unban the ANC; free all those who had been imprisoned, banished or exiled for their opposition to apartheid; and guarantee free political activity. These are presented as steps to be taken by Botha and his government if a ‘looming confrontation’ is to be averted, and amount to Mandela’s (and possibly the ANC’s) conditions for a peaceful settlement of the South African conflict. These same demands – formulated in a less formal way – are also embedded in Mandela’s statement read out at the Soweto rally.
Most significantly, though – as suggested by Mandela in his conversation with Suzman and Van der Merwe – the letter also contains a definite feeler in the direction of engagement. In a marked shift in tone, it states:
‘Despite your commitment to the maintenance of white supremacy, your attempt to create new apartheid structures, and your hostility to a non-racial system of government in this country … the simple fact is that you are South Africa’s head of government, you enjoy the support of the majority of the white population and you can help change the course of South African history. A beginning can be made if you accept and agree to implement the five-point programme on pages 4–5 of this document. If you accept the programme our people would readily cooperate with you to sort out whatever problems arise as far as the implementation thereof is concerned.
‘In this regard, we have taken note of the fact that you no longer insist on some of us being released to the Transkei. We have also noted the restrained tone which you adopted when you made the offer in Parliament. We hope you will show the same flexibility and examine these proposals objectively. That flexibility and objectivity may help to create a better climate for a fruitful national debate.’
This passage is carefully worded; for instance, use of the word ‘negotiate’ is avoided. However, in line with Mandela’s remark to his Progressive Federal Party visitors, it signals an unmistakable invitation to Botha to engage with the ANC. It is equally startling today to realise that the NP government eventually met all or almost all of those conditions.
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Whether the letter ever reached Botha is unknown, and if it did, so is his reaction. Maybe Coetsee decided it was too provocative, and never gave it to him. The only annotation on the letter itself is ‘Bêre 913’ (‘Place in the 913 file’). If Botha ever read the letter, he never commented on it in public.
In February 2010, the Nelson Mandela Foundation staged a commemoration of Mandela’s rejection of Botha’s offer of conditional release. To mark the occasion, the Foundation interviewed Zindzi Mandela, who had read out the ‘My Father Says’ statement. She recalled: ‘I wasn’t worried about us on stage, but I was nervous because Mummy [Winnie Mandela, who was banned to Brandfort at the time] was in the crowd with a scarf on her head, cheap sunglasses, no make-up, and looked like an ordinary aunty from the township, because she insisted on being there.’
The Foundation also interviewed Ahmed Kathrada, who described how Mandela’s response to Botha’s offer was crafted. The item on the Foundation website quotes him as saying: ‘Madiba had been called to the office and [was] informed of this offer of Botha and then he was given, I think, a copy of Hansard … a page or two of Hansard where Botha had made this offer. We then discussed it, and it didn’t take long for us to unanimously reject the offer. We discussed it among the five of us and, of course, rejected it. And Madiba then, of course, drafted a reply, which we all agreed to. We all helped with the reply and then, of course, he drafted the speech that Zindzi read at a rally in Jabulani.’ If this account is correct, it is instructive to note that Mandela was not the only Rivonia trialist who, in the mid-1980s, started to make overtures to the Botha regime.2
In the meantime, numerous other ‘security prisoners’ quietly accepted Botha’s offer. They included the Rivonia trialist Denis Goldberg, who had been held in Pretoria Central for 22 years. Goldberg was released on 28 February 1985 and put on a plane to Israel where he was reunited with his family. He later worked for the ANC in London, and returned to South Africa in 2002. He was made to sign a document. He said later that he had grown tired of prison, and he knew in any case that negotiations had effectively begun.
3
Tardy ministers and the State Security Council
‘The SSC resolved that certain ministers, after collaboration with one another and with relevant role players … would devise a strategy for releasing, from a position of power, security prisoners from both the right and the left, before Christmas …’
BOTHA’S OFFER of release and Mandela’s response seem reasonably straightforward – a simple binary of action and reaction. However, the Coetsee archive reveals that this was far from the truth. Indeed, key documents in the archive contain some startling revelations that substantially rewrite previous histories of this period.
The first is a top-secret memorandum written and signed by Kobie Coetsee, and addressed to the chairman of the State Security Council (unnamed, but known to have been P.W. Botha). Dated 13 December 1984, it was written in preparation for an SSC meeting the next day. A translation of the complete memorandum follows:
THE CHAIRMAN OF THE STATE SECURITY COUNCIL
MEETING OF THE STATE SECURITY COUNCIL: 14 DECEMBER 1984: SECURITY PRISONERS
On 3 December, the State Security Council took the following decision (item 3 of the Minutes):
(a)‘That the relevant ministers, in collaboration with one another and with institutions such as President Matanzima and Chief Minister Buthelezi, will work out a strategy for releasing, from a position of strength, certain security prisoners from the right and left before Christmas;’ and
(b)‘That the Minister of Justice would submit the strategy to the State Security Council on 14 December 1984.’
The relevant Ministers are Ministers Botha, De Klerk, Le Grange, Viljoen and myself. I have consulted the Ministers both verbally and telephonically, and asked them via their staff to submit any inputs to me by Wednesday 12 December. No written inputs have been received. Minister Botha indicated that he wanted to hold more consultations, that he would prepare inputs, and that those inputs would be sent to me by 13 December, failing which they would be submitted to the meeting. [While this was not stated, it is reasonably clear that ‘Minister Botha’ was a reference to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Pik Botha, an ex officio member of the SSC, and not its chairman, P.W. Botha.]
Officials of the Departments of Justice, the Interior and Foreign Affairs as well as the Directorate Security Legislation have deliberated about the available statutory powers for removing relevant people born in the Transkei from the RSA to the Transkei. The identified possibilities are discussed in Appendix C. To summarise, the conclusion is that no legal authorisation for such a forced removal exists that does not hold serious risks of revision in the Supreme Court, and of possibly being set aside. Such litigation could also bring with its serious political disadvantages, especially as it would involve issues such as citizenship, guaranteed rights, and the removal of persons …
Appendix B contains deliberations about each of these prisoners … with relevant political and security considerations … as well as recommendations about release. Immediate release (that is to say, before Christmas) is only recommended in the case of G[ovan] Mbeki. In respect of Mandela, the recommendation is also positive, with a time scale to be determined either via negotiations with the Transkei and suitable legislation, or the model for Mbeki, based on experience with his release. As far as this person and others are concerned, the question is whether this could be done so that release could hold the maximum advantage and the minimum disadvantage in respect of political and security – so that we will not be worse off after release than we are now.
In formulating these recommendations, I have taken the following into consideration: legal authorisation for removing relevant people to the Transkei …; the contents of the ‘Green Book’ (Total Planning – Book 1 / Policy); the National Intelligence Assessment, which has just become available; the ANC Strategy as adopted by the State Security Council and the draft UDF strategy. Communication and action can only be planned after decisions have been taken.
STAMPED: H.J. COETSEE, Minister of Justice, 1984-12-13