in transnational space» reveals positioning and self-identification in the context of Kaliningradians boundary modalities. The historical context and cultural transborder’s dialog plays a role through the prism of migration mobility after the collapse of the Soviet Union.
The issue of borderland communities occupies a prominent place in the theory of anthropology and sociology. In this chapter, extensive attention is paid to the perception of the «space» and the aspiration of self-identity, as well as to the theme of Kaliningrad regional culture as a component (periphery) of the Russian national culture and as a link to the European cultural space.
The final part of the last chapter is devoted to empirical research in the «remote field» in relation to the «home field». During two years I had numerous interviews with Kaliningradians, which temporarily or permanently live in Berlin and find the field for the implementation of their motivations, ideas and projects. My respondents were young specialists and teams of professionals who implement and develop their startup initiatives and projects in the field of culture and innovative technologies.
I has spent considerable time searching for relevant respondents and localization of participating observation, because Kaliningradians in Berlin are not numerous and scattered among different co-working spaces and events. A process of search revealed that the consolidating center or space does not exist and is not even forming.
I study the role of startup scene as a channel of transnational mobility for young Kaliningradians and analyzed this role, within entrepreneurs’ initiatives of Kaliningradians in the Berlin startup-scene through theories of self-identity and transmigration.
2. The Kaliningrad region and its historical background
2.1. Birth of the Kaliningrad Oblast
The Kaliningrad regional culture is marked by the presence of ethno-cultural, geopolitical, and historical phenomena. It represents intensive cross-cultural interaction so that it has a considerable sociocultural dynamics and increasing cultural uncertainty. This comprehension is important for the study of the features of ethno-cultural particularity of the Kaliningrad region in terms of European neighbourhood. In this regard, the issues of correlation of national, local, and regional dimensions acquire urgency. The establishment of the region almost 70 years ago as a Soviet Oblast initiated the formation of peculiar social and cultural phenomenon.
The 20th century is characterized by significant and momentous changes on the map of Europe, which suddenly affected the way of life of millions of people and their domicile. The Kaliningrad region is one of the smallest regions of the Russian Federation, which has found a new history, cultural, and social profile due to incorporation to the Soviet Union in 1945. This fact was possible in consequence of World War II and of the diplomatic negotiations that took place between the US, Great Britain, and the USSR.
An intent look at this history is a significant step to grasp a full-scale perspective on the issue. How has the fate of former East Prussia been decided that resulted on the map of Europe a new territorial entity, the Kaliningrad region? Familiarity with this history provides an understanding of how ambiguous the process was. Appeal to the history helps us to understand the peculiarities of perception of this area by the first settlers and official Soviet authorities after the war, to estimate the origins of the contemporary post-Soviet identity of Kaliningradians and their interests in the neighbourhood countries of the European Union and their territorial isolation from the «large Russia».
The issue of East Prussia has appeared in the records of high-level diplomatic negotiations in the initial phase of World War II, when the outcome of the war was not known. On 5 December 1941, during the meeting with the Soviet ambassador in London, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill has explained his idea: «The main challenge is to once and for all eliminate the German threat. This task requires the complete disarmament of Germany at least within of one generation and the fragmentation of Germany, especially separation of Prussia»110.
On 16 December 1941, Joseph Stalin in Moscow during negotiations with British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden proposed to add to the draft agreement on joint actions the secret protocol on separation of Germany after the war into few independent states. The part of East Prussia with Königsberg he proposed to transfer to the USSR under a term of 20 years as a guarantee of reimbursement of incurred losses from the war with Germany111. This attempt to probe English colleagues was not accident: In fact, it was based on the point of view of Churchill, who expressed his opinion a little earlier in conversations with Soviet representatives in London.
During negotiations, Anthony Eden said that Great Britain promised Poland that its borders would be settled at the final peace conference after the war. Stalin suggested that «the western border of Poland will include East Prussia and Corridor (Gdansk). Poland’s eastern border with the Soviet Union has to go along the river Neman, and Tilsit should be in the hands of Lithuania, which is constituted as a portion of the USSR. Further to the south this border should go roughly along the Curzon line112, which can be partially modified to a certain point»113. By insisting on the immediate recognition of borders of the USSR by the British government, Stalin stated unequivocally that he «puts the conclusion of any kind of Anglo-Soviet agreement under condition of an agreement on this issue»114.
Thus, from the very beginning of the war the issue of East Prussia became a part of the Polish question, which was of strategic importance for the Great Powers in framing East European policy. Despite East Prussia being part of Germany, the fate of Konigsberg in times of negotiations was dependent on the Polish question.
The dynamics of the negotiations on the subject can be tracked in the course of major conferences and meetings of representatives of the USSR, the USA, the UK, as well as those of the Polish government-in-exile.
At one of the meetings of the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers of the USSR, the USA and the UK (19—30 October 1943), which was actually a rehearsal for the Tehran conference, the issue of the fate of Germany was considered. This question was raised on the initiative of the US. Eden laid out the plan of the British government on the future of Germany: «We would like to divide the Germany into separate states; in particular, we would welcome the detachment of Prussia from the rest of Germany»115. According to Eden, Franklin Roosevelt told him about the need of formation on the territory of Germany of three new states – Prussia, the Federation of Rhineland, and the South-German Union. The US government was divided on the question of the forms of decentralization of Germany, but its influential members were in favour of the fragmentation of Eastern Prussia.
Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov in reply said that the public opinion of the Soviet Union, «speaks for the dismemberment of Germany by addressing this issue on top of allies»116.
The reference to public opinion in the Soviet Union is cynical, as it is obvious that it had no place and could not have any. However, this is a very important point, which is worth paying attention to. At that time, the military, party staff, and the civilian population began to form an idea of Prussia as a ’centuries-old bridgehead for aggression on Russia’, as «the main source of German militarism».
At the fourth session of the Tehran conference of the three Allied powers – the USSR, the USA and the UK (28 November – 1 December 1943), American President Roosevelt offered to discuss the issue of the partition of Germany. He said that in order to ’stimulate’ the debate on this issue, he would like to present the «plan for the dismemberment of Germany into five states» drawn up by him two months ago117.