knowledge, which embraces concisely or in detail the predicaments as they actually are, is called 'right knowledge' by the wise."
This knowledge is fivefold as divided into mati, śruta, avadhi, manas-paryáya, and kevala; as it has been said, "Mati, śruta, avadhi, manas-paryáya, and kevala, these are knowledge." The meaning of this is as follows:—
1. Mati is that by which one cognises an object through the operation of the senses and the mind, all obstructions of knowledge being abolished.
2. Śruta is the clear knowledge produced by mati, all the obstructions of knowledge being abolished.
3. Avadhi is the knowledge of special objects caused by the abolition of hindrances, which is effected by "right intuition," &c.[56]
4. Manas-paryáya is the clear definite knowledge of another's thoughts, produced by the abolition of all the obstructions of knowledge caused by the veil of envy.
5. Kevala is that pure unalloyed knowledge for the sake of which ascetics practise various kinds of penance.
The first of these (mati) is not self-cognised, the other four are. Thus it has been said—
"True knowledge is a proof which nothing can overthrow, and which manifests itself as well as its object; it is both supersensuous and itself an object of cognition, as the object is determined in two ways."
But the full account of the further minute divisions must be got from the authoritative treatise above-mentioned.
(c.) "Right conduct" is the abstaining from all actions tending to evil courses by one who possesses faith and knowledge, and who is diligent in cutting off the series of actions and their effects which constitutes mundane existence. This has been explained at length by the Arhat—
1. "Right conduct is described as the entire relinquishment of blamable impulses; this has been subjected to a fivefold division, as the 'five vows,' ahiṃsá, súnṛita, asteya, brahmacharyá, and aparigraha.[57]
2. "The 'vow' of ahiṃsá is the avoidance of injuring life by any act of thoughtlessness in any movable or immovable thing.
3. "A kind, salutary, and truthful speech is called the 'vow' of súnṛita. That truthful speech is not truthful, which is unkind to others and prejudicial.
4. "The not taking what is not given is declared to be the 'vow' of asteya; the external life is a man's property, and, when it is killed, it is killed by some one who seizes it.
5. "The 'vow' of brahmacharyá (chastity) is eighteen-fold, viz., the abandonment of all desires,[58] heavenly or earthly, in thought, word, and deed, and whether by one's own action or by one's consent, or by one's causing another to act.
6. "The 'vow' of aparigraha is the renouncing of all delusive interest in everything that exists not; since bewilderment of thought may arise from a delusive interest even in the unreal.
7. "When carried out by the five states of mind in a fivefold order, these great 'vows' of the world produce the eternal abode."
The full account of the five states of mind (bhávaná) has been given in the following passage [of which we only quote one śloka]—
"Let him carry out the 'vow' of súnṛita uninterruptedly by the abstinence from laughter, greed, fear, and anger, and by the deliberate avoidance of speech,"[59]—and so forth.
These three, right intuition, right knowledge, and right conduct, when united, produce liberation, but not severally; just as, in the case of an elixir, it is the knowledge of what it is, faith in its virtues, and the actual application of the medicine,[60] united, which produce the elixir's effect, but not severally.
Here we may say concisely that the tattvas or predicaments are two, jíva and ajíva; the soul, jíva, is pure intelligence; the non-soul, ajíva, is pure non-intelligence. Padmanandin has thus said—
"The two highest predicaments are 'soul' and 'non-soul;' 'discrimination' is the power of discriminating these two, in one who pursues what is to be pursued, and rejects what is to be rejected. The affection, &c., of the agent are to be rejected; these are objects for the non-discriminating; the supreme light [of knowledge] is alone to be pursued, which is defined as upayoga."
Upayoga [or "the true employment of the soul's activities"] takes place when the vision of true knowledge recognises the manifestation of the soul's innate nature; but as long as the soul, by the bond of pradeśa and the mutual interpenetration of form which it produces [between the soul and the body], considers itself as identified with its actions [and the body which they produce], knowledge should rather be defined as "the cause of its recognising that it is other than these."[61]
Intelligence (chaitanya) is common to all souls, and is the real nature of the soul viewed as pariṇata [i.e., as it is in itself]; but by the influence of upaśamakshaya and kshayopaśama it appears in the "mixed" form as possessing both,[62] or again, by the influence of actions as they arise, it assumes the appearance of foulness, &c.[63] As has been said by Váchakáchárya [in a sútra]—
"The aupaśamika, the Ksháyika, and the 'mixed' states are the nature of the soul, and also the audayika and the Páriṇámika."
1. The aupaśamika state of the soul arises when all the effects of past actions have ceased, and no new actions arise [to affect the future], as when water becomes temporarily pure through the defiling mud sinking to the bottom by the influence of the clearing nut-plant,[64] &c.
2. The Ksháyika state arises when there is the absolute abolition of actions and their effects, as in final liberation.
3. The "mixed" (miśra) state combines both these, as when water is partly pure.
4. The audayika state is when actions arise [exerting an inherent influence on the future]. The Páriṇámika state is the soul's innate condition, as pure intelligence, &c., and disregarding its apparent states, as (1), (2), (3), (4).[65] This nature, in one of the above-described varieties, is the character of every soul whether happy or unhappy. This is the meaning of the sútra quoted above.
This has been explained in the Svarúpa-sambodhana—
"Not different from knowledge, and yet not identical with it—in some way both different and the same—knowledge is its first and last; such is the soul described to be."
If you say that, "As difference and identity are mutually exclusive, we must have one or the other in the case of the soul, and its being equally both is absurd," we reply, that there is no evidence to support you when you characterise it as absurd. Only a valid non-perception[66] can thus preclude a suggestion as absurd; but this is not found in the present case, since (in the opinion of us, the advocates of the Syád-váda) it is perfectly notorious that all things present a mingled nature of many contradictory attributes.