How Sentiment Matters in International Relations: China and the South China Sea Dispute. David Groten

produced in differentiation from some kind of ‘otherness’ or ‘out-group’. Hence, identity conceptions are subjective, discursively constructed and, as a relational term, also require a certain degree of social recognition and interaction. In defining how a country (significant domestic groups) perceives itself, the term national identity refers, as a special version of conventional identity⁴⁸, to the collective level assuming a collective and national dimension. As such, for the purpose of this project, national identity shall be understood as a “collective narrative of the nation” (Hall, 1996, p. 613) and its characteristics and peculiarities. While there is no such thing as a uniform and stable national identity, several of them, just like status conceptions, may overlap, coexist, and replace one another over time. In the view of Wodak, “the discursive construction of national identity revolves around the three temporal axes of the past, the present and the future” (1998, p. 26). In this vein, Hypothesis I argues that a shift in both, predominant status and identity conceptions, can be observed in Chinese elite discourses over time. Accordingly, if such a shift was indeed being observed, it would be expected to have a significant effect on the scope of China’s self-evaluative needs and expectations, and, ultimately, on its policy preferences pertaining to the South China Sea dispute. The two questions guiding the discussion of Hypothesis I read as follows:

      - Can a (relative) shift in discursive patterns of self-ascribed predominant status and identity conceptions be observed over time (2007–2016)?.

      - Are there any indications that such a shift in status and identity is associated with a change in self-confidence, self-evaluative needs and interests?⁴⁹

      [45] In doing so, Hypothesis I solely addresses the ego or input dimension of Chinese self-ascribed status and identity conceptions. Subsequent chapters, then, will refer back to this dimension, particularly when discussing a possible connection between shifting identity and status conceptions and their effect on China’s respect expectations (output dimension) and, ultimately, policy preferences.

2.2.2 Hypothesis II: ‘Chinese⁵⁰ disrespect experiences in the context of the SCS dispute are severe and have been increasing over time’⁵¹

      The degree to which respect expectations are met is said to depend on an “actor’s interpretation of its partner’s behavior” (Wolf, 2011, p. 11). Therefore, Hypothesis II concerns the identification of discursive manifestations of respect and disrespect experiences in Chinese discourses on U.S. and Philippine conduct pertaining to the South China Sea. As respect dynamics, particularly experiences of disrespect, are usually not apparent at first sight, a set of six indicators is utilized for the sake of respect tracing (see chapter 2.3.1). Accordingly, if the majority of these indicators can be confirmed for a given sub-case, respect dynamics and disrespect experiences are considered present. Moreover, in the event that respect dynamics are found significant, Hypothesis II seeks to determine and critically reflect on prevailing patterns of respect expectations⁵². In this vein, it is anticipated that a shift in (self-perceived) status (Hypothesis I) and the resulting increase in relative status differences have facilitated a blunt articulation of respect expectations following a growing sense of entitlement⁵³. That said, a growing mismatch between China’s self-attributed status and the adequacy of external conduct is estimated to cause mounting disrespect experiences. Furthermore, it is discussed as to whether [46] respect expectations positively correlate to the status of the opposing country. In other words: is China more eager (sensitive) to obtain respect by a high-status than by a low-status actor? The following questions are guiding the discussion on Hypothesis II:

      - Which of the respect indicators can be identified and to what extent do they prove significant?

      - What kind of alleged offenses has been subject to discussion over time?

      - Have disrespect experiences aroused substantial negative emotions like anger and injustice?⁵⁴

      - Does the severity of disrespect experiences vary by the status of the offender?

      - Did Chinese respect-related expectations toward the conduct and attitude of other stakeholders rise over time, hence matching shifting levels of self-perceived status and identity conceptions?⁵⁵

      In sum, the scope of Hypothesis II is restricted to the input dimension⁵⁶ of respect and disrespect experiences and related sentiments of anger, injustice and frustration.

2.2.3 Hypothesis III: ‘A causal correlation between (dis)respect experiences and the type of policy recommendations and preferences advocated by FPTT scholars is plausible’

      The third hypothesis closely traces and examines policy recommendations and preference patterns in order to verify the thesis that a causal mechanism between (dis)respect experiences and the type of [47] recommendations/preferences, particularly in terms of their implied level of cooperation, is plausible. This verification proceeds in two consecutive stages. First, it is scrutinized as to whether correlative patterns (see chapter 4.4) between adequate/inadequate recognition of both Chinese respect needs and expectations⁵⁷, on the one hand, and the endorsement of cooperative/less cooperative policy measures, on the other hand, can be observed. This serves the purpose of determining as to whether or not (an increase in) disrespect experiences can plausibly account for the shift in Beijing’s SCS policy from restraint, low profile, stability and cooperation toward a much bolder, proactive and assertive approach in recent years. At the same time, this section scrutinizes the extent to which a widening gap between Chinese self-worth conceptions and recognition thereof by external SCS stakeholders may have affected the type of cooperation/non-cooperation advocated by FPTT scholars (intervening variable). Second, it is examined whether the presence or absence of disrespect experiences can account for the type of recommendation endorsed (or verbal complaint articulated), hence confirming the plausibility of a causal mechanism. The first ideal-type logic underlying this plausibility probe is as follows: If external behavior is regarded as a denial of respect (inadequate consideration), Chinese FPTTs are more inclined to suggest (or deem appropriate) policy measures of non-cooperation or even confrontation and, at the same time, are less keen to advocate concessions and cooperation⁵⁸. At least, such a cooperative attitude will be made contingent on certain terms and conditions if a certain degree of disrespect prevails. A lack of due respect, thus, facilitates an ever-increasing respect sensitivity among Chinese policy actors vis-à-vis external actors⁵⁹. In this vein, limited cooperation or non-cooperation is expected to be endorsed for two reasons: first, the urge to re-establish China’s self-worth, especially adequate external recognition of its identity and status conceptions; second, retaliation with the goal of “educating the offender” (Miller, 2001, pp. 540–541) by sending a firm and abundantly [48] clear message to the offender, thereby demonstrating the unwillingness of being treated this way (chapter 4.4.5). The second ideal-type logic presupposes that adequate respect (here: the lack of disrespect experiences) encourages Chinese scholars to advocate the making of concessions and to engage in cooperation with other SCS stakeholders⁶⁰. That said, the following questions guide the discussion of Hypothesis III in particular:

      - Which (political, legal, military, economic) measures pertaining to China’s SCS policy are recommended or advocated by FPTT scholars?

      - To what extent can these measures be classified as conditional/limited cooperation (sub-category III.II⁶¹) or non-cooperation/confrontation (subcategory III.III)?

      - Are these measures accompanied by a reference to the alleged offender?

      - Is it plausible that disrespect experiences prompted analysts to put forward retaliatory measures in response (and vice versa)? (criteria A–D⁶²)

      - How are these retaliatory measures/preferences explained? Are there any indications that policy preferences/recommendations involving elements of confrontation are regarded as increasingly justifiable and legitimate due to disrespect experiences made in the past?⁶³

      - Can a correlation between FPTT scholars’ propensity to advocate or recommend retaliatory policy measures and a low level of empathy for respect needs and expectations of China’s