No Collaborative Organizational Structure
Prior to the IMS methods, there would often be problems with incident wide organizational structures. This was because they were nonexistent in most instances. While each agency had their own chain of command, an overarching chain of command between agencies (especially on a major incident) typically was not part of the response protocols. Complicating the matter even more, there was usually no attempt made to form a collaborative organizational structure. More often than not, individuals responding to an incident would not collaborate to create a formal, or even an informal structure. They failed to recognize that this action would have increased collaboration, communication, and cooperation with each other.
The lack of collaboration, cooperation, and communication often led to freelancing of various agencies. Freelancing refers to agencies undertaking the actions that they felt were operationally necessary, while being oblivious to the needs (and tactics) of other agencies. These actions usually increased the risk to life safety for other first responders and led to taking longer to bring the incident under control. Moreover, the sense of accomplishment was not there. Sometimes agencies would do “their part” of the response and then feel as if other agencies did not do their part in bringing the incident under control. In some instances, the agency that accomplished their task first would chide, or even spitefully ask if they needed the other agency to do their job. As with most of the rest of the reasons for creating and IMS method, this created more conflict.
1.4.6 Strictly Enforced Intra‐agency Command Structure
As agencies came together to respond to a single incident, it became obvious that each had their own command structure. That established command structure did not always coincide with the command structure of other responding agencies. On an agency‐by‐agency basis, the chain of command structure was often strictly enforced by their own agency, and it left no room for deviation. Rather than coming up with a universal command structure or assimilate to the command structure of the agency, they were there to support; some mutual aid agencies would unequivocally refuse to adapt to change their own structure. This refusal to change command structure occurred for a multitude of reasons, but in some instances, the underlying problem fell along the lines of holding on to traditions. In other instances, this defiant attitude was based on past (or current) turf wars between agencies.
The traditionalist agencies were most often the ones to create the biggest fuss over their command structure. They were often unwilling to even slightly change to match up with other agencies. Some believe that this led to a quote about some fire departments that states “150 years of tradition, unimpeded by progress.”
1.4.7 Command Based on Home Rule
Whenever a major incident required multiple agencies, and a command structure was actually implemented, the jurisdiction in which the incident occurred would regularly attempt to fill all command positions with their personnel. Rarely was there a way to establish any type of leadership using individuals from the other agencies that were represented. On the surface, this seemed like a promising idea; however, there were often people in other agencies that had advanced qualifications and/or experiences dealing with the issue at hand, and their expertise was not utilized. Rather than using these experienced and qualified individuals to help mitigate the situation (by placing them in some type of leadership role), they were time and again utilized in undertaking manual labor. This essentially wasted that specialized talent they had. Ironically, that specialized talent probably would have made working conditions substantially safer, and the incident could have potentially come to an end quicker if those talents had been effectively used.
Beyond the command issue, the mentality of home rule also failed to take into consideration of creating liaisons between the home agency and the mutual aid organizations. In most instances, a liaison would be familiar with the command structure, the equipment, the qualifications, and the expertise of the mutual aid organization. A lack of ensuring a working relationship with a single person tasked for liaising between agencies often created more contention between agencies, and it usually added to the overall confusion on a major incident.
1.4.8 Too Many Subordinates Reporting to a Single Supervisor
The consideration of how many people a single person could effectively manage did not usually play into the decision‐making process on many incidents. Numerous operations were carried out with only one leader or supervisor managing the entire incident. In some instances, a supervisor would manage an exorbitant number of individuals (on occasions, more than 100), which hampered the response and increased the potential of the death or injury to a first responder. This left many individuals (or groups of individuals) to improvise, or get off task, while in the operating theater. With no immediate supervisor to keep them on task, it was not uncommon for response crews to do as they wanted rather than following orders (freelancing). The idea of the military's system of platoons or other similar supervisory structures was rarely, if ever considered. Even when an agency put a limit on how many people one person could supervise, it usually ended up being more personnel than they could effectively manage.
1.4.9 Lack of Accountability
Due to the complexity of most major incidents, and the inherent danger of multifaceted operations, being able to account for all personnel was, and still is, important. When a command structure was in place, agencies or one team of an agency, might freelance. Often, no immediate supervisor was assigned to documenting where each individual was assigned, what they were doing, and how they were doing it.
If a disastrous incident within the operational theater were to occur, the ability to account for each individual was compromised. This occasionally led to individuals unnecessarily being put in harm's way. It was not uncommon for someone to be injured or killed, and nobody was aware of it until much later. It also led to individuals being left behind when an evacuation was ordered, or when the operations ceased.
In 1972, a commission was formed by then President Richard Nixon. The National Commission on Fire Prevention and Control was formed to investigate how to reduce fire deaths, including firefighter fatalities. That commission released a report called America Burning. Among the many findings by the commission, two specific recommendations stand out, in relationship to accountability. The first was to create an administration to oversee and support firefighters, the second was to reliably record Line of Duty Deaths (LODDs) of firefighters. In 1976, the US Fire Administration was founded, and firefighter fatalities began to be credibly reported on 1 January 1977. Prior to 1977, there were not any credible numbers of how many firefighter fatalities were suffered each year. For the calendar year of 1977 there were 157 firefighter fatalities, and in 1978 there were 174 firefighter fatalities. Comparing this to firefighter fatalities statistics in 2016, the death toll fell to 69 (FEMA, 2018a).
1.4.10 No Interagency Planning
In the 1970s, interagency operational planning was overlooked time and again. If there was operational planning between two or more agencies, it was often done haphazardly and/or randomly. Clear and concise operational planning that utilized interagency integration was not usually a priority for the initial agency, or the mutual aid agencies. Tactics were rarely discussed before sending a first responder into characteristically dangerous and often hazardous, operations. Sometimes, this had negative and life‐threatening results.
Prior to the formal creation of IMS methods, it was not unusual for mutual aid agencies to show up and to be told where they were most needed, with no further discussion. Even if they decided to follow those orders, because varying agencies had differing methods to mitigate a given circumstance, these entities could be working on the same incidents utilizing different methods. They were doing what they thought was best, rather than having a specific plan where everyone knew what tactics were being employed.
This would sometimes lead to a disastrous result. Because there are many methods to fighting a fire, each with their own risks, contradictory tactics could, and sometimes would, put firefighters at risk. The previous example about wildland firefighting also