How Sentiment Matters in International Relations: China and the South China Sea Dispute
of recognition’ and that is considered necessary for a human beings’ positive self-evaluation: love, rights and solidarity (1995, p. 92ff.). Accordingly, rights, including material rights, are seen as signifiers of social rank and self-evaluation. As such, recognition closely corresponds to Taylor’s definition of identity, building upon Hegel, as “a person’s understanding of who they are, of their fundamental characteristics as a human being” (1994, p. 259). Consequently, identity or positive self-evaluation is (partly) molded by recognition of such rights:
“For it is only due to the cumulative acquisition of basic self-confidence, of self-respect, and of self-esteem […] that a person can come to see himself or herself, unconditionally, as both an autonomous and an individuated being and to identify with his or her goals and desires” (Honneth, 1995, p. 169).
Inadequate recognition of these rights, on the contrary, turns actors into victims whose self-evaluation and self-worth is threatened. Such non-recognition or misrecognition “can inflict harm, can be a form of oppression, imprisoning someone in a false, distorted, and reduced mode of being” (Taylor, 1994, p. 25). Just like rights, actors also seek recognition of their status (social position) and identity conceptions as a confirmation of their significance and self-worth. In turn, non-recognition is generally said to cause negative sentiment such as anger, hatred, frustration or even aggression (Bourdieu 1966; Vaillancourt & Hymel, 2006), which in turn trigger detrimental and retaliatory response patterns, for instance with the goal of securing appropriate recognition (Taylor, 1994), taking revenge, penalizing the offender and escalate the conflict (Pruitt & Kim, 2004). Unlike respect, recognition takes the causal mechanism between misrecognition and response struggles for granted and tends to ignore “non-evaluative dimensions of human existence” (Wolf, 2011, p. 9). Conversely, respect assumes that negative emotions (caused by acts deemed as disrespectful) are much more likely to occur if the non-evaluative dimension of an actor’s social status is adversely affected simultaneously, not just the evaluative dimension20. Accordingly, if others are overstating a given actor’s self-perceived social status, or if their conduct is not touching upon that actor’s non-evaluative status dimension but only questioning or neglecting a small part of his identity, negative sentiment is not inevitable according to the respect conception applied here. In this sense, recognition theory attributes a much higher (and exclusive) significance to the role of external confirmation of identity formation processes than does respect. In sum, unlike respect, recognition theory is very much restricted to an actors’ identity or self-evaluation, [27] on the one hand, and external recognition or misrecognition thereof, on the other hand. As a result, an actor’s desire to be taken seriously, unrelated to specific rights or identities to be recognized by others and irrespective of any evaluation thereof, is covered by respect, yet not by recognition.
Second, honor is associated with an actor’s social reputation within a certain group. Reputation, in turn, is measured by compliance with group norms and values such as honesty or integrity (Berger, 1970; Offer, 1995). Different from respect, honor is more concerned with the broader social context and social norms in which an actor operates than with that actor’s self-perceived identity and status conceptions, the question of adequacy, and the impact of the external conduct on self-worth.
The third concept to mention in this context is prestige21. As a form of esteem, it relates to admiration for an actor “usually because of a reputation for high quality, success, or social influence” (Cambridge Dictionary, 2017). Other sources provide more neutral definitions of prestige, for instance as “reputation for power” (Morgenthau, 1948) or “a group’s sharing of a certain second-level belief: each member believes that the rest believe that a party has a certain desirable quality” (O’Neill, 2002). For instance, a state may seek to modernize its military apparatus not out of security concerns but in order to become a fully-fledged prestigious member of international politics (Meyer, 1997). Moreover, as Markey finds, prestigious political actors often enjoy a reputation of being significant, capable and valuable (1999, 2000).
No matter the precise definition, esteem and prestige, contrary to respect, are not limited by a given actor’s subjective assessment of the level of adequacy expected from others. For the sake of exemplification, certain forms of esteem such as love cannot be assessed in terms of adequacy; such kind of esteem can hardly be seriously requested by anyone. Therefore, prestige, unlike respect, ignores what advocates of role theory refer to as the ‘ego-dimension’ of an actor’s role conception. Accordingly, no matter the prestige22 publicly granted to a given actor, the concept does not provide an answer to the question as to whether it is considered adequate or not. Equally, prestige does not help examine actors’ subjective self-worth conceptions nor account for derived self-evaluated needs. As a result, despite a significant amount of prestige, an actor may still feel disrespected either way.
Fourth and ultimately, another notion closely linked to the role of respect is justice. Justice and injustice designate an emotional feeling, for example, aroused by the absence of respect, and mark an independent field of research [28] at the same time. While justice research, mainly covering the field of political and social psychology, encompasses a whole range of issues such as (relative) deprivation (Crosby, 1976; Olson et al., 1986) and prosocial behavior (Batson, 1998; Krebs & Miller, 1985), distributive and procedural justice are most relevant for the project at hand. Distributive justice research roughly suggests three principles relating to resource distribution that actors are found to particularly desire: need, equality and equity (Miller, 2001, p. 528). That said, justice perception is a highly subjective matter based on the cognition and consequential assessment of certain behavior or development. Key indicators of distributive justice include calls for (or concerns of) fairness and equal treatment. In addition, procedural justice focuses less on outcomes while placing a stronger emphasis on procedure, particularly of legal nature. For instance, citizens participating in legal proceedings strongly care, as several studies indicate, about formal (structural) and less formal (interpersonal) aspects of fair legal procedure and equality, especially in terms of their legal rights (Bies, 1987; Leventhal, 1976; Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler, 1990).
In sum, several concepts and theoretical approaches are closely related to the respect conceptualization provided. They all have in common certain elements and propositions. Similarly, a perceived lack (or depreciation) of any of them is expected to arouse negative sentiment. At the same time, yet, respect, regardless of several commonalities, differs from all other concepts in some regards. Among the most unique features of respect is the significance it attributes to both the material and self-evaluative dimensions of respect and derived needs and expectations alike, the special emphasis it places on social status considerations and effects thereof and, lastly, the emphasis on the subjective question of adequacy of external conduct.
2.1.1.2 Respect: Applicability Beyond the Individual Level
In recent years, the concept of respect has gradually been applied beyond the individual level to the collective and governmental level as well. In doing so, respect is increasingly been operationalized-usually in the context of associated emotions and the role of recognition-into a feasible concept of IR and FPA research (Fikenscher et al., 2015; Wolf, 2011). While it is generally agreed that states and institutional (state) bodies, unlike individual human beings, do not have feelings per se (Wight, 2004), a variety of research suggests that states, naturally comprised of individuals and groups of individuals, can be associated with both individual and collective feelings nonetheless (Neumann, 2004). According to this viewpoint, government staff tends to, besides bearing the individual set of emotions and identities held by every [29] human being, identify with the state it is working for and the citizens its government represents. That said, such identification processes are capable of generating collective emotions as well. As Sasley puts it, “studying states-as-groups allows us to consider the state as the psychological – emotional group – changing its members to think, feel, and react similarly so that we can speak of ‘state’ emotions” (2011, p. 465). In a similar vein, Hymans reasons, “states are not gigantic calculating machines; they are hierarchically organized groups of emotional people” (2010, p. 462). Moreover, government officials are commonly engaged in interpersonal meetings with their respective counterparts from other countries, for instance in the context of state visits, international