With kind permission from the author.
Janna Thompson, “Aesthetics and the Value of Nature,” Environmental Ethics, 17 (3) (1995): 291–306. Reprinted with permission.
Chapter 5
Onora O’Neill, “Environmental Values, Anthropocentrism and Speciesism,” Environmental Values, 6 (1997): 127–142. Reprinted with permission.
Holmes Rolston III, “Environmental Ethics: Values in and Duties to the Natural World,” from F. Herbert Bormann and Stephen R. Kellert (eds.), The Broken Circle: Ecology, Economics, and Ethics, Yale University Press, 1991; pp. 228–247. Reprinted with the permission of Yale University Press.
Paul Taylor, “Respect for Nature: A Theory of Environmental Ethics,” from Respect for Nature, Princeton University Press, 1986; pp. 248–259. c 1986 Princeton University Press. Reprinted with permission.
James P. Sterba, “Reconciling Anthropocentric and Nonanthropocentric Environmental Ethics,” Environmental Values, 3 (1994): 229–244. Reprinted with permission.
Brian K. Steverson, “On the Reconciliation of Anthropocentric and Nonanthropocentric Environmental Ethics,” Environmental Values, 5 (1996): 349–361. Reprinted with permission.
James P. Sterba, “Reconciliation Reaffirmed: A Reply to Steverson,” Environmental Values, 5 (1996): 363–368. Reprinted with permission.
Chapter 7
Peter Singer, “Animal Liberation,” New York Review of Books, April 5, 1973 c Peter Singer, 1973. Reprinted with the kind permission of the author.
Tom Regan, “The Radical Egalitarian Case for Animal Rights,” from In Defence of Animals (ed. Peter Singer), Blackwell, 1985; pp 320–330. Reprinted with the permission of John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
Mary Anne Warren, “A Critique of Regan’s Animal Rights Theory,” from Between Species, 2 (4) (1987): 331–333, see at: http://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/bts. Reprinted with permission.
Dale Jamieson, “Against Zoos,” in In Defense of Animals: The Second Wave (ed. Peter Singer), Blackwell, 2005; pp. 132–143. Reprinted with the permission of John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
Chapter 8
Stephen Gardiner, “A Perfect Moral Storm: Climate Change, Intergenerational Ethics, and the Problem of Moral Corruption,” Environmental Values, 15 (3) (August 2006): 397–413. Reprinted with permission.
Wilfred Beckerman, “‘Sustainable Development’: Is it a Useful Concept?” Environmental Values, 3 (1994): 191–209. Reprinted with permission.
Herman E. Daly, “On Wilfred Beckerman’s Critique of Sustainable Development,” Environmental Values, 4 (1995): 49–55. Reprinted with permission.
Steve Vanderheiden PSQUAD TO SUPPLY
Companion Website
The instructor’s material on the Companion Website: www.wiley.com/go/boylan/environmental provides the following to assist the professor in teaching the class:
A multi-step set of instructions on writing case study essays on the topics set out in the book. The essays are staggered so that they follow the progression of the text.
The culmination of the multi-step process is a “manifesto” which the student will write on solving or improving public policy on a particular area of environmental ethics that they find most important. This manifesto can also be shared via blog to the general public or as an epistle to their political representatives.
Further readings that might be useful to those wishing to continue their research beyond the essays presented in the book.
It is the hope of the editor that this Companion Website will provide added-value to instructors when presenting his or her course.
Thanks for choosing Environmental Ethics 3rd edition, for your course!
1 Ethical Reasoning
MICHAEL BOYLAN
What is the point of studying ethics? This is the critical question that will drive this chapter. Many people do not think about ethics as they make decisions in their day-to-day lives. They see problems and make decisions based upon practical criteria. Many see ethics as rather an affectation of personal taste. It is useful only when it can get you somewhere. Is this correct? Do we act ethically only when there is a win–win situation in which we can get what we want, and also appear to be an honorable, feeling, and caring person?
A Prudential Model of Decision-Making
In order to begin answering this question we must start by examining the way most of us make decisions. Everyone initiates the decision-making process with an established worldview. A worldview is a current personal consciousness that consists in one’s understanding of the facts and about the values in the world. It is the most primitive term to describe our factual and normative conceptions. This worldview may be one that we have chosen or it may be one that we passively accepted as we grew up in a particular culture. Sometimes, this worldview is wildly inconsistent. Sometimes, this worldview has gaping holes so that no answer can be generated. Sometimes, it is geared only to perceived self-interest. And sometimes, it is fanciful and can never be put into practice. Failures in one’s personal worldview model will lead to failures in decision-making.
One common worldview model in the Western world is that of celebrity fantasy. Under this worldview, being a celebrity is everything. Andy Warhol famously claimed that what Americans sought after most was “fifteen minutes of fame.”1 Under this worldview model we should strive to become a celebrity if only for a fleeting moment. What does it mean to be a celebrity? It is someone who is seen and recognized by a large number of people. Notice that this definition does not stipulate that once recognized the object is given positive assent. That would be to take an additional step. To be seen and recognized is enough. One can be a sinner or a saint—all the same. To be recognized is to be recognized. If this is the end, then it is probably easier to take the sinner route. In this way, the passion for celebrity is at heart contrary to ethics.
Another popular worldview model is one of practical competence. Under this model the practitioner strives to consider what is in his or her best interest and applies a practical cost–benefit analysis to various situations in order to ascertain whether action x or action y will maximize the greatest amount of pleasure for the agent (often described in terms of money). Thus, if you are Bernie Madoff (a well-known financial swindler) you might think about the risks and rewards of creating an illegal Ponzi scheme as opposed to creating a legitimate investment house that operates as other investment houses do. The risks of setting off on your own direction are that you might get caught and go to prison. The rewards are that you might make much more money than you would have done under the conventional investment house model. Since you think you are smarter than everyone else and will not get caught, the prudential model would say: “Go for it!” Madoff did get caught, but who knows how many others do not? We cannot know because they have not been caught. But even if you are not caught, is that the best worldview approach? The prudential model says yes.
Possible Ethical Additions to the Prudential Model
Some people, including this author, think that the prudential model is lacking. Something else is necessary in order have a well-functioning worldview by which we can commit purposive action (here understood