How Sentiment Matters in International Relations: China and the South China Sea Dispute
1: Single Case Design
Table 2: Legal Background at a Glance
Table 3: Important Events in the South China Sea: 1950–2016
Table 4: Features Claimed/Occupied by the PRC
Table 5: Features claimed/occupied by the Philippines
Table 6: References to the ‘United States‘ (CICIR & CIIS)
Table 7: U.S. Freedom of Navigation Operations in the SCS
Table 8: References to ‘The Philippines’ (CICIR & CIIS)
Table 9: At a Glance: The Award by the Permanent Arbitration Tribunal
Table 10: Article 298 (1) UNCLOS
Table 11: Official Declarations by the PRC on Art. 298 UNCLOS
Table 12: Correlative Patterns I and II
Table 13: Text Segments on Sovereignty Issues
Table 14: Text Segments Signaling Reassurance/Accommodation
Table 15: Text Segments Signaling Restraint/Stability
Table 16: Text Segments on Priority to Sovereignty I
Table 17: Text Segments on Priority to Sovereignty II
Table 18: Text Segments Entailing Legal Recommendations/Preferences
Table 19: Text Segments on Regional Cooperation
Table 20: Text Segments on Sino-centrism
Table 21: Text Segments on Dispute Shelving
Table 22: Text Segments on Joint Development
Table 23: Text Segments on Island Construction/Land Reclamation I
Table 24: Text Segments on Island Construction/Land Reclamation II
Table 25: Text Segments on New Model of Great Power Relations
Table 26: Text Segments on Military Recommendations/Preferences
Table 27: Text Segments Characterizing The Philippines as the Offender
Table 28: Text Segments Characterizing the U.S. as the Offender
Table 29: Overview of Recommendation Patterns (Sub-Case I)
Table 30: Overview of Recommendation Patterns (Sub-Case II)
Table 31: The Causal Mechanism
Table 32: Selection of Text Segments Satisfying Criteria A–D (Pattern I)
Table 33: Selection of Text Segments Satisfying Criteria A–D (Pattern II)
Table 34: Explanations and Objectives (Sub-Case I)
Table 35: Explanations and Objectives (Sub-Case II)
Table 36: Cross-Case Comparison (2010–mid-2012)
Table 37: Cross-Case Comparison (mid-2012–mid-2016)
List of Figures
Figure 1: Map of the South China Sea with Competing Legal Claims
Figure 2: Map of the South China Sea
Figure 3: Nine-Dash-Line (as Attached to Note Verbale CML18/2009)
Figure 4: Total FPTT References to the ‘South China Sea’
Figure 5: Total FPTT References to ‘Chinese Dream/Great Rejuvenation’
Figure 6: Total FPTT References to ‘China, the Developing Country’
Figure 7: Total FPTT References to ‘China, the Regional Power’
Figure 8: Total FPTT References to ‘Multipolar World’
Figure 9: Total FPTT References to ‘The United States of America’
Figure 10: Total FPTT References to ‘China, the Victim’
Figure 11: Total FPTT References to ‘The Philippines’
[13] Introduction
Over the last two decades, the Asia-Pacific has turned into the most dynamic and fastest growing region in the world, accounting for almost 50 percent of the total global trade volume. Apart from its unprecedented pace of economic development, the Asia-Pacific features severe political discord among its highly heterogeneous nations, not least by virtue of a variety of looming and ongoing conflicts, profound political tensions, and power shifts. The South China Sea (SCS) dispute constitutes the region’s major and most complex territorial conflict, its vast relevance and implications exceeding the Asia-Pacific by far. It represents a maritime space roughly encompassing around 1,400,000 square miles geographically located between the People’ Republic of China (PRC), the Republic of China (ROC/Taiwan), The Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, Indonesia, Singapore, and Vietnam. According to rather pessimistic estimates, USD 3.37 trillion in trade transited the South China Sea in 2016 (Center For Strategic and International Studies (CSIS, 2017). This number reflects 21 percent of global trade and 39.5 percent of Chinese total trade2, thereby strikingly demonstrating the SCS’s international and strategic significance. The SCS dispute itself, inextricably linked to the region’s long and conflict-prone history, substantially evolves around conflicting claims to legal status, border delimitation and ownership of both numerous territorial features (islands, reefs, rocks, islets) and adjacent maritime zones. Even though the dispute had already erupted in the 1970s and witnessed numerous standoffs and contentious changes of ownership between the 1980s and mid-1990s, it remained below the radar of global politics and international attention for quite some time. This has successively changed as of 2009, triggered by a deadline for SCS claimant parties to submit their claims for an extended seabed hydrocarbon continental shelf to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS). In subsequent years, particularly from 2012 onwards, the general situation in the SCS has further aggravated. This was manifested by multiple diplomatic, political and military incidents3 and [14] countless endeavors by various actors to defend their interests and to support their disputed claims. As a result, the risk of conflict escalation has been significantly increasing ever since just as security dilemma dynamics while the feasibility of effective conflict management has been declining. It was during this time that the SCS dispute started to attract considerable scholarly and political attention worldwide.
A close analytical look at the conflict-prone course of events reveals several dimensions and factors that have somewhat facilitated the dispute’s rapid exacerbation, thereby accounting for the ongoing failure to effectively mitigate tensions at the same time.