a new song, saying, Thou art worthy to take the book, and to open the seals thereof: for thou wast slain, and hast redeemed us to God by thy blood.” Revelation 5.9.
Redemption, when used with reference to Christ, seems to mean the application of the benefits and blessings which he has procured to believers in this world, and the actual introduction of them to happiness in the world to come. But this is a happiness which none but the elect experience.
Had the atonement of Christ been designed to be extinguished, the guilds of a certain number of sins, as a man liquidates a debt of a certain fixed and determinant sum of money, he doubtless would have had the sins of the elect in view, and would have extinguished the guilt of these, but this does not appear to have been the object of the atonement. Strictly speaking, the atonement has extinguished. Neither the seems of the elect nor of the non-elect. But it has laid a foundation so that the punishment due to the sins of those who are interested in it, may as completely be removed as if they never had been guilty. Here, then, lies, the distinction: the elect will experience this. But the non-elect, in consequences of their neglect, will not experience it.
Here Gelston seems, rather strangely, to affirm something like hypothetical universalism, which more naturally fits with either Moral Government or Anselmian satisfaction, and echoes Crisp’s notion of doctrinal development. Gelston’s reference to the sufficiency-efficiency distinction of Christ’s work hints in this direction. That said, such thinking also might fit with a version of penal substitution, provided he construe the payment as one for sin, corporately construed, rather than individually construed where Christ pays a debt of punishment for the consequences of sin. It is not entirely clear to this point that this is what he has in view.
In question 171, Gelston asks: “Did Christ suffer and die in the stead as well as for the benefit of his people?” His answer is as follows.
(Answer 171) Christ suffered a punishment which would fully support the honor of the divine law and the dignity of the divine government, though his people be released from the punishment they personally deserve. Indeed, the object of his atonement was that they might thus be released. Still, however, it does not appear that they can demand this release as a debtor might insist upon a discharge when a third person had fully paid the demand of his creditor. Christ, therefore, did not suffer and die in the stead of his people so as to lay God under obligation to accept of the atonement, whether he chose or not. He, however, suffered and died so far in their stead. That day will not actually experience that punishment, which otherwise, they would have experienced. By his sufferings and death. He completely atoned for the sins of his people. They will not, therefore, be required to undergo any farther punishment.
Here Gelston raises the question as to whether Christ suffered in “instead” and as a “benefit” for his people. His answer is interesting, but, once again not entirely clear. In fact, the following may be the most confusing aspect of Gelston’s thinking. “Christ suffered a punishment which would fully support the honor of the divine law and the dignity of the divine government, though his people be released from the punishment they personally deserve.” However, Gelston does not clearly articulate penal substitution. Gelston supports the notion of Christ bearing the penal demands of the law, but this does not necessarily suggest a substitutionary act, even more, a substitutionary act for individuals. In other words, it is not apparent that Christ absorbs the penalty for individuals. Gelston states, “therefore, did not suffer and die in the stead of his people so as to lay God under obligation to accept of the atonement.” He proceeds immediately to say something seemingly contradictory, namely, that “He, however, suffered and died so far in their stead.”
In question 172, he asks the related questions: “Could he have made atonement without suffering in stead of his people?”
Answer 172. It is not conceived that any thing without suffering would have constituted an atonement. Nothing but this could have shown the awful and tremendous consequences of sin. Nor could anything else have shown the incident evil and instructive tendency of sin. Nothing else would properly have been a penalty of the law. Obedience was already due from every creature, and could, in no sense be considered as a penalty. It does not appear, therefore, that the honor of the divine law or the dignity of the divine government could have been supported except by suffering, either personally, or having a substitute. This substitute must, to make an atonement which would be complete and satisfactory, suffer instead of his people, so far as mentioned above.
Here again, Gelston is clear that Christ’s suffering is necessary, yet it is an open question as to the priority of retributive justice or rectoral justice. Even where there is a place for retribution, it is not entirely clear that it amounts to (i) the absorption of a penalty or (2) that Christ’s act is committed on behalf of the individual. These fundamental tenets are essential elements of standard penal substitution theory. It is true that Gelston uses the language of “suffering” and “substitution,” yet he also uses the language of “satisfaction” and atonement for a collective whole, “his people”. In the quote above, Gelston suggests moral government or penal non-substitution when he says, “Nothing but this could have shown the awful and tremendous consequences of sin. Nor could anything else have shown the incident evil and instructive tendency of sin. Nothing else would properly have been a penalty of the law.” Gelston’s use of the word “substitution” seems to amount to a different kind of substitution than that found in penal substitutionary atonement. Rather, Gelston states that this “substitute” must “suffer instead of his people” not on behalf of his people or in their penal stead. With the variations of atonement theory swirling around during the time of New England theological development, it is not surprising that New England theologians, like Gelston, might use language reflective of penal substitution theory, moral government, and even the satisfaction theory. While the evidence points in favor of interpreting Gelston as a defender of moral government his language lends itself to some ambiguity.
According to question 173, Gelston inquires: “Did Christ pay the debt for the elect, so that they can claim salvation on the foot of justice?”
(Answer 173) When one man pays a debt for another, where a sum of money is due, this other on the principles of strict commutative justice may justly demand a release from his creditor. The reason is, because the creditor has received his full demand, and justice in no case demands more than the law points out, as due. But in matters of distributive justice. The law does not point out the punishment of one man as due for the crime of another. It has no right to demand this. And the one man should consent to suffer for another, the executive authority is not obliged to accept of the substitute. It is against the breaker of the law that it is threatenings are leveled, and it is to him alone that the law looks for satisfaction. Originally, therefore, it knows of no substitute. If then, one man actually suffers the punishment due to another, the demand of the law, according to strict distributive justice, still remains in full force. If the sovereign accept of this punishment as a substitute, it is not because this kind of justice requires his acceptance.
Similar is the case of the elect. This kind of distributive justice will never support any claim for salvation. To a matter like this, the punishment might still be executed.
The general good or general justice, however, admits of their salvation, and by virtue of God’s promise, on the ground of this, they have a right to expect it.
It seems clear from the above that Gelston has in mind rectoral satisfaction rather than the absorption of penal consequences. Christ does not so much assume the penalty of individual sin, but he honors God or the moral law in a way that creates a surplus benefiting humans. The notions of “credit” and “creditor” are clearly at home with Anselmian satisfaction, or, possibly, moral government. Whilst the discussion on whether the payment is paid directly to God or the moral law by which God maintains moral order is an open question, but what seems clear is his rejection of a certain variant of penal substitution that says that Christ suffered a loss on behalf of the elect so as to pay the debtor (as is clear here: “The law does not point out the punishment of one man as due for the crime of another. It has no right to demand this.”). Rather, Christ pays off the debt owed to God the creditor. In other words, he pays a positive demand.
For question 174, Gelston responds to the question of “Were the sufferings of Christ