have failed or have been delayed.6
Table 3: Major Chinese Investments in Greece 2009–2017. [Bastian, 2017. Р. 10]
In Romania “The Cernavodă Nuclear Power Plant is one of the most important Romanian – Chinese projects that have not been implemented. Because of the quick succession of Romanian governments, the negotiations were delayed for more than two years. /…/ The project was estimated to cost around 6.4 billion euro (8 billion dollars).” [Popescu, Brînză, 2018. P. 32]. A preliminary investors’ agreement has been signed in May 2019, but now, after five years of negotiations, a new problem has arisen: “The fact that the Chinese partner is under US sanctions would make this subject very politically sensitive for Nuclearelectrica“7.
In the case of Bulgaria and Romania, the reasons for the relative failure should also be sought in the EU’s membership of the two countries. „As an EU Member State Bulgaria has an access to the EU Structural Funds which provide partial grants and this makes Chinese loans less attractive.“ [Zhelev, 2018. P. 12]
However, despite some failures, it should be emphasized that China’s presence in the Balkan economies has been expanding since 2009, and especially since the launch of the BRI in 2013. Everything the Chinese have accomplished has been done in just 5–10 years.
1. Western Powers vs Chinfluence
The rapid spread of Chinese influence in the Balkans has caused both EU and US reactions. European Commissioner for Enlargement Johannes Hahn warned of the role of China in the Western Balkans and the possibility that Beijing will transform the region’s countries into Trojan horses that will one day be members of the EU8.
„The German Foreign Minister Sigmar Gabriel appealed to EU members to pursue a common foreign policy vis-à-vis China to counter Beijing’s tactics: If we do not succeed, for example, in developing a single strategy towards China, then China will succeed and dividing Europe, he said. China is increasingly anticipated by the EU as a threat.“ [Prorokovic, 2017. P. 9]. For US analysts, the Chinese approach is clear, and therefore very problematic: „Interestingly, a comparison could be made with the United States between the two world wars and China’s promotion of the MSRI (Maritime Silk Road Initiative, as a part of BRI, remark by D. P.).“ [Blanchard, Flint, 2017. P. 235].
To a certain extent, it is unbelievable that Chinese influence is growing despite the fact that most Balkan countries are in the EU and/or NATO. The analysis of Slovenian IFIMES offers a simple explanation of this phenomenon: “European leaders have often confirmed their support to the Western Balkans and its Euro Atlantic road, expressing at the same time concerns about the impact of individual states in the region, particularly Russia, China and Turkey. The EU with its enlargement stalemate practically pushes the Western Balkans counters to Russian hug, to blame in the end those countries for their close relations and cooperation with Russia. However, some EU states always set new requirements and membership criteria for the Western Balkans. Some experts have been pointing out that 15 EU member countries would not be able to fully meet the membership criteria now, which are required from the Western Balkans countries.”9
In addition, the hypocrisy or double standards of both – the EU institutions and key European countries are often visible. Germany, for example, strongly insisted on the implementation of the Third Energy Package, which essentially meant stopping the construction of the South Stream gas pipeline across the territories of Bulgaria, Serbia and Hungary10. But at the same time, it continued to build the North Stream and the EU did not even try to prevent it. [Proroković, 2018. P. 702].
Similar is the case with NATO, which is a key instrument in securing the US position in the Balkans. The US aggressive policy is based on the securitization of the Russian issue as well as the new attitude of the Donald Trump administration towards acute crises in the Middle East. In this context, the Balkan NATO members are forced to following the US, establishing a restrictive policy towards Russia and supporting Washington’s initiatives in the Middle East, which is not usually in their national interest. [Proroković, 2018a. P. 86–87].
2. Conclusion: Perspectives and Challenges
In contrast to the Western powers, which show a deficit of “optimistic initiatives” or constantly make political demands, the Chinese approach is different. China presents itself as an ambitious and constructive partner. And more importantly for “Balkan Stabilitocracies”, it does not require any political concessions11. This is probably the reason for China’s great success. China is firmly committed to realizing the geo-economic goals of the BRI and is taking a number of initiatives in the Balkans. To some extent, it is even noticeable that „the number and intensity of China’s economic and political initiatives in the Balkans since 2013 are utterly disproportionate to the size of the markets and the foreign trade importance of these countries to China.” [Proroković, 2016. P. 54–55]. Therefore, it can be concluded that China is projecting the pace and scope of its presence in the region. China has become a serious challenger to the US and EU in the Balkans. Therefore, China is an actor who will become more involved in regional political and security issues in the future.
However, the West’s advantage in the Balkans is characterized by its deep institutional presence (EU and/or NATO membership) and widespread economic ties (which are completely disproportionate, so that the export of the Balkan countries is predominantly EU oriented). Given that the EU and NATO have recognized China as a geopolitical challenger and Chinfluence as a threat, it is undoubted that they will use institutional mechanisms and economic leverage to attempt to limit or squeeze China out of the Balkans.
From the perspective of the ten-year development of relations between China and the Balkan countries, this format has a perspective. At the same time, looking at the long-term interests of the EU and NATO, there are many challenges ahead.
References
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