The rationalistic logic of the general achieved its zenith in organized, industrial modernity. It was during this time that society endeavored once and for all to triumph over the fundamental problems of scarcity and disorder mentioned above. Although many structural decisions made during this phase would remain influential in late modernity, organized modernity as an all-encompassing formation has since become history. Its social logic of the general would go on to serve as a negative example for late modernity, which would distance itself from it with its own social logic of singularities. As we will see, however, matters are somewhat more complicated. Industrial modernity was not organized in an entirely rationalistic manner, and it was not completely de-singularized. For its part, moreover, late modernity has developed its own version of rationalization, which now serves as an enabling form of infrastructure.
Notes
1 Rather than being obsolete, the theory of functional differentiation and that of capitalism are still effective for analyzing structural elements of societies that are characterized by formal rationalization. 2 See Max Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology, trans. Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978); and Wolfgang Schluchter, The Rise of Western Rationalism: Max Weber’s Developmental History, trans. Guenther Roth (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981). 3 See, for instance, Georg Simmel, The Philosophy of Money: Third Enlarged Edition, trans. Tom Bottomore and David Frisby (London: Routledge, 2004); Martin Heidegger, “The Age of the World Picture,” in The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays, trans. William Lovitt (New York: Harper & Row, 1977), pp. 115–36; Theodor W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment, trans. John Cumming (New York: Verso, 1979); Hans Blumenberg, The Legitimacy of the Modern Age, trans. Robert M. Wallace (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1983); Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Vintage, 1977); and Zygmunt Bauman, Modernity and Ambivalence (Cambridge: Polity, 1991). 4 On normality and normalism, see Jürgen Link, Versuch über den Normalismus: Wie Normalität produziert wird, 5th edn. (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2013). 5 See Alfred Schütz and Thomas Luckmann, The Structures of the Life-World, 2 vols., trans. Richard M. Zaner et al. (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1973–89). 6 Similarities thus operate outside of the dualistic logic of identity and difference. See Anil Bhatti et al., “Ähnlichkeit: Ein kulturtheoretisches Paradigma,” Internationales Archiv für Sozialgeschichte der Literatur 36 (2011), pp. 261–75. 7 For such broad understanding of techne, see Hans Blumenberg, Schriften zur Technik (Berlin: Suhrkamp, 2015). On the traditional rationalization of religion and law, see the fifth and sixth chapters of Weber’s Economy and Society. 8 On the awareness of contingency, see Michael Makropoulos, Modernität und Kontingenz (Munich: Fink, 1997). 9 See also John Law, Organizing Modernity: Social Ordering and Social Theory (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994). 10 On the notion of progress, see Reinhart Koselleck, Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time, trans. Keith Tribe (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004). 11 On this complex, see David F. Noble, America by Design: Science, Technology, and the Rise of Corporate Capitalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979); and Yehouda Shenhav, Manufacturing Rationality: The Engineering Foundations of the Managerial Revolution (Oxford University Press, 1999). 12 See H. Floris Cohen, Scientific Revolution: A Historiographical Inquiry (University of Chicago Press, 1994); and Stephen Toulmin, Cosmopolis: The Hidden Agenda of Modernity (University of Chicago Press, 1990). 13 See Link, Versuch über den Normalismus. 14 The classic treatment of this subject is Norbert Elias, The Civilizing Process: Sociogenetic and Psychogenetic Investigations, rev. edn., trans. Edmund Jephcott (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000). Regarding organized modernity, see Peter N. Stearns, American