сотрудничества. Учитывая, что ЕС и НАТО считают Китай геополитическим противником, нет сомнения, что они используют институциональные механизмы и экономическое давление для сдерживания Китая на Балканах. Но в свете итогов сотрудничества между Китаем и балканскими странами у этого формата есть перспективы. Тем не менее в будущем это сотрудничество ждут серьезные испытания.
Ключевые слова: Китай, Балканы, Западные Балканы, китайское влияние, ЕС, НАТО.
The emergence of China as a regional policy actor in the Balkans is a completely new phenomenon. China’s influence has been growing, both in economy and in politics, and initial steps have been taken to improve military relations. To date, Chinese companies have become indispensable investors, on which economic growth in the region depends, and banks are important lenders that finance the construction of some of the most important infrastructure projects. The offensive of Chinese institutions in the field of cultural diplomacy is also visible, with the expansion of scientific cooperation with research centers in the Balkans. Given that the EU and NATO have recognized China as a geopolitical challenger and Chinfluence as a threat, it is undoubted that they will use institutional mechanisms and economic leverage to attempt to limit or squeeze China out of the Balkans. From the perspective of the ten-year development of relations between China and the Balkan countries, this format has a perspective. At the same time, looking at the long-term interests of the EU and NATO, there are many challenges ahead.
Keywords: China, Balkans, Western Balkans, Chinfluence, EU, NATO.
Introduction
The emergence of China as a regional policy actor in the Balkans is a completely new phenomenon. Namely, from 1958 to 1978, China established special ties with Albania. China returned to this region 30 years later. Since 2009, China’s influence has been growing, both in economy and in politics.
The growth of Chinese influence in the Balkans has been recorded since the implementation of the ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Intensified political contacts and first investments emerged in 2009, at the stage when the BRI was being prepared. Since 2013, we have been witnessing a kind of “eruption” [Dimitrijević, Ping, 2017].
The Balkan Peninsula is an integral part of the European (Maritime) Route. Chinese Premier Li Keqiang “described the port of Piraeus as a pearl in the Mediterranean Sea and said it could become one of the most competitive ports of the world”1. Also, the Balkans is well connected (transport and economic ties) with Western Turkey (CAWA route) and Central Europe (NELB).
As a result, in September 2019, a direct railway connection was established via NELB from Jinan (Shandong Province) to Belgrade (Serbia)2. In this context, the initiative to modernize the Belgrade–Budapest railway should also be considered. In 2014 governments of China, Serbia, Hungary and Macedonia signed an agreement on the modernization of railroad traffic with the intention to extend the Budapest-Belgrade railway to the south towards Macedonia and Greece through a North-South vertical. Thus, the new transport corridor would connect the port in Piraeus and the most important traffic junctions of Central Europe, which are part of the NELB.
Тhe CEE (Central – Eastern Europe) region “is attractive to China thanks to its strategic geographical position for the New Silk Road project, its high-skilled yet cheap labour, and its open trade and investment environment.” [Stanzel, 2016. P. 1].
Тable 1: Land and Maritime routes – Belt and Road Initiative3
Table 2: Chinese firms’ major construction contracts in the Western Balkans, 2010–2017 [Holzner, Schwarzhappel, 2018. P. 17]
The number of major Chinese projects contracted in the Western Balkans (shown in Table 2) “since the outbreak of the global financial crisis is non-negligible. Overall, Chinese infrastructure projects make up about USD 9.1 billion (EUR 7.8 billion). Almost 90% of these, however, have been initiated only since 2013. The most important transport sector contractor is the predominantly state-owned China Communications Construction Company. In the energy sector, the state-owned China National Machinery Industry Corporation – known as Sinomach – is the leading contractor. Geographically, the prime target of Chinese construction contracts is Serbia.” [Holzner, Schwarzhappel, 2018. P. 17]. The increased interest of Chinese investors and banks in investing in Greece is also evident (shown in Table 3).
In Bulgaria „In the realm of infrastructure, the China Machinery Engineering Corporation (CMEC) signed in 2019 a €120 million contract with the joint stock company Logistical Center-Varna for the joint development of port infrastructure in Bulgaria’s largest seaside city of Varna. This is the first project of its kind that Beijing is going to realize in Bulgaria and is part of the Belt and Road Initiative. China has also made a major investment in innovative Bulgarian business. The China-CESEE Investment Corporation Fund (a $500 million private equity fund launched in 2014 through financing provided by the Exim Bank of China) acquired a 10% share in Walltopia – a world leading Bulgarian manufacturer and installer of mounting walls. Moreover, the China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) has expressed interest in the construction of the Belene nuclear power plant in cooperation with Russia’s Rosatom.”4 Chinese companies are also increasingly present in Romania: „The Dutch multinational company Nidera, the largest trader in commodities for agricultural markets with operations in Romania, which was taken over in 2017 by COFCO, China; The American company Smithfield Foods, a global leader in pig farms and pork production, with a branch in Romania that manages 46 farms in the counties of Timi and Arad, which was taken over in 2013 by Shuanghui International, in the largest ever Chinese acquisition of an American company (over USD 7 billion); The famous Italian tyre maker, the world’s fifth largest, Pirelli, which was taken over in 2015 by the Chinese state conglomerate ChemChina in a USD 7.7 billion deal, including two factories in Romania”. [Pencea, 2017. P. 24]. Curiosity is the fact that China’s most modest activities have been detected in Albania. „In 2016 China’s Everbright Group bought Tirana’s Nënë Tereza International Airport Company and it has a concession on the airport until 2027. The aim is to set up a logistics centre to transport Chinese goods into Europe and to promote tourism in Albania, especially tourists from China“5.
Of course, some authors are right to state that „these projects are not FDI, but mostly public investment contracts financed by Chinese banks; not all the projects might be realised.“ [Holzner, Schwarzhappel, 2018. P. 17]. So the data presented in Tables 2. and 3. can also