doubtful, whether it is consecrated or not, does not destroy its validity as a legal Erub, but if the loaf of bread was deposited while yet consecrated, the doubt existing at twilight whether it had already become ordinary does not nullify its sanctity as a consecrated object, and as a consecrated object cannot be deposited as an Erub, the validity of the Erub, is impaired."
MISHNA: A man may make his Erub, conditional and say: If foes come from the east, my Erub shall be valid for the west; should they come from the west, my Erub shall be good for the east; should they come from both sides, I am at liberty to go in what direction I please; should they not come from either side, I am like the rest of my townsmen. Should a sage come from the east, my Erub shall be valid for the east; should one come from the west, my Erub shall be valid for the west; should one come from each side, I am at liberty to go in which direction I please; should none come from either side, I am like the rest of my townsmen. R. Jehudah. said: If one of the two sages (should they come at the same time) had been the man's teacher, he must go to meet his teacher; if both had been his teachers, he may go in which direction he pleases.
GEMARA: "R. Jehudah said: 'If one of the two sages,'" etc. What is the reason of the dissension of the sages from R. Jehudah's opinion? Because it frequently happens, that a man has a greater fondness for his colleague than for his teacher.
Rabh said: This part of the Mishna (wherein R. Jehudah states, that "if both sages had been the man's teachers, he may go in whichever direction he pleases") does not hold good, because Ayo taught: R. Jehudah said: "A man cannot make an object conditional upon two contingencies and in this case of the Erub he may make it conditional upon the arrival of a sage from either the west or the east, but not upon sages arriving from opposite directions." Why can he not make it conditional upon the arrival of sages from opposite directions? Because R. Jehudah does not admit of the theory of premeditated choice (i.e., he does not consent to a man deciding upon a certain thing on one day and declaring that it had been his intention to decide in that manner since the day before), hence if two sages come from opposite directions, the man cannot say, that he had intended to meet the sage towards whom he went at the time he deposited the Erub, i.e., on the day before.
If R. Jehudah does not hold to the theory of premeditated choice why does he consent to a man making an Erub and saying: "If the sage come from the east, my Erub shall be good for the east, and if from the west, for the west." His choice is certainly dependent upon two conditions; first the condition, that the sage will come from either one of two directions, and second, that he may not come at all, in which case his Erub is of no account. If the sage arrived on the morrow, and the man will go forward to meet him, he (the man) will be compelled to claim a premeditated choice saying, that he had intended when depositing his Erub to go in that direction and that would be incorrect; for it may be, that at the time the Erub was made, the sage himself did not know from which direction he would come.
Said R. Johanan: The statement of Ayo in the name of R. Jehudah, that a man may make his Erub conditional upon the arrival of a sage from the east or west holds good, only if the sage had already started on his way and was no more than four thousand ells away from the man [i.e., if he or his Erub was at the time when the man deposited his Erub already within the legal limit established through the deposition of his (the sage's) own Erub]. Hence it was not a premeditated choice on the part of the man dependent upon the two conditions cited, for the sage was already on his way and his coming from a certain direction was an accomplished fact.
Why does Rabh say, that the Mishna does not hold good because of Ayo's statement? Let him say on the contrary, that Ayo's statement does not hold good, because the Mishna opposes it? Nay; it would not be proper; for we have learned elsewhere, that R. Jehudah does not hold to the theory of premeditated choice. Ula, however, declares, that Ayo's statement should be discountenanced on account of the Mishna (and as for the report, that R. Jehudah discards the theory of premeditated choice, Ula declares, that on the contrary, he holds it to be good).
Said Rabha to R. Na'hman: Who is the Tana, who holds, that the sages also discountenance the theory of premeditated choice? For we have learned as follows: If one man said to five others: "I will make an Erub for any one of you whom I may choose, and if I desire, he shall be permitted to go within its limits, and if not, he must not do so." If he made his decision, while it was yet day (before the Sabbath set in) his Erub is valid; but if he made his decision after dark, his Erub is not valid, (because it was not known at twilight which man he had chosen). R. Na'hman was silent and did not answer.
Should he have said, that this was according to the school of Ayo? He had not heard of Ayo's decree. Said R. Joseph: Wouldst thou ignore the other Tanaim? There are other Tanaim who dispute the above decision, as we have learned: If a man said: "I will make an Erub for all the Sabbaths of the ensuing year. If I then choose to go, I shall do so, and if not, I shall not." If he made his decision while it was yet day on the day preceding Sabbath, he may go, but if he made his decision after dusk, R. Simeon says, his Erub is still valid, and the sages say, it is not. (Hence there are sages who do not hold to the theory of premeditated choice.)
Have we not heard elsewhere, that R. Simeon does not hold to the theory of premeditated choice? This would be a contradiction made by R. Simeon to himself? Therefore learn to the contrary: (R. Simeon says, the Erub is not valid, and the sages say it is.) Why this question? Can it not be, that R. Simeon does not hold the theory of premeditated choice to be good where biblical laws are concerned but does hold the theory good for rabbinical laws? R. Joseph maintains, that one who admits of the theory of premeditated choice does so for both biblical and rabbinical laws, and one who discountenances the theory does so for both kinds of laws.
MISHNA: R. Eliezer said: When a festival precedes or succeeds a Sabbath (by one day), a man should prepare two Erubin and say: My first Erub is to be valid for the east and my second for the west; or my first for the west and the second for the east. My Erub is valid for the first day and the second day I am like the rest of my townsmen, or my Erub is good for the second day and the first day I am like my townsmen. The sages however hold, that one may prepare his Erub for one direction only; otherwise it is not valid at all; also that he must prepare his Erub for both days, or it is not valid at all. But how must this be done? One carries out the Erub to the place, where he means to deposit it on the eve of the first day of rest and remains with it until dusk, when he carries it back with him. He then brings the Erub out again on the second day, remains with it till dark and then cats it and goes away. It is obvious, that in this manner he gains his walk beyond the Sabbatical limit and he gains by eating his Erub. Should his Erub have been eaten on the first day, it is a legal Erub for the first day only; but not for the second day. R. Eliezer said to them: "Thus ye acknowledge to me that they are two distinct holidays (i.e., that the sanctification of one day is not equal to that of the other)."
GEMARA: What do the sages mean to tell us: If a man prepares his Erub for one direction, it is good for both days and if he prepares it for both days it is good for one direction? What need is there of this repetition, is it not one and the same thing? Nay; the sages mean to say to R. Eliezer: "Wilt thou not acknowledge, that it is not permitted to make two Erubin for one day, one of which shall be good for the South for one half of the day and the other be good for the North for the other half of the day?" and he answered: "Yea." "Then," rejoined the sages, "in the same manner as this is not permitted, it is also not allowed to make Erubin good for both days, which should in addition be also good on one day for the east and on the other for the west." [What answer could R. Eliezer make to this? He might say, that in the case of the two Erubin for one day, the sanctification of that one day continues throughout the entire time of the validity of the Erub, whereas in the case of the Erubin for both days, the sanctification of the one day (Sabbath) is not the same as that of the other day (the festival); therefore a separate Erub may be made for each sanctification in a different direction.] Said R. Eliezer to the sages again: "Let us suppose now, that a man did not make an Erub, but on the eve of the first day went to the place, where he should have made it, personally and declared that he would take his Sabbath-rest there. Would this hold good also for the second day? Nay, he would have to return on the following day and again declare his intention of resting there the next day, and then it would be lawful? The same theory applies to an Erub. If he deposited it on the eve of the first day, and it had been eaten when deposited, he would have to make