the Maharajah and the Ameers of Sindh shall be maintained as heretofore.
16th. Shah Soojah engages, after the attainment of his object, to pay without fail to the Maharajah the sum of two lakhs of rupees of the Nanukshahee or Kuldar currency, calculating from the date on which the Sikh troops may be despatched for the purpose of reinstating his Majesty in Caubul, in consideration of the Maharajah stationing a force of not less than 5000 men—cavalry and infantry—of the Mohamedan persuasion, within the limits of the Peshawur territory for the support of the Shah, and to be sent to the aid of his Majesty whenever the British Government, in concert and counsel with the Maharajah, shall deem the aid necessary; and when any matter of great importance may arise to the westward, such measures will be adopted with regard to it as may seem expedient and proper at the time to the British and Sikh Governments. In the event of the Maharajah requiring the aid of the Shah’s troops, a deduction shall be made from the subsidy proportioned to the period for which such aid may be afforded; and the British Government holds itself responsible for the punctual payment of the above sum annually to the Maharajah, so long as the provisions of this treaty are duly observed.
17th. When Shah Soojah-ool-Moolk shall have succeeded in establishing his authority in Afghanistan, he shall not attack or molest his nephew, the ruler of Herat, in the possession of his territories, now subject to his government.
18th. Shah Soojah-ool-Moolk binds himself, his heirs, and successors, to refrain from entering into negotiations with any foreign state, without the knowledge and consent of the British and Sikh Governments, and to oppose any power having the design to invade the British and Sikh territories by force of arms, to the utmost of his ability.
The three powers parties to this treaty—namely, the British Government, Maharajah Runjeet Singh, and Shah Soojah-ool-Moolk—cordially agree to the foregoing articles. There shall be no deviation from them, and in that case the present treaty shall be considered as binding for ever; and this treaty shall come into operation from and after the date on which the seals and signatures of the three contracting parties shall have been affixed thereto. Done at Lahore, this 26th day of June, in the year of our Lord 1838, corresponding with the 15th of the month of Assar, 1895. Area of Bekramajeet.
The treaty was despatched to Simlah for the signature of the Governor-General, which Runjeet Singh expressed some anxiety to obtain with the least possible delay. But Lord Auckland at once decided that he could with no propriety attach his name to the treaty until it had been sanctioned and signed by Shah Soojah. Anxious as he was to conclude the negotiation, Runjeet Singh could not demur to this decision. His patience, however, was not to be severely taxed. Macnaghten was directed to proceed with all possible expedition to obtain the consent of the Shah; and so, on the 13th of July, the Maharajah gave the English gentlemen their audience of leave; and, amidst the most profuse expressions of friendship and attachment, they took their departure from Runjeet’s Court.
They turned their faces towards Loodhianah. A pensioner on the bounty of the British Government, Shah Soojah, ever since his last disastrous attempt to regain his empire, had dwelt there in the midst of his family as one not yet reconciled to a life of peaceful obscurity, but somewhat sobered down by the repeated failures which had beset his unfortunate career. It is probable that no political vicissitudes in Afghanistan, however favourable to the restoration of the monarchy, would have tempted him to head another expedition for the recovery of Caubul and Candahar. But when reports reached him of the designs of the British Government, and the probability that he would be supplied with British money and British skill for the support and conduct of the army which he was to lead against the Barukzye Sirdars, he saw more clearly his way to his old place in the Balla Hissar of Caubul; and long dormant hopes and expectations began to revive within him. But he could not wholly suppress his suspicions of the sincerity both of the British and the Sikhs; and his delight was straitened by the thought that he would, in effect, be little more than a passive instrument in the hands of his powerful and ambitious allies.
On the evening of the 15th of July, accompanied by Captain Wade and Lieutenant Mackeson, Mr. Macnaghten waited on Shah Soojah at Loodhianah. Seated on a musnud slightly elevated above the level of the room, the Shah received the British gentlemen with becoming cordiality, and desired them to seat themselves on a carpet beside him. Macnaghten commenced the conference. He spoke of the friendly feeling that had always existed between the British Government and the Suddozye Princes, since Mr. Elphinstone’s mission to Afghanistan. He said that, although unable actively to co-operate with the Shah in his first attempts to regain his kingdom, the British Government had always desired the success of his undertakings. He explained the circumstances under which a mission had been sent to the Court of Dost Mahomed. And then, with as little truth as had marked his previous communications to Runjeet, commented upon the unfriendly manner in which the Mission had been received, and the conduct of the Ameer in “rejecting our good offices;” conduct which had rendered it necessary to counteract his hostile designs by establishing a friendly power in the territories of Afghanistan.
To all of this the Shah listened attentively, and then said that he had always foretold the result of the mission to the Court of Dost Mahomed—(which was a piece of good luck the Ameer was not able to appreciate)—that he who had not been true to his own master was little likely to be true to a foreign power; but that now he would see the result of his folly, and be baffled in his attempt to betray his country into the hands of the Persian invaders.
Upon this Macnaghten at once announced the intention of the British Government to restore Shah Soojah to his hereditary dominions. It would have been more agreeable, he said, to his government to act in such a matter without consulting any other state; but that the Sikhs were now in actual possession of so many of the provinces of the old Douranee Empire, and their interests so intimately associated with those of the British in that part of the country, that it was impossible to omit them from the compact—that, consequently, the Governor-General had instructed him to wait on Runjeet Singh, and that the result had been the formation of a treaty which was now to be submitted for his Majesty’s approval, together with a letter from Lord Auckland. The letter was then read; and Macnaghten reverting first to the old treaty between Shah Soojah and Runjeet Singh, said that it was the intention of the British Government to become a party to its stipulations under certain alterations and additions. With the utmost unconcern the Shah said that a paper of some kind had been exchanged with Runjeet Singh, but that it was merely to the effect that if he regained his dominions there should be an interchange of friendly letters, presents, and missions between the two Courts.
Whether Macnaghten smiled at this version of the old alliance is not on record. But he began now to read and explain the articles of the amended treaty. The Shah’s comments were frequent and emphatic. Sneering at the minuteness with which the possessions of Runjeet Singh were defined in the first article, he declared that Peshawur was only a burden to the Sikh government, and that Runjeet would willingly hand it over to any one but Dost Mahomed. Indeed, he said, that the Maharajah’s vakeel had often pledged his word to him that, in the event of his recovering his throne, Peshawur should be reannexed to his dominions. But when Captain Wade and Moollah Shikore[230] recalled, to his Majesty’s recollection that Peshawur had been expressly named in the old treaty among the possessions of Runjeet Singh, the Shah acknowledged that it was so, and yielded the point.
Other articles were then commented on by the Shah and his agent; but that which seemed most to stagger them was the stipulation for the annual payment by Caubul of two lakhs to the state of Lahore. Little advantage, observed the Shah, could the British Government expect to derive from his restoration, if they placed him in a position inferior to that held by the present ruler of Caubul, who paid no tribute to the Sikhs. “He had long,” he said, “indulged a hope that the day would come when the British Government, whose honoured guest he had been for more than twenty years, would restore him to the throne and possessions of his ancestors—that the British Government must be aware that, after such a period of dependence on them, in whatever manner they chose to send him forth, his fair name was identified with their own—that in this world a good name alone deserved to be prized—that half a loaf with a good name were better than abundance without it. He then alluded to the small revenues of Afghanistan—said that Caubul and Candahar yielded nothing—that when Shikarpoor paid its revenues regularly, the amount realised was only three lakhs—that