off this evil, but that which is also infinite. The sinner would make no atonement by repentance and reformation, for they are already do. He cannot suffer a punishment of the temporary kind which will be adequate to the crime; for it would be but finite. Nor could any creature, however great, atone: because what ever he should suffer would still be finite. It is allowed, however, that a creature more excellent than man might have made an atonement proportionally greater. But to render an atonement completely adequate, the person must be infinite in dignity and excellence, or suffer and infinite evil fully equal to the sins of those for whom he makes atonement. Hence, it was that an atonement so great as that of Christ was necessary.
Gelston makes the case for explicit support of the doctrine of the necessity for atonement, something made much of in Crisp’s analysis of Edwards Jr. He writes, “The evil of sin is infinite, and in its nature and consequences tends to produce infinite mischief in the moral government of God. No atonement, therefore, could wipe off this evil, but that which is also infinite. The sinner would make no atonement by repentance and reformation, for they are already do.” Gelston goes on to make clear that a divine person is necessary to make atonement. Gelston’s emphasis on the necessity of the atonement represents a token of the Anselmian tradition (which echoes the non-penal substitution found in the final part of his response in the previous question), and yet still does not commit Gelston to either a view of penal substitution or non-substitution.72
In question 155, Gelston pushes further toward this distinction when he asks, “In what sense did he satisfy divine justice by his sacrifice?” What he says about how the atonement is answerable to divine justice and for whom it is answerable will reveal a great deal about Gelston’s theological commitment. He argues,
(Answer 155) Christ so completely answered the demands of the law as that, the believer may be saved from the curse of it, and yet the honor of the law and the dignity and authority of the divine government be fully supported. The penalty of the law, however, may still be executed to the full extent upon the finally impenitent. Justice therefore, has received no satisfaction with respect to them. And indeed, the believer, were it not for the constitution and promises of God might, notwithstanding all Christ has done and suffered, experience the full punishment due to his sins. The believer, therefore, would not demand a release from punishment, as a debtor might demand a release from his debt when a third person had paid for him the full demand of his creditor. Justice, therefore, is not satisfied with respect to the believer as it is with respect to the debtor. God was under no obligation from justice to accept the atonement which Christ has made: and if he actually does except of it, it must be from sovereign mercy and free grace.
There are several important observations that might be made here. First, notice that Gelston appears to think Christ’s work solves a problem related to the law that entails a solution to problem of offenses against God himself; something we will see again in his answer to question 175. Second, notice that the solution to the problem is not collective, that is, not for all humanity. “Did Christ redeem all men alike, elect and non-elect?” His answer is quite telling, pushing directly against Crisp’s suggestion that hypothetical universalism was a doctrine that developed amongst the New England theologians. While it may have developed so for Bellamy, but perhaps not for Gelston. He argues that “[t]he believer, therefore, would not demand a release from punishment, as a debtor might demand a release from his debt when a third person had paid for him the full demand of his creditor. Justice, therefore, is not satisfied with respect to the believer as it is with respect to the debtor.” In other words, the work Christ was somehow in Gelston’s mind accomplished only for the elect. With his repeated reference to “believers,” this suggests a substitutionary act on the part of Christ, which again hints in the direction of his subscription to something like a doctrine of penal substitution.
Next, in Question 156, Gelston considers whether God was “under an obligation of justice to provide an atonement for sinners?” To this he responds, rather briefly, that
(Answer 156) If God had been under an obligation of justice to provide an atonement for sinners it must be on account of his law. For, surely if the law of the holy, just and good, is so far from requiring God to provide an atonement, strict, distributive justice requires the actual punishment due to the violation of the law. Since, therefore, the law is thus holy, just and good, as is evident from the nature of it, and the declarations of God’s word, if an atonement be made for the violation of it, it must proceed not from justice, but the goodness, mercy and grace of God.
There are two rather interesting elements to this answer, chief among which is Gelston’s introduction of the concept of distributive justice. This category often assumes two other (sub)species of divine justice: remunerative justice—having to do with rewards, and retributive justice—having to do with punishment.73 As we have already seen, the penal substitution model of atonement is mostly often directly associated with overcoming the problem of divine retribution. That Gelston speaks here of distributive justice, makes at least some logical room for our thinking that the aspect of remunerative justice must play into the way he conceived of Christ’s work. How it factors in is the question. What is clear from the previous section is that functional role played by Gelston’s affirmation of remunerative justice puts him at an increased distance from penal substitution. The second point of interest here is Gelston’s seemingly intentional link between divine mercy and divine justice. That atonement is made by virtue of God’s mercy rather than by some judicial precedent lends support to idea that God has some notion of substitution in mind. What is substituted? is the question. Is this a substitution of one for particular individuals, as in the case of penal substitution? We might well think so, especially in view of his answer to question 156. Perhaps this is merely a nod to the notion of suitable equivalence. It is not entirely clear.
Without really supplying us with answer, Gelston moves on to question 157, where he asks “Does the appointment of a Mediator prove that God is already reconciled to men?”
(Answer 157) If the appointment of Mediator prove[s] that God is already reconciled to men, then it will prove that he is so without the execution of the office as Mediator. If so, then, there was no necessity of Mediator. But surely a God of infinite goodness and compassion would never require any thing of this kind, unless absolutely necessary. The design of the Mediator is to lay a foundation, so that he may become reconciled to mankind in a consistency with his law and moral government. But to say that reconciliation takes place previous to the undertaking and accomplishment of the Mediator’s work is to place the effect before the cause.
Besides, none are interested in the benefits of the atonement until they are possessed of those qualifications which are made the necessary prerequisites. Nor are any sinners reconciled to God until they are interested in the benefits of this atonement.
Here we see that Gelston has in mind that the design of the atonement is such that it makes restitution between humanity and the divine according to both his moral law and moral governance; something we saw in answer 156. Notice his appeal to the necessity of the atonement. His suggestion that the Mediator “is to lay a foundation” hints at some interesting points. What is this foundation? Whatever it is, it appears that it is something definitive, that is, something from which God is able then to execute his retributive and/or remunerative justice. It also appears that by this work of mediation, God is able to deal in an effective way with both believers and non-believers. Notice, finally, that reconciliation to God, as Gelston sees it, is not something which those prior to Christ’s work enjoyed the true privilege of.
In question 158, Gelston asks whether “Christ redeemed all men alike, elect and non-elect?” To this he responds:
(Answer 158) The atonement of Christ is sufficient for all mankind would day, but accept of it upon the terms proposed. The invitation of the gospel is in universal terms, “whosoever will, let him take the water of life freely.” Revelation 22.17. So far, the elect and non-elect are alike. But the application of this redemption will be made to the elect alone. Nor was it the design of God. From eternity that any but the elect should actually accept of the proposed atonement and enjoyed the happiness of the redeemed. It is the elect who are chosen of God in Christ before the foundation of the world. Ephesians 1.14. It is the elect who are “Justified by his grace freely through the redemption that is in Jesus Christ.” Romans 3.24. It is