Sir John William Kaye

History of the War in Afghanistan (Vol. 1-3)


Скачать книгу

his government, and keep it, he would require to maintain 15,000 troops; and how were they to be paid?—that it would be less irksome if the money were only required to be paid whenever he had occasion to make use of the services of Runjeet Singh’s troops.”[231] To all this Macnaghten replied, that the payment was not by any means, to be regarded in the light of tribute from a weaker to a more powerful state, but simply as remuneration for services performed. Adroitly alluding to the subsidy recently paid by the British Government to the Persian state, the English Envoy said that a powerful government often subsidised, for its own uses, a weaker one; and that if Runjeet did not furnish the troops, the Shah would be exempted from paying the money; but that as the former was bound to hold them always in readiness for service, it would not be reasonable to pay them only when they were called into the field. Indeed, he urged, Runjeet Singh had with difficulty been persuaded to consent to the terms of this very article, which imposed upon him no light conditions, and had, moreover, been substituted as a compensation to the Maharajah for withdrawing the demands he had made for actual territorial concessions both at Shikarpoor and Jellalabad.

      There was little to be said in reply to this. The Shah yielded a reluctant assent. The remaining articles of the treaty were read, and called forth but slight comment. Macnaghten then invited the Shah to state unreservedly his opinions on the whole question. Thus appealed to, the exiled King spoke out cordially and unrestrainedly, but with a full sense of what was due to himself. “He spoke of his long connexion with the British Government, of his fortune being entirely in their hands—said that he had entertained the hope, in his long exile, that it would sooner or later stretch out its arm to restore him to all the possessions and powers of his ancestors; but that if this hope could not at once be fulfilled, he must content himself with what now remained of the disjointed kingdom of Afghanistan; that in the event of the straitened revenue of Candahar and Caubul being further reduced by the payment of two lakhs of rupees annually to the Sikhs, he must look to support from the British Government to meet and oppose any increased danger from the approach of more powerful enemies from the westward. On this point full assurance was given him. He then observed that there were one or two other points in which he wished to have assurance given him, and that, in other respects, he was at the disposal of the British Government:—1stly. That no interference should be exercised with his authority over those of his tribe and household; 2ndly. That he should be allowed to raise forces of his own to go with some show of power, and not as though he were a mere puppet in the hands of the British Government to work out their views. He then dwelt on the importance of this in the eyes of his people who would come to join his standard; said that if they found he was no longer the source of honour and reward, they would desert him and return to their homes, as they would have no object in connecting themselves with the schemes of foreigners—that he should therefore be allowed to commence recruiting men, as many were waiting to enter his service—that when his adherents flocked to his standard, he should be able to give them hopes of reward for their services.”[232]

      On all these points the fullest assurances were given to the Shah. Then Macnaghten began to set forth how it was the desire of the British Government that one of their own functionaries should be stationed at the Shah’s Court;[233] and that British officers should be furnished to discipline the Shah’s levies, to command them during the expedition, and to remain with him after his restoration. To all of this the Shah readily assented. Declaring himself confident of success, he then expressed an eager hope that no delay would be permitted, but that the expedition would set out as soon as ever the troops could be raised for the purpose. When the beginning of the ensuing cold weather was named as the time for commencing operations, the Shah expressed surprise and regret that the movement should be so long delayed; and urged the expediency of moving whilst Herat was still holding out. His appearance in the neighbourhood of Candahar, he said, would doubtless compel Mahomed Shah to withdraw his investing army, and secure the frontier against all future attacks.[234]

      Then Macnaghten asked the King whether it were his desire to advance by the Khybur Pass, or the route of Sindh. To this Shah Soojah replied that the Khyburees were his slaves—that they were willing to sacrifice themselves at his bidding—that he frequently received imploring letters from the Momunds, the Eusofzyes, and other tribes in the neighbourhood of Peshawur, but that there were so many solid advantages in the combined movement by Candahar and Peshawur, which would completely paralyse the movements of Dost Mahomed, that he gave it the preference. His own force, he said, should advance by Candahar, whilst his eldest son, Prince Timour, might accompany the Sikh army through the Khybur Pass.[235]

      Little more now remained to be said. But before taking his leave of the Shah, Macnaghten invited him to state in writing the points on which he required the assurances of the British Government, and expressed a hope that, as the Mission had received instructions to return immediately to Simlah, his Majesty’s wishes might be laid before him with the least possible delay. Desiring the British Envoy to call upon him again on the following evening, after leisure had been allowed him to study well the contents of the proposed treaty, the Shah then bade him adieu; and the English officers took their departure. It did not appear to those present, on this occasion, when the sovereignty of Afghanistan was offered to the long-exiled monarch, and now, for the first time since his dethronement, there dawned upon him something like a certainty of recovering his lost dominions, that he received the announcements of the English Mission with feelings of very earnest exultation and delight. There were evidently some misgivings in the mind of the Shah, who mistrusted both Runjeet Singh and the British Government. Everything seemed to have been already arranged between the two parties, whilst he himself, it appeared, was designed to be a passive instrument for the furtherance of their ends—a puppet in their hands, to give grace to the show and character to the expedition.

      An hour before the time appointed for the second meeting between Shah Soojah and the British Emissary, Moollah Shikore waited upon the latter with a paper, setting forth the points upon which the Shah especially desired to have the assurances of the British Government. They ran to the following effect:

      Firstly. That as regards the descendants of the King of the Douranees (Ahmed Shah), and the sons and relations of myself, whoever they may be, the right of providing for them or not, and the direction of all that concerns them, belong to me alone; in this matter neither the British Government nor other shall exercise any interference.[236]

      Secondly. After I have been re-instated in Caubul and Candahar, if, in consequence of the smallness of my possessions, I should desire to send an army against Balkh, Seistan, Beloochistan, and the neighbourhood and dependencies of Caubul and Candahar, and take possession of them, no hindrance shall be offered.[237]

      Thirdly. When Caubul and Candahar become mine, the dependencies of those places, as they existed in the time of the monarchy, ought to belong to me.[238]

      Fourthly. When I have been re-instated at Caubul, and the officers of the British Government prepare to return, should I desire to retain one of them as an envoy, and some others for the purpose of forming and disciplining my army, they will not be refused.[239]

      Fifthly. The British officers shall exercise no authority over the people of Afghanistan, whether soldiers or subjects, without my approbation and concurrence.[240]

      Sixthly. With respect to giving two lakhs of rupees, and something besides from Shikarpoor, it appears to me very hard and difficult; firstly, because my country will not afford means sufficient for the expenses of my government and the maintenance of my troops; and secondly, because the measure will be considered by the world as payment of tribute. It rests, however, with the British Government, and if it is of opinion that the country has the means, and that the measure is a proper one, I do not object. The conduct of my affairs is in the hands of the British Government.[241]

      Seventhly. After the decay of the monarchy, in the same manner as my servants rebelling usurped the country, so did the Sindhians place officers in possession of Shikarpoor; now that I shall regain possession of my kingdom, the Sindhians must release Shikarpoor. It is a royal possession, and must belong to me.[242]

      Eighthly. With respect to slave-girls who ran away from their masters, although to deliver them up may be against the regulations, yet it is a matter of necessity, for respectable people (females) cannot dispense with servants,