David Groten

How Sentiment Matters in International Relations: China and the South China Sea Dispute


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superimposing traditional preferences of stability, cooperation and certain norms such as harmony. Subsequently, the perpetrator is anticipated to interpret the victim’s retaliatory response as a non-adequate consideration of its very self-evaluative needs as well. In the end of this admittedly quite simplistic example, voluntary or involuntary defection from cooperation (Folger & Skarlicki, 1998, Lind, 2000; Tyler & Blader, 2001) and exacerbation of bilateral tensions are likely outcomes, even though both may have been desired in the first place by any party involved, especially not the victim state. At the same time, insecurities and security dilemma dynamics tend to proliferate in the wake of rising tensions and enhanced disrespect. In the absence of trust and knowledge (and interest) about others’ sincere intentions and psychological needs, states are inclined to assume the worst and take higher risks, particularly if disrespect is engraving and experienced over a longer period of time (Checkel, 2005). In this vein, Craig draws a link between the perception of respect and security by stating that “any threat to China’s ‘national dignity’ and ‘status of equality in the international community’ is considered to endanger the country’s security” (2007, p. 15).

      In a nutshell, the project at hand holds that disrespect dynamics account for the adoption, preference and proposition of retaliatory measures, gestures and verbal complaints. Due to the experience of disrespect and negative emotions that are commonly associated with it, such retaliation is expected to be deemed as just, legitimate and necessary, thereby curtailing the victim’s propensity to engage in self-criticism and empathy. Consequently, disrespect dynamics are regarded as not conducive to cooperation, let alone effective and sustainable conflict management, neither in the SCS nor in any other dispute of that kind. On the contrary, a vicious circle of reinforcing disrespect dynamics with adverse effects on trust, empathy and self-reflection may set in, hence further hampering a careful consideration of mutual respect sensitivities, needs and associated claims and expectations. Following this logic, if disrespect experiences and dynamics were found to be crucial in China’s SCS policy between 2010 and 2016, implications would be profound, not only regarding the development of China’s SCS approach and the future of the SCS dispute, but also in terms of the overall relevance of respect, status and cognitive [38] variables at large, both in the realm of international politics and foreign policy analysis.

      To be sure, the overall significance of international respect in a given country is rooted in that country’s social realities and particularities such as its political system39, its identity and culture, the nature of its relationships with other countries and its (relative) rank and position therein. That said, this section, by taking a specific glance at the cultural dimension, seeks to provide a brief overview of the concept of face and its role in Chinese culture. Face is defined by Goffmann as “an image of self-delineated in terms of approved social attributes (1967, p. 5). As such it is closely related to respect. That said, Leung and Chan (2003), building upon concise preliminary research by Goffmann (1972) and King (1993), define face as “the respect, pride, and dignity of an individual as a consequence of his/her social achievement and the practice of it” (p. 1575). Similarly, Ting-Toomey & Kurogi label it a “claimed sense of favorable social self-worth that a person wants others to have of her or him. It is a vulnerable identity-based resource because it can be enhanced or threatened in any uncertain social situation” (1998, p. 187). What is peculiar in this regard is the implied belief that face needs very much are subject to change, depending on the cultural context as well as the social relationship at work. Brown & Levinson (1978) further distinguish between positive and negative face, the former denoting someone’s claim over its self-ascribed self-image, the latter representing claims to territory and other claims not directly associated with self-image concerns. Ultimately, the concept of face bears a close resemblance to respect and related terminologies such as dignity, honor, prestige and status. At the same time, however, certain differences remain. As Ho (1976) sums it up, “the claim to face may rest on the basis of status, whether ascribed or achieved and on personal or non-personal factors; it may also vary according to the group with which a person is interacting. Basic differences are found between the processes involved in gaining versus losing face” (p. 867). Building upon these definitions, face-work is required in order to appropriately consider and save someone else’s face needs in a given social framework. Face-work, thus, can be understood as “a set of communicative behaviour that people use to regulate their social dignity and to support or challenge the other’s social dignity” (1998, p. 188) or as “the use of a complex package of [39] social skills to protect one’s own face and the face of others” (Leung & Chan, 2003, p. 1575).

      While face is indeed of Chinese origin, it is by no means solely attributable to Chinese culture. Instead, it is somewhat applicable to non-Chinese cultural settings, especially to Asian40 cultural backgrounds, but also non-Asian ones. Preliminary research, yet, suggests that Western-style culture tends to be comparatively bad at face-work (Reischauer, 1962), hence frequently underestimating or simply disregarding the much more significant role of face in other, say Asian cultural settings. This observation is also shared by Techau who maintains:

      “Like duty, honor, and pride, respect is almost a non-word in Western culture. These terms have a very reduced meaning in Western political discourse, having been relegated to the realm of the semisacred that is invoked only in Sunday sermons or when honoring fallen soldiers” (Techau, 2013, para. 9).

      Moreover, while a truly universal phenomenon, its conceptualization and question as to how to engage in effective face-work is very much country and culture-specific. That said, face is traditionally deeply rooted in Chinese society and culture. Unlike predominant Western conceptions, the role of Chinese face is less subject to the individual human being and strongly associated with Confucianism41 instead. The latter, guiding China’s political philosophy and identity, is frequently held responsible for China’s view of the world and itself within a predominantly relational context (Ho, 1976; Ho, 2016; Hu, 1944). Against this backdrop, Hwang & Han argue as follows:

      “Chinese face is often tightly linked with vertical relationships and close others. Its operation follows a compelling principle of reciprocity. In contrast, Western face emphasizes the separateness of an individual. A person is not required to assume responsibility for the behaviour of relatives or family members. Social interactions abide by the principle reciprocity, but they tend to maintain the individual’s autonomy” (2010, p. 481).

      Further illustrating the importance of such vertical relationship context in Chinese culture42, Figurette stresses that, in line with Confucianism, “unless [40] there are at least two human beings, there are no human beings” (1972, p. 7). The principle of reciprocity is an indispensable prerequisite of the Chinese face conception. According to Leung and Chan (2003), Chinese face-work, in addition to reciprocity, encompasses three further dimensions: respect, response and reputation. According to this definition, respect is a core element of face and comprises of aspects of each of the three remaining dimensions43.

      Prevailing, yet sparse (English-language) literature approaches the subject of face and the role of face-work in China from different angles. Leung & Chang (2003) for instance adopted an economic point of view, scrutinizing the signs of face-work in business negotiations with China. Zhai (2004) and others studied the role of respect in social and interpersonal exchanges and relationship development, largely on the level of the individual human being. Other studies examined the role of face-work and face-negotiation strategy in conflict management with or by China (cf. Wilmot & Hocker, 1998). Ting-Toomey & Kurogi elaborate upon the link between face-work and conflict as follows:

      “[F]ace influences conflict behavior, because, in any conflict situation, conflict parties have to consider protecting self-interest conflict goals and honoring or attacking another person’s conflict goals. On top of incompatible goals, intercultural conflict parties typically use their habitual conflict scripts to approach the conflict situation. Intercultural conflict often involves miscommunication between members of two or more cultures over incompatible identity, relational, process, and substantive conflict issues” (1998, p. 188).

      One of the most concise theoretical works on the subject