Jacquemin 1999: 85).
21. Xen. Hell. 4.6.4–7.1; Xen. Ages. 2.20; Plut. Ages. 22.9–11; Paus. 3.10.2 (a confused account that excludes the Achaians entirely and claims that the Spartans went to the assistance of the Aitolians in their own territory); Polyaenus, Strat. 2.1.1.
22. Diod. Sic. 15.75.2. Freitag 2009: 20 argues that the Achaians invaded Akarnania with expansionist intentions; he may be right. Note that the Aitolians granted Agesilaos passage through their territory in 389 as he withdrew from Akarnania “because they hoped that he would help them to regain Naupaktos” (Xen. Hell. 4.6.14). Kelly 1978 proposed that this was the context for the conclusion of the inscribed treaty between Sparta and Aitolia (T48).
23. Ephoros FGrHist 70 F 115 (ap. Str. 8.3.33).
24. The political significance of the grant of Achaian citizenship to Kalydon has been cited by Larsen 1953: 809 and 1968: 81, 85; Koerner 1974: 485. The extent of the Achaian state in this period is indicated by Polyb. 2.41.7–8, providing a list of members before the reigns of Philip and Alexander: Olenos, Helike, Patrai, Dyme, Pharai, Tritaia, Leontion, Aigion, Aigeira, Pellene, Boura, and Karyneia.
25. Xen. Hell. 4.6.2–4.
26. Xen. Hell. 5.1.31; Diod. Sic. 14.110.2–4. See Cawkwell 1981 for speculation that the actual agreement had to contain more detailed provisions than are preserved in the royal rescript recorded by Xenophon.
27. Xen. Hell. 5.1.32–33.
28. Hansen 1995b: 28.
29. V. Martin 1944: 26 n. 7; Ryder 1965: 122–23; Cawkwell 1981: 72–74; Urban 1991: 110; Jehne 1994: 37–44. Beck 2001: 362 is right to conclude that “it is impossible to decide whether the federal principle was eo ipso in contradiction to the autonomy clause” and to insist on the importance of Spartan actions establishing a precedent that defined it in practical terms. It is certain that the issue was clarified in the next two decades. The Aristoteles decree of 377, which records the establishment of the Second Athenian League (RO 22 ll. 20–24), spells out the three facets of autonomy relevant to that context: being governed under whatever form of government a city wishes; neither receiving a garrison nor submitting to a governor; and not paying tribute (phoros). The common peace of 366/5 had as its principal condition that each signatory polis would “hold its own territory” (Xen. Hell. 7.6.10).
30. Larsen 1968: 171–72; Badian 1991: 39; Beck 2001: 363. The Olynthians, as aggressive leaders of the emergent koinon of the Chalkideis, were attacked by the Spartans in 382 in response to an appeal for help from Akanthos (Xen. Hell. 5.2.11–19), Amyntas (Diod. Sic. 15.19.1–3), or both. In Xenophon’s account, the Akanthian speaker, Kleigenes, points to the efforts of the Spartans to “prevent Boiotia from becoming one” (5.2.16) and asks that they not ignore the repetition of the same phenomenon in the north. The Akanthians wished “to keep their ancestral laws [patrioi nomoi] and to be citizens of their own state [autopolitai]” (5.2.14). Whether Sparta’s willingness to help was a direct response to the King’s Peace (which was not a common peace; it was binding only on the actual signatories) is unclear and depends upon whether the Olynthians can be proved to have been involved in the Corinthian War, as is suggested by Isae. 5.46. Cawkwell 1973: 53 seems to assume that Olynthos was a signatory, and that the Spartan response to the Akanthian appeal was legally justified by a sanctions clause in the peace, which our sources do not record.
31. Larsen 1968: 171, 175; R. J. Buck 1994: 59–61; Beck 1997: 96.
32. Mention of polemarchs in Thebes, 382–379/8: Xen. Hell. 5.2.25, 30, 32 (382 BCE); 5.4.2, 7, 8 (379 BCE); Plut. Pel. 7.4, 9.8, 11.4; Ages. 24.2. The office is amply attested epigraphically in eight Boiotian poleis from the mid-third century BCE to the imperial period.
33. Numismatic evidence has sometimes been taken to prove the complete independence of the Boiotian poleis after 386. Coins minted with polis legends and types on the reverse, with the Boiotian shield on the obverse, have been assigned to the period 386–378 (Head 1881: 43–60; against Head’s circular reasoning note Hansen 1995a: 31–32). The magistrate staters were placed next in the series (Head 1881: 61–72; Kraay 1976: 113), but it has now been shown that they go back to the very earliest years of the fourth century (Hepworth 1989, 1998). The chronology of Boiotian coinage is so insecure, and its political significance so unclear, that the coins cannot be pressed into service as evidence for this argument.
34. Th. 1.58.2 with Hornblower 1991–2008: I.102–3; Zahrnt 1971: 49–66; Demand 1990: 77–83; Psoma 2001: 189–95.
35. Military cooperation: Th. 2.29, 58; 4.7, 78–79. The Chalkidian poleis were listed independently in the Peace of Nikias (Th. 5.18.5–8) but in 415 had concluded a ten-day truce with the Athenians (Th. 6.7.4). Ambassadors: Th. 4.83.3. Proxenos: Th. 4.78.1. There has been extensive debate about the nature of the Chalkidian state in the fifth century: Larsen 1968: 59 believed that it was federal, while Hampl 1935: 182 and Zahrnt 1971: 65–66 saw evidence only for a unitary state.
36. Isae. 5.46; Diod. Sic. 14.82.3; RO 12.
37. The embassy from Amyntas is attested only by Diod. Sic 15.19.3, though Xen. Hell. 5.2.12–13 describes the hostilities between the Chalkideis and Amyntas.
38. Xen. Hell. 5.2.12. This speech and its arguments will be discussed in greater detail in chapter 5.
39. Diod. Sic. 15.19.1–3 with V. Parker 2003: 126–32.
40. Xen. Hell. 5.2.20–24. The Spartans authorized a levy of ten thousand Peloponnesian troops, augmented by allied forces. The size of this force is taken by Larsen 1968: 73–74 as an index of the strength of the Chalkideis.
41. Xen. Hell. 5.2.27. There has been some speculation that after the King’s Peace the Thebans made an alliance with Sparta, but the only ancient evidence for the claim is in Isocr. 14.27, a passage full of tendentious factual errors, and Plut. Pel. 4–5.1, a passage that directly contradicts both Xenophon’s (Hell. 5.2.4–6) and Diodoros’s (15.5.3–5, 12.1–2) accounts of the same event and is tendentious in its own way, attempting to portray Epameinondas as a philosopher-warrior, the Sokrates to Pelopidas’s Alkibiades. (Cf. Plut. Alc. 7.3.) The decree prohibiting Thebans from participating in an expedition against Olynthos would have been a clear violation of any such alliance, and this consideration along with the source problems tips the balance against the veracity of the claim. See Buckler 1980a; on Epameinondas as philosopher see Arist. Rhet. 1398b18; Vidal-Naquet 1986: 61–84.
42. On this aspect see Gehrke 1985: 175–77.
43. Xen. Hell. 5.2.25.
44. Betrayal: Xen. Hell. 5.2.26–31; cf. Plut. Pel. 5. Trial of Ismenias: Xen. Hell. 5.2.35–36 (jury composed of representatives of the Peloponnesian League); cf. Plut. Pel. 5.3; De gen. Soc. 576a (who places the trial in Sparta). See Landucci Gattinoni 2000.
45. Xen. Hell. 5.2.28, 32; Diod. Sic. 15.20.2.
46. T4.4.
47. Xen. Hell. 5.4.10–13; Diod. Sic. 15.20.2, 23.4, 25.1 and 3, 27.1 and 3; Plut. Pel. 12.3, 13.2; De gen. Soc. 598f.
48. The repopulation of Plataia is a necessary precondition to Xenophon’s narrative about its pro-Spartan sympathies in the late 380s and early 370s. Paus. 9.1.4 places its restoration in the period of the King’s Peace, and the same is implied by the hypothesis to Isocrates’ Plataikos. Some have argued that Plataia was restored in 382, but Paus. 9.1.4 indicates that 386 is more likely; for full discussion see Amit 1973: 106–9.
49. Xen. Hell. 5.4.10, 14–16.
50. Xen. Hell. 5.4.46. For Spartan garrisons in Boiotia in this period see Wickersham 2007.
51. Xen. Hell. 5.4.49.
52. Xen. Hell. 5.2.37–3.27; Diod. Sic. 15.20.3–23.3. The terms of the treaty (having the same friends and enemies, following wherever the Spartans might lead, and being symmachoi) are precisely those identified by Bolmarcich 2005 as belonging to subordinate allies of Sparta.
53. It is usually assumed, despite the absence of any clear evidence to support the claim, that the koinon of the Chalkideis was dissolved after the Spartan victory at Olynthos: Beck 1997: 241.