length of their sentences, their age, and the time spent in prison. Those in category I – prisoners serving life sentences who were older than 65 and had served 20 years of their sentences – include only ‘G. Mbeki, N. Mandela and W. Sisulu’. Appendix B analyses the pros and cons of their potential release in terms of seven categories, namely policy considerations; grounds for release; means of release; political aspects; security aspects; strategy (effectively, the recommendations); and time frame.
In the case of Mandela, no fewer than six ‘possibilities’ are mapped out across all seven categories. Possibility One comprises handing ‘subject’ to the Transkei for detention, either at the full discretion of the Transkei, or on conditions and guarantees approved by the RSA. After citing a host of political and security disadvantages, this option is rejected as ‘not feasible – at least not in the short term’.
Possibility Two comprises unconditional release followed by immediate deportation to the Transkei, with the legal implication that Mandela’s ‘host’ could deal with him at will. This option, the document says, would only be feasible if the legal uncertainties could be eliminated.
Possibility Three comprises unconditional release followed by immediate deportation, but preceded by negotiations with the subject aimed at (a) securing his agreement to be released in the Transkei; and (b) an undertaking that he will not make it necessary for him to be rearrested. This is recommended as the ‘second option’.
Possibility Four comprises unconditional release in the RSA after ‘successful negotiations with the subject’, aimed at securing his agreement to do nothing that would make it necessary for him to be rearrested. ‘However, it is doubtful that subject will sign such document.’ As a result, this option is ‘not regarded as feasible’.
Possibility Five comprises unconditional release on the grounds of age; the fact that ‘subject’ has served 20 years of his sentence; as well as requests by black leaders, ‘not because they regard him as their leader, but because they regard this as advisable’. This is recommended as the ‘first option, in tandem with experience in respect of Mbeki’s release. Simultaneously with Mbeki’s release, it could be announced that Mandela was also under consideration, but proof should be provided that this would not lead to unrest – or that such a step could only be taken in a climate of public order.’
Possibility Six comprises conditional release (parole), aimed at restricting ‘subject’. It could include employment, as well as reporting to the South African Police. Negative factors would include continued agitation for his unconditional release, and the deliberate flouting of parole conditions. This would create opportunities for conflict with the authorities. ‘It will not be possible to restrict the subject, and he could rather be detained in prison for this purpose.’ For these reasons, this option is also ‘not recommended’.
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The implications are inescapable. At an unknown point, but probably in the course of 1984, the SSC took a decision in principle to release political prisoners ‘from both the left and the right’ before Christmas 1984, with the unstated but reasonably obvious implication that ‘prisoners from the left’ would include long-term ‘security prisoners’ such as the Rivonia trialists, including Mandela, Mbeki and Sisulu. At this stage, the SSC still seemed intent on releasing them to the Transkei.
Pursuant to this, Coetsee then recommended that Govan Mbeki be released before Christmas 1984; that the government should announce that it was also considering Mandela’s release; and that he should then be released, at an unspecified time but presumably soon afterwards, provided Mbeki’s release did not have adverse consequences. Most importantly, Mandela would no longer be released to the Transkei, but to the Republic of South Africa. No formal undertakings or ultimatums were mentioned. Significantly, all the options for release to the Transkei (and, by extension, any other ‘independent homeland’) were rejected as ‘inadvisable’ or ‘not feasible’, and Coetsee conjured up a host of legal obstacles in this regard.
This begins to speak to Coetsee’s assertion to co-author Jan-Ad Stemmet two days before his death that his archive would ‘rewrite the story of Mandela’s release’. Specifically, it speaks to Coetsee’s assertion in the course of one of his interviews with the Irish researcher Padraig O’Malley some 25 years later that Mandela’s release flowed from a structural (and non-racially formulated) change in policy regarding the release of ‘security prisoners’, introduced by himself in a deliberately obscure speech in the Senate, which had enabled the release of Breyten Breytenbach in December 1982 – in the full knowledge or with the clear intent that this would eventually result in Mandela’s release as well.
Given the document’s elaborate officialese, and the fact that the ‘recommended’ option of unconditional release in the RSA is buried as Possibility five, it also speaks to Coetsee’s admission to O’Malley that he sometimes deliberately used obfuscation to advance his political agenda.
The second salient document in the Coetsee archive is a top-secret memorandum written on 23 January 1985 by the director-general of Justice, S.S. (Fanie) van der Merwe. This was two days after the Bethell interview, and seven days before Botha’s statement in parliament. Addressed to Coetsee, the memorandum was clearly written after Van der Merwe had studied the Bethell transcript. It casts light on the December meeting of the SSC, as well as the consequences of Bethell’s visit. The entire memorandum minus some paragraph numbering is reproduced below.
NO. 913 PRISONER NELSON MANDELA: POLLSMOOR PRISON: MANAGEMENT [HANTERING]
MINISTER
On 14 December 1984, the State Security Council, among other things, took the following decision with respect to abovementioned prisoner:
‘that he [presumably P.W. Botha] will have no objection if Mandela be informed that numerous people and institutions have asked for him to be released, and that release upon the request of the president and prime minister of Transkei will only be considered if he [Mandela] should undertake to abide by the Law’.
Subsequent to this, Lord Bethell (Britain) spoke to Mandela in the course of an orientation visit on 21 January 1985 to SA Prisons during which he also had the opportunity to conduct discussions with a number of prisoners. In the course of the discussion, which took place in the presence of the Head of Pollsmoor Prison (Major Van Sittert), Mandela expressed himself as follows about the use of violence by the ANC, with which he associated himself:
1.The policy of the RSA government had left the ANC with no other choice;
2.Attempts at ‘constructive engagement’ by the ANC since 1912 had failed;
3.Violence was primarily aimed at so-called hard targets, such as military installations, and not at persons;
4.If soft targets (individuals in charge of or in defence of such hard targets, or even civilians) were to fall victim in the process, this was regrettable;
5.That the ANC was still prepared to negotiate with the RSA government, but only unconditionally, and not under condition that violent actions should first cease.
Aforesaid attitude once again confirms what we already know and/or suspect, namely that to date there is scant indication that Mandela will renounce violence, even if this should result in his release. His attitude is that he has already spent 22 years in prison for this cause, and that he will not capitulate at this stage for personal benefit.
The question therefore arises whether, taking account of the advantages and disadvantages spelled out below, it would still be advisable to confront him with an opportunity to give a firm commitment in this regard:
(a)Advantages:
(i)Gives the Government an opportunity to motivate Mandela’s non-release on the grounds that he advocates violence. [The Government] will be able to substantiate this in writing.
(b)Disadvantages:
(i)He [Mandela] could grab the opportunity to give such an undertaking, but could qualify it in such a way that it could rob the undertaking of any value, or embarrass the government.
(ii)A declaration in favour of violence would increase his stature