2007: 43–46).
141. Diod. Sic. 16.23.3.
142. Diod. Sic. 16.23.4–24.5, 30.1.
143. Diod. Sic. 16. 24.4, 25.1–3, 27.5, 28.3.
144. Diod. Sic. 16.28.4–31.5. The delay is to be explained by the Thessalians’ reticence to act against Athens (a Phokian ally) until the outcome of the Social War (in 355) was clear.
145. Diod. Sic. 16.29.132 and FDelph III.5.19, a list of Delphic naopoioi that reflects fairly broad support for the Phokian position. Rebel amphiktyony: Ellis in CAH VI2: 741.
146. Greek contributions: RO 57. The Byzantines, who had supported the Theban naval initiative and now maintained the alliance out of hostility to Athens at the end of the Social War, made their contribution via synedroi (ll. 11, 24), implying a synedrion of which they were members (Lewis 1990b). It is doubtful that the Boiotians had created a formal deliberative body with representation from its allies, for if such an entity had existed we would expect that all contributions would have been made by the synedroi of each allied state, whereas the inscription indicates that only the Byzantines had them. See Buckler 1980b: 222–33 and 2000b; Jehne 1999: 328–44. Persian contribution: Diod. Sic. 16.40.1–2 with Buckler 1989: 100.
147. Phokian attacks on western Boiotia: Diod. Sic. 16.33.4, 56.2, 58.1; Dem. 3.27, 19.141 and 148; Theopomp. FGrHist 115 F 167. Opposition to the Boiotian koinon within Koroneia, exploited by the Phokian general Onomarchos: Ephoros FGrHist 70 F 94, Σ Arist. Nic. Eth. 3.8.9. Cf. Buckler 1989: 72, 82, 101–4; and Kallet-Marx 1989.
148. Diod. Sic. 16.58.2–3.
149. Diod. Sic. 16.59.2; Dem. 19.139, 318–25; Aeschin. 2.133.
150. The settlement had broad ramifications for the Athenians that are beyond my present concerns; for detailed discussion see Harris 1995: 82–106.
151. Phokian surrender: Diod. Sic. 16.59.3–4; Dem. 19.62, 123, 278. Western Boiotian poleis: Dem. 19.141. Punishment of the Phokians, inflicted by the amphiktyony, with Macedonian support: Diod. Sic. 16.60.1–4; cf. Dem. 19.60–61, 123. For the limited nature of the Macedonian destruction see Typaldou-Fakiris 2004: 326. This is not the place to enter into the debate about Philip’s intentions toward Thebes and Athens, which now sought peace with Philip after their war over Amphipolis. See Buckler 1989: 121–24 with references.
152. Dem. 5.10, 19.112.
153. Theopomp. FGrHist 115 F 292; Dem. 18.87–94; Plut. Phok. 14. Cf. Diod. Sic. 16.77. On Athenian politics in this period see Harris 1995: 107–23.
154. Aeschin. 3.116 with Sánchez 2001: 229. For the technicality upon which the Athenians are indicted by the Amphissans in Aeschines’ account see Bommelaer and Bommelaer 1983: 21–26. Cf. Dem. 18.150.
155. Aeschin. 3.115, 117–33; Dem. 18.155–57. Demosthenes’ claim (Dem. 18.143–51) that Aeschines fabricated the whole tradition about the consecration of Kirrha under a bribe from Philip, in order to have a war declared that would give Philip the right to be in central Greece with his army, is to be rejected in the face of earlier evidence for the duty of the amphiktyony to protect the sacred land (e.g., CID IV.1 with Sánchez 2001: 153–63 and Rousset 2002: 188–92). It is clearly intended to counter Aeschines’ charge (3.113–14) that Demosthenes had taken bribes from Amphissa.
156. Dem. 18.167, 175; Plut. Dem. 18.1; Philoch. FGrHist 328 F 56; Diod. Sic. 16.85.3.
157. Aeschin. 3.140; Philoch. FGrHist 328 F 56b; Dem. 18.153. Cf. Harris 1995: 100. How the Boiotians had come to control Nikaia is unclear. Dem. 11.12 calls it a Theban apoikia. See Nielsen in Hansen and Nielsen 2004: 669–70 for its shadowy history.
158. Dem. 18.169–88; Diod. Sic. 16.84.2–85.1.
159. Aeschin. 3.142.
160. Dem. 16.169–79; Aeschin. 3.142–51; Diod. Sic. 16.85.5–86.6. See Harris 1995: 126–37.
161. Justin 9.4.6–8.
162. Paus. 4.27.10.
163. Plataia: Paus. 4.27.10, 9.1.8.
164. Arr. Anab. 1.7.11.
165. Dem. 9.34.
166. Theopomp. FGrHist 115 F 235. Cf. Bosworth 1976: 169–74. Most assume that Dem. 9.34 simply anticipates Strabo (9.4.7), who says only that Naupaktos was Aitolian in his own time, that Philip must have actually made Naupaktos Aitolian, which he could only have done shortly after Chaironeia, and misread Theopompos as supporting this reconstruction, when in fact he (the best of the three sources) contradicts it. See Oldfather, RE XVI.2 s.v. “Naupaktos,” col. 1990; Lerat 1952: II.49; Merker 1989: 306; Freitag 2000: 87–88; Rousset 2004: 396; BNP IX s.v. “Naupaktos,” col. 547.
167. RO 76.
168. Diod. Sic. 17.3.3–4, 8.1–3; Arr. Anab. 1.1.3, 7.1–3.
169. Persian contributions: Din. 1.10, 18 with 1.20–22; Aeschin. 3.156–57, 239–40; Hyp. 5.17, 25. Uneven Arkadian support: Din. 1.19–20 with Arr. Anab. 1.10.1.
170. Arr. Anab. 1.7.4–8.8, 9.6–10; Marm.Par. (IG XII.5.444 ll. 103–4); Din. 1.24; Aeschin. 3.157; Diod. Sic. 17.9–14; Plut. Alex. 11.6–12.6.
171. Arr. Anab. 1.8.8 with Hurst 1989; Diod. Sic. 17.13.5; Justin 11.3.8.
172. Akraiphia: Paus. 9.23.5. Athens: Aeschin. 3.159; Paus. 9.7.1; Plut. Alex. 13.1; Munn 1998: 53–54 for a Theban among the ephebes at Panakton ca. 330–320. Persian army: Hofstetter 1978: nos. 89, 313 with Arr. Anab. 2.15.2–4; Plut. Apophth. Alex. 22 (Mor. 181B). Some of the Thebans’ Boiotian enemies joined Alexander’s army: Anth.Pal. 6.344.
173. Hyp. Epit. 17; Arr. Anab. 1.9.9.
174. Arr. Anab. 1.9.9; Diod. Sic. 18.11.3–5; Din. 1.24. Cf. Gullath 1982: 77–82.
175. Arr. Anab. 1.9.10; cf. Plut. Alex. 34.2; Plut. Arist. 11.9; Justin 11.3.8. The rebuilding of Plataia after 338 appears to have involved construction on an orthogonal plan: Konecny et al. 2008.
176. Paus. 1.34.1; Σ Dem. 18.99 (176 Dilts) suggest that it was made Athenian after Chaironeia, and this has been the dominant view until recently (e.g., Robert 1940–65: XI–XII.195). But now see Knoepfler 1993a: 295 and 2001a: 367–89 for 335 as the date when Oropos was handed over to the Athenians. After its transfer, the Athenians disputed how the territory would be divided up among the tribes; see Hyp. 4 and Agora I.6793 with Langdon 1987; Lewis 1990a; Papazarkadas 2009b.
177. Arr. Anab. 1.10.2.
178. Bosworth 1976: 166–67; Scholten 2000: 16.
179. Sordi 1953b: 435. Compare the dispatch of three ambassadors by the Aitolians, one to represent each of the three major ethnē, to the Spartans in 426, after Demosthenes’ invasion: Th. 3.100.1. See above, p. 56. For detailed discussion see Funke 1997: 159–60.
180. FDelph III.4.399 (SEG 17.228). The date of the grant is controversial. I follow Arnush 1995 (cf. Arnush 2000: 299–300) contra Bousquet 1988a: 58 n. 50. Even if we accept Arnush’s argument for the Delphic archonship of Sarpadon belonging to the year 335/4, we cannot determine the relative chronology of the grant and the destruction of Thebes.
181. Hyp. 5.18.
182. Achaian participation in revolt of Agis: Aeschin. 3.165; Din. 1.34; Q.C. 6.1.20. This suggestion is hypothetical, and it is difficult to know how to square it with the claim of Hyp. 5.18 that the Achaian koinon was in existence in 323.
183. Mendels 1984: 129–49.
3
The Hellenistic Period
MAINLAND GREECE AND THE WARS OF THE SUCCESSORS, 323–285
During the Hellenistic period, the koina of mainland Greece and the Peloponnese were strengthened and expanded both to achieve greater security against powerful enemies and to gain control over greater and more diversified sets of resources. Attempts to retain regional autonomy led to a series of shifting alliances,